REMARKS

On a Book entituled,

Prince Arthur, an Heroick Poem.

With some General

Critical Observations,

And several New

Remarks upon Virgil.

By Mr. *DENNIS.*

Abrotonum agro
Non audet, nisi qui didicit, dare: quod Medicorum est,
Promittunt Medici.——
Scribimus indocti doctiq; poemata passim.

Horace *ad* Augustum.

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To the Right Honourable Charles, *Earl of* Dorſet *and* Middleſex, *Lord Lieutenant of* Suſſex, *Lord Chamberlain of the* Houſhold, *Knight of the moſt Noble Order of the* Garter, *one of his* Majeſties *moſt Honourable* Privy Council, *and one of the* Lords Juſtices *for the Adminiſtration of the* GOVERNMENT.

MY LORD.

THe Poem upon which I have made the following Remarks has met with very different ſucceſs in the World. Some have admir'd it as a Maſter-piece of Art and Nature. Others have exploded it with extream Contempt. And a third ſort, amongſt whom are ſome extraordinary Men, have been willing to encourage ſomething that is Generous in the Deſign, and

ſomething that is Happy at leaſt in ſome parts of the Execution. I need not acquaint Your *Lordſhip* that for my own part, I believe *Prince Arthur* to be neither Admirable nor Contemptible. For if I had the one or the other Opinion, I ſhould certainly never have Written againſt him. I have given my Reaſons in the following Treatiſe why I cannot admire him, which I hope will have the Aprobation of Your *Lordſhip*'s Judgment.

It would be an intolerable preſumption in me, if I ſhould endeavour to give Your *Lordſhip* any long diverſion from that ſublime Employment, which the King to ſhow the Judgment of his firſt Choice, has a ſecond time conferr'd on You. While *England* with Joy beholds You Exalted to Rule the State, which from the firſt moment of Your Riſing in it, You have always Enlightened,

lightened, Adorn'd and Animated.

Your *Lordſhip* with a certain Preſage of Soul has all along taken care by improving and encouraging Arts to ſoften and humanize that ſtubborn People, whom You were one day deſign'd to Govern. Yet You have always, with a Juſt tho' an Abſolute Sway, Rul'd the moſt Capricious part of that People, and by much the moſt difficult part to be Govern'd. I ſpeak, MY LORD of the Men of Wit, a Turbulent and a Tumultuous Nation, exceeding ſufficient in their own conceits, impatient of reproof, and greedy of glory. And he who has the Skill to command theſe, with a great deal of eaſe can Govern the reſt. Your *Lordſhip* has always diſtributed Juſtice to them with undiſputed Authority, but always with an inclination to Mercy, when Mer-

cy was not Cruelty: and by Your admirable goodneſs of Nature join'd with Your rare Qualities, have gain'd to that degree upon them that the vaineſt of Men have been publickly ſeen to ſubject their very Senſe to You; and have been found to make it their vanity, (for vanity will be ſure to gain in one place what it has loſt in another) to ſubmit their own to Your *Lordſhip's* Judgment. To imitate them in this I preſume to lay the following *Remarks* at Your Feet; and to aſſure Your *Lordſhip* that I am with all reſpect imaginable,

MY LORD.

Your Lordſhips moſt Humble, moſt Faithful, and moſt Obedient Servant.

JOHN DENNIS.

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CONTENTS.

Part I.

Chap. I. *Of an Epick Poem in general.* p. 1.
Chap. II. *Of the Action of an Epick Poem; which with the Moral, makes the Fable.* p. 4.
Chap. III. *That Mr.* Blackmore *ought not to have copied* Virgil *in his Fable, nor in his Action.* p. 18.
Chap. IV. *Of the Unity of the Action.* p. 17.
Chap. V. *Of an Episode in Prince* Arthur *that corrupts the Unity of the Action.* p. 20.
Chap. VI. *Of another Episode that corrupts the Unity of the Action.* p. 28.
Chap. VII. *Of the Integrity of the Action.* p. 32.
Chap. VIII. *Of the Moral.* p. 34.

Part II.

Chap. I. *Of a good and a bad Taste.* p. 39.
Chap. II. *That the Characters ought to have Manners.* p. 44.
Chap. III. *Of a Scene in the* Hypolitus *of* Euripides. p. 58.
Chap. IV. *Of the Manners in Prince* Arthur. p. 69.
Chap. V. *That the Incidents in Prince* Arthur *are not of a delightful Nature.* p. 121.

Chap.

Chap. VI. *Of the Number, Variety, and Diſpoſition of the Incidents.* p. 145.
Chap. VII. *That the Incidents in Prince Arthur are not ſurprizing.* p. 177.
Chap. VIII. *That the Epiſodes are not pathetick.* p. 186.
Annotations. p. 206.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Author's Abſence from the Town has occaſion'd the following Errors, which the Reader is deſir'd to mend with his Pen.

ERRATA.

PAge 2. for *Allegories*, read *Allegory*. p. 53. r. Achilles *is rage*. p. 64. f. *whilſt* r. *while*, and ſo thro the whole Scene. Ibid. f. *concern'd*, r. conceiv'd. p. 74. r. *that is a Monarchs*. p. 76. f. *Dubiti de mente*, r. *Dubiti Di nienente*. p. 80. f. *Torrent*, r. *Terrent*. p. 86. f. *peti*, r. *pete*. ib. f. *Palas*, r. *Palus*. ib. f. *refrſa*, r. *refuſo*. p. 92. f. *bilis*, r. *belli*. ib. r. *he had imitated*. p. 105. f. *manner*, r. *manners*. p. 114. f. *torrent*, r. *terrent*. p. 115. r. *before the Deſcent of one of the Diræ*. p. 119. r. *that he has been ſo far from preſerving*. ib. r. *and thro' his Poem*. ib. f. *them*, r. *him*. p. 145. f. *every large Incident*, r. *every artful Incident*. p. 146. f. *ſegrais*, r. *ſegrais*. ib. in the French, r. *qui ont cru marcher ſur ſes pas*. p. 146. f. *ſemble*, r. *ſemblent*. p. 151. r. *inſidat*. ib. f. *Criticks*, r. *Critick*. p. 153. r. *venulus*, p. 155. f. *tibi viri*, r. *tibi vis*. p. 155. f. *adverſas*, r. *adverſos*. ib. f. *tumidam*, r. *tumidum*. ib. f. *procubuiſti*, r. *procubuiſſe*. ib. f. *then a daring Enterpize then a nocturnal Combat*, r. *then a daring nocturnal Enterprize then a Combat*. p. 159. f. *in Name*, r. *his Name*. p. 160. f. *oculos*, r. *ventos*. ib. f. *Baletum*, r. *Balatum*. p. 164. f. *tells that*, r. *tells him that*. p. 171. f. *meritis vacat*, r. *meritis : vacat*. p. 173. f. μεδὲ λύπη, r. μετὰ λύπης. p. 174. f. *has Barbarity*, r. *has a Barbarity*. p. 183. f. *etiam*, r. *& jam*. ib. f. *he cited*, r. *we cited*. p. 184. f. *Tolle fuge*, r. *Tolle fuga*. ib. f. *at O*, r. *ut O*. p. 182. f. προσδοκήσειαν, r. προσδοκήσεις.

THE PREFACE.

I *Think my ſelf obliged to give the Reader an account of the Method which I propounded to uſe in the following Remarks. In the firſt Part I intended to ſhew that Mr.* Blackmore's *Action has neither unity, nor integrity, nor morality, nor univerſality, and conſequently that he can have no* Fable *and no* Heroick Poem. *In the ſecond Part I deſign'd to come to the Narration; and to ſhew that it is neither probable, delightful, nor wonderful. I propounded to ſhow that there are three things that make a Narration delightful; The Perſons introduc'd, the Things related, and the Manner*

of relating them. I reſolv'd to conſider the firſt of theſe, and to prove that the Poetical Perſons ought to have manners, and that thoſe manners ought to have the following qualifications: That they ought to be good, convenient, reſembling, and equal, and that beſides there ought to be an unity of Character in the principal perſon; and that that unity of Character like an univerſal Soul was to run thro' the whole Poem. Next, I determin'd to make it appear that Mr. Blackmore's *Characters have none of the forementiond qualifications. Then, I pretended to convince the Reader that the things contain'd in* Mr. Blackmore's *Narration are neither in their own natures delightful, nor numerous enough, nor various enough, nor rightly diſpoſed, nor ſurprizing, nor pathetick. And thus far I have already gone.* My

My intention was next to enquire into the third particular, that makes a Narration delightful. And that is the manner of relating the things contain'd in it, which comprehends the Thoughts, the Diſcourſe, the Expreſſions; and here I deſign'd to have inſerted a Diſcourſe concerning Poetical genius, of which no one that I know of has hitherto treated. I deſign'd to ſhow that this extraordinary thing in Poetry which has been hitherto taken for ſomething Supernatural and Divine, is nothing but a very common Paſſion, or a complication of common Paſſions. That felicity in writing has the ſame effect upon us that happineſs in common Life has: That in Life when any thing lucky arrives to us, upon the firſt ſurprize we have a tranſport of Joy, which is immediately follow'd by an exaltation of mind: Ut res

noſtræ ſint ita nos magni atque humiles ſumus; *and that both theſe, if the thing that happens be beyond expectation fortunate, are accompanied with aſtoniſhment: we are amazed at our own happineſs: That the very ſame thing befalls us upon the conception of an extraordinary hint. The Soul is tranſported upon it, by the conſciouſneſs of its own excellence, and it is exalted, there being nothing ſo proper to work on its vanity; becauſe it looks upon ſuch a hint as a thing peculiar to it ſelf, whereas what happens in Life to one Man, might as well have happen'd to another; and laſtly, if the hint be very extraordinary, the Soul is amazed by the unexpected view of its own ſurpaſſing power. Now it is very certain that a Man in tranſport, and one that is lifted up with pride and aſtoniſh'd, expreſſes him-*

ſelf

ſelf quite with another air, than one who is calm and ſerene. Joy in exceſs as well as rage is furious. And the pride of Soul is ſeen in the expreſſion as well as in the mien and actions, and is the cauſe of that Elevation, which Longinus *ſo much extolls, and which, he ſays,* is the image of the greatneſs of the mind. *Now it is certain that greatneſs of mind is nothing but pride well regulated. Now as Joy cauſes Fury, and pride elevation, ſo aſtoniſhment gives vehemence to the expreſſion.*

This was the Doctrine which I deſign'd to deliver, of which I had the firſt hint from the following verſes,

Rapture and Fury carried me thus far
Tranſported and Amaz'd.

Which are in an admirable Poem Written by a very great Man, who

with all that wonderful fire which is ſo conſpicuous in him, has all the diſcernment and the fine penetration, which is neceſſary for the reflecting upon the moſt ſecret motions of his own mind, and upon thoſe of others.

After that I had done this, I deſign'd to lay down this definition of genius, that it was the expreſſion of a Furious Joy, or Pride, or Aſtoniſhment, or all of them cauſed by the conception of an extraordinary hint. Then I intended to ſhow, that a great many Men have extraordinary hints, without the foremention'd motions, becauſe they want a degree of Fire ſufficient to give their animal ſpirits a ſudden and ſwift agitation. And theſe are call'd Cold-writers. On the other ſide, if Men have a great deal of Fire and have not excellent Organs, they feel the foremention'd motions in thinking without extra-

extraordinary hints. And these we call Fustian-Writers. When I had done this I intended to show that Mr. Blackmore *had very seldom either the hints or the motions. In order to which I design'd to consider the several sorts of hints that might justly transport the Soul by a conscious view of its own excellency. And to divide them into hints of* Thoughts *and hints of* Images. *That the* Thought *which might justly cause these motions of Spirits were of three sorts, such as discover a greatness of Mind, or a reach of Soul, or an extent of Capacity. That* Images *were either of* Sounds *or of* Things, *that* Images *of* Things *were either* Mighty *or* Vast *ones. I design'd to give examples of all these from* Homer *and* Virgil, *and from* Milton *and* Tasso; *and to have compared them with several passages*

in Mr. Blackmore's *Poem. I de-ſign'd particularly to have treated of the clearneſs, and juſtneſs, and of the energy of* Images.

After this I reſolv'd to deſcend to conſider the expreſſion, and to ſhow that it ought to have the following qualifications. That it ought to be pure, clear, eaſie, ſtrong, noble, poetick, harmonious. I deſign'd particularly to have examin'd the difference between a Poetick and a Proſaick Diction, and to have ſaid as much as the little obſervation which I have made, would give me leave of our Engliſh numbers, and of our Rhymes and Cadences; and then to have come to Application, and to have ſhown that Mr. Blackmore *has been very faulty in all the fore-mention'd particulars.*

But having juſt gone thro' the one half of my Method it will be

con-

convenient, before I proceed, to ſee how the Reader reliſhes this. I deſire him to excuſe the Style; which is neither exact nor equal, the Book being written with too much diſpatch for that. I think it is but juſt that the Reader ſhould pardon this, if the matter will make any amends for it.

But that he may come with the leſs prejudice to the Reading the following Criticiſm, I deſire to prepare him, by Anſwering ſome Objections which have been made againſt Criticiſm.

Three Objections have been made againſt Criticiſm in General: The Firſt, That it is an invidious ill-natur'd thing. The Second, That it is a vain and ſucceſsleſs Attempt. And the Third, That it tends to the certain diminution of the happineſs of the Reader. Firſt it is Objected, That Criticiſm is a very ill-natur'd thing.

In

The Preface.

In the following Treatiſe I have had an occaſion to ſpeak concerning Goodneſs of Nature, and if the account which I have given of it there be reaſonable, I make no doubt but that the Reader will be convinc'd, that a man at the ſame time that he Criticizes may have a great deal of Goodneſs of Nature. At preſent I will only ſay this, That I know not what Good Nature may be in a Beaſt, but that in a Man I cannot think it to be contrary to Juſtice, that is to Reaſon; and therefore I cannot think there can be any ill-nature in Detecting the faults of an ill or indifferent, tho' a ſucceſsful Writer. For if it be juſt and reaſonable in every Man to contribute what he can to the publick happineſs, becauſe upon that depends his own, and if the advancing of Arts and Sciences conduces to the good of the

the State; and laſtly if Men of Merit are more capable of advancing Science than thoſe who want it; I cannot but think it the moſt reaſonble thing in the World to diſtinguiſh good Writers by diſcouraging bad. For it is impoſſible in this caſe to encourage a Coxcomb, but you muſt at the ſame time mortifie a man of Wit, tho he happens to find the ſame encouragement: Since the laſt Writing, by an impulſe of vanity rather than intereſt, quarels with fortune to make his Court to Fame, and ſeeks diſtinction rather than riches.

Nor is Criticiſm an ill-natur'd thing in relation even to the very Perſons upon whom the Critick makes his Reflections. It is true it may deprive them a little the ſooner of a ſhort profit and of a tranſitory reputation. But then it may have a

good

good effect upon them and oblige them before it be too late to decline that for which they are ſo very unfit, and to have recourſe to ſomething in which they may be more ſucceſsful, whereas if they are ſuffer'd ſtill to impoſe upon the People, Time, which is a ſlow but a certain Friend to truth, will at laſt undeceive them, and oblige them to abandon the unhappy Authors after they have exhauſted their Youth and their Vigour in fond endeavours to pleaſe them.

From what has been ſaid, I think it is plain, that a Critick cannot be juſtly accus'd of ill-nature, if it appears that he Writes with a Deſign to contribute that little which lies in his power to advance the Art upon which he makes his Reflections. And charity will oblige us to believe that, if his Objections are found

found to be Solid. But he who cavils at an Author is mov'd by envy and not by a publick Spirit; by envy the baſeſt of all the Paſſions, and to which none but the baſeſt of men are liable. Yet I believe a Critick oblig'd to theſe two things, tho' the Objections which he has to make are never ſo Solid. The firſt is, not to be ſevere upon faults where the beauties are more and greater. The ſecond, is not to treat a young Author with Rigour, if it appears that genius ſhines thro' his incorrectneſs. For the doing of either of theſe, by the diſcouraging even of good Artiſts, would tend to the deſtroying the Art. And tho' we are now ſpeaking of general Criticiſm, yet I think fit to give the Reader a hint that neither of theſe will reach Mr. Blackmore's *caſe.*

The ſecond Objection againſt Criticiſm

ticiſm is, that it is ſure to prove a vain and ſucceſsleſs Attempt. Men will not be writ out of what they like, nor can they endure that any Man ſhould alter their taſts but themſelves. We find (ſay the Objectors) that it is exceeding difficult to reform the manners, and Philoſophers have attempted it for ſome thouſands of years in vain. So difficult a thing it is to perſwade Men to leave their pleaſures. What hope can remain then for thoſe who endeavour to reform their taſts; ſince to do that would be to deprive them of the very greateſt of pleaſures? For it is upon his taſt that a Man chiefly builds the dear opinion which he has conceiv'd of himſelf, and therefore he cannot be reaſon'd out of that without an unſupportable mortification. And it is for this Reaſon that the Duke De la Rochefoucaut

foucaut *assures us, that* on renonce plus aisement a son interest qu'a son goust, *A Man will more easily resolve to give up his interest than to part with his tast.*

This is an Objection against Criticism in General. But a Gentleman of a great deal of Wit and Judgment has applied it to the following Treatise; But I desire leave to tell him with all the submission that is due to his extraordinary merit, that the validity of this Objection in relation to the following Remarks, depends upon a supposition which is more to the disadvantage of Mr. Blackmore *than all the reflections which can be made on his Poem. The supposition is this, That no Man will ever read* Mr. Blackmore *but who has already perus'd him. For tho' I should grant that a man is not to be argued into a dis-*

a diſlike of that, by the approbation of which he has for ſome time flatter'd himſelf into an Opinion of his own Judgment, yet there are, or at leaſt there may be Readers, who may know as ſoon of the following Criticiſms, as they may hear of Prince Arthur, *and who conſequently may take in the Antidote before or immediately after the Poem. I ſay there may be ſuch Readers as theſe, and a Man who Writes with a publick Spirit, certainly Writes for poſterity. But then on the other ſide, I cannot believe it ſo exceeding difficult to argue People out of their taſts. Between the years ſixty and ſeventy, the taſte of* England *was for Rhyming Heroick Fuſtian. Now the Rehearſal almoſt alone reform'd the taſte of the Age. So great an influence had the Ridiculum in that Play joyn'd with good Senſe, upon the*

the minds of the People, and conſequently upon the practice of thoſe who Writ. Now whatever has been done once that may certainly be done again. And nothing is more vain than to argue againſt experience. But this is certain; That ſome will hardly be perſuaded by any Arguments to come off from their taſts immediately; but Reaſon will lie brooding on their Minds till it has hatch'd Conviction, and then they will be ſeen gladly to part with their taſts, when they have ſtaid ſo long after they have been inform'd that they may eaſily perſuade themſelves that they owe their converſion only to their own ſufficiency.

But to come to the third Objection, Suppoſe, ſay they, the People were to be reaſon'd into a diſlike of the Things which they now approve; Yet to reform their taſts would be to do

them a disservice. For Happiness is the Universal aim, say they. 'Tis a Man's business and interest to make himself Happy: and Happiness and Pleasure are Terms Synonymous. Now in regard to the delights of the Mind, this is self Evident, that the more Delicate we grow the more we retrench our Pleasure. There are two whimsical sorts of People (say they) who fansie they doe a great deal of good in the World, and those are Stoicks and Criticks. The Stoick sets up a vain Tranquillity, a Fantastick Felicity which is not to be found in Nature. And the Critick makes it the business of his Life to instruct People, how they may be discontented by Art. The Sage of the Stoick is a Chimerical Person, who has extirpated all his passions, and rais'd himself by Precept and Practcie

to a perfect ſtate of Tranquility, from which Happy State he looks down with ſcorn upon the diſorders of Men below him. The Critick ſeems to be the real reverſe of this Philoſophical Fantom. He is of the number of thoſe grumbling People, who value themſelves upon their being diſſatisfied. He places his perfection in his diſcontent, and if you obſerve him at a Play or at a Recital, he induſtriouſly ſeeks out occaſions to vex himſelf, and looks with contempt upon all who are Happy about him.

For their Parts (they ſay) when they are at a Play or at a Recital, they are for Pleaſure, becauſe Pleaſure is Happineſs, and they are for a greater degree of Pleaſure rather than for a leſs, becauſe they find ſomething in their Natures that tells them, they ought to be as Happy as

they can; and they cannot for their lives (they ſay) conceive, but that he for example, who laughs at a Comedy muſt have by much a more ſenſible Pleaſure than he who makes his Objections there. And therefore any thing which makes them laugh there, ſhall be to them a beauty. That Man (they ſay) is a Fantaſtick Creature, who chooſes to be wretched that he may be thought Wiſe, when that very choice muſt make him paſs for a Coxcomb with all Men who think rightly.

This is the ſumm of what has been ſaid to enforce this ſecond General Objection, which has been made by ſome Gentlemen againſt Criticiſm. But here methinks are too many words to have ſubſtance in them. For Truth (like the Innocence of our firſt Parents) loves to appear naked, and Solid Senſe like perfect Beauty,

Beauty, is but hid by Ornament.

For I would ask theſe Gentlemen, If they could reſolve to poſſeſs a Woman only for the ſake of the Pleaſure, tho' they were very certain to pay for it by a ſevere Diſtemper? If they Anſwer that they could not, then it is plain that a laſting trouble can more than balance a momentary ſatisfaction. I would ask one of them yet further, Whether if it lay in his Power he would corrupt the Wife of his Friend, tho' ſhe appear'd the moſt delicious Creature of all her Sex to him? A Man of Honour would certainly Anſwer no. But why? For Pleaſure is Happineſs and Happineſs is the buſineſs and intereſt of Mankind. 'Tis certain. But he will not purchaſe a ſhort Pleaſure by a tedious Mortification. For Mortification is trouble. *Beſides vanity is the Original of*

every Delicate Pleaſure, and nothing could pleaſe him to a height, that would deſtroy the good opinion which he had conceiv'd of himſelf, as ſo perfidious an Action would not fail to do. Very good! But then me thinks the doing a fooliſh thing ſhould mortify a Man as much at leaſt as the doing an ill thing. Since the doing an ill thing helps only to degrade him from the rank of thoſe that are good, but the doing a fooliſh thing helps to degrade him even from the rank of Men. I know indeed that there is this conſiderable difference, that a Man always knows when he does an ill thing, and is ſeldom conſcious to his doing a fooliſh thing. But tho' he is ignorant of it at the time of his acting, yet others prompted by Charity or by Malice, may one day make him a Mortifying Remonſtrance. And there-

therefore a Man who would keep in good humour with himſelf ought to decline the doing a fooliſh thing, as much at leaſt as the doing an ill thing, and ought conſequently to avoid the paſſing a fooliſh Judgment, and the being tickled with what an indifferent Author Writes, the which to prevent is the main Deſign of Criticiſm.

Yet Criticiſm does not only prevent trouble, by reſtraining the Reader from paſſing a fooliſh Judgment, but it alſo makes him capable of being pleas'd to a height. For Delicacy augments the Pleaſure which it retrenches. A man indeed who is able to Judge is not pleas'd with ſo many things. But when he finds he has Reaſon to be pleas'd, his Pleaſure is infinitely greater than that of others. For the reflection that ſo few are capable of it ex-

ceedingly ſooths his vanity. Now as Criticiſm prepares a Reader to receive this Pleaſure, ſo by advancing the Art upon which the Critick makes his Reflections, it capacitates a Writer to give it.

Thus we have endeavour'd to Anſwer the Objections which are made againſt Criticiſm in General. But there are two particular Objections which are made againſt the following Treatiſe.

The Firſt is, That it is Written againſt a Book which has been very agreeable to a great many Readers.

The Second that it is intended to expoſe a Poem which was deſign'd for the ſervice of the Government. The firſt Objection has been already Anſwer'd in the Firſt Chapter of the Second Part of the Remarks, and thither I refer the Reader.

The

The Second Objection was urg'd with all the force, that it was capable of receiving. That the Government comprehended the Church and State, for both which I had in a peculiar manner declar'd; and therefore to endeavour to invalidate that which was deſign'd for the Service of both, would ſhow alteration of Mind or a want of Thought; and that as the laſt of theſe was a Scandalous Weakneſs, the firſt was both an Odious Crime and a Contemptible Indiſcretion.

But that my Tranſgreſſion in this affair, if there be any Tranſgreſſion, proceeds from no alteration of Principles, I think may be eaſily demonſtrated. For ſince it is plain that to the conſiderable detriment of my little affairs, I declar'd for the Government at a time when I had no Encouragement, nor any Proſpect

Proſpect of receiving the leaſt return; I think, I ſhould prove as well the moſt fooliſh as the moſt ungrateful of Men, if I could fall from my Engliſh Principles at a time when I have receiv'd repeated Encouragements from an Extraordinary Man, whoſe Favour is ſufficient to give Force and Fire to the moſt Spiritleſs, and Pride to the Leaſt pretending.

So that if I have been Guilty of any Offence in Writing the following Remarks, it can proceed from nothing but want of Thought, and ſuch an Offence muſt be allow'd to be at leaſt in ſome meaſure pardonable; it being Evident that no man would have any Weakneſs if he could help his Infirmity.

But let me aſſure all thoſe into whoſe hands this Book may happen to fall, that before ever I ſet Pen to Paper,

Paper, I endeavour'd to hearken to the voice within me with all the attention of which I was capable: And let my Friends bear Witneſs for me that I Conſulted them with all the ſincerity of a Man who is willing to be inform'd, and yet that neither they nor I were able to think of this affair ſo ſeriouſly, but that we were inclin'd to treat thoſe Men as ridiculous, who look'd upon the Writing againſt Prince Arthur *as the committing a Crime of State, and the incurring a premunire.*

Boileau *in his Epiſtles to the* French King, *laughs very freely at all the Dull Authors who had Written in that Monarch's praiſe, and if he who is a Slave could diſcover by the force of his Reaſon that he might make ſo free with his Maſter, I am confident that no man can take it amiſs, that an* Engliſhman *who*

who Writes to his Fellow Subjects ſhould take the old honeſt Engliſh Liberty of publickly reprehending what he diſapproves.

I never deſign'd to make an Enquiry into any of Mr. Blackmore's *Principles, which may regard either Church or State. A Man had need have a great deal of time upon his hands, who has leiſure enough to Examine a Poet's Politicks, or a Phyſician's Religion. My intention was only to conſider this Gentleman in his poetical capacity, and to make ſome Remarks upon the reaſonableneſs of his Deſign and upon the felicity of his execution. And therefore the College of Phyſicians, to whom he in a peculiar manner belongs, have juſter cauſe to be alarm'd at the following Treatiſe, than either the Church or the State, who are no further concern'd in him than*

than they are in any other Engliſh-man.

My little penetration could never diſcover what motive can prevail upon any of the Clergy of the Church of England *to eſpouſe a very faulty Poem, in the which they cannot be in the leaſt concern'd.*

For Firſt I have demonſtrated in the firſt part of the following Treatiſe as clearly as any thing in Humanity can be demonſtrated, that the action of Mr. Blackmore's *Poem is an empty Fiction, without any manner of inſtruction; and I cannot for my Soul comprehend how Legends in Rhyme ſhould become Sacred at the ſame time that Proſaick Legends are contemn'd and exploded.*

Secondly, Boileau *tells us with a great deal of Reaſon in the Third*

Canto

Canto *of his* Art of Poetry, *tho it is ſpoken in Rhyme,*

That the Terrible Myſteries of the Chriſtian Faith are not capable of delightful Ornaments. That the Goſpel offers nothing to us but Repentance on the one ſide, or Eternal Torments on the other, and that the Criminal mixture of Poetical Fictions gives a Fabulous Air, even to its moſt Sacred Truths.

De la Foy d'un Chreſtien les Myſteres Terribles;
D'ornemens egayez ne ſont point ſuſceptibles.
L'Evangile a l'Eſprit n'offre de touscôtez
Que Penetence a faire ou tourmens meritez.

Et

Et de vos fictions le melange coupable
Meme a ſes veritez donne l'air de la Fable.

Now if this be reaſonable in the Roman Church, I cannot but think that it muſt have as much force in a much purer Religion.

Thirdly. All Mr. Blackmore's *Celeſtial Machines, as they cannot be defended ſo much as by common receiv'd opinion, ſo they are directly contrary to the Doctrine of the Church of* England. *For the viſible deſcent of an Angel muſt be a Miracle. Now it is the Doctrine of the Church of* England, *if I am not miſtaken, that Miracles had ceas'd a long time before Prince Arthur came into the World. Now if the Doctrine of the Church of* England *be true, as we are oblig'd to believe, then*

then are allthe Celeſtial Machines in Prince Arthur *unſufferable, as wanting not only Humane but Divine probability. But if the Celeſtial Machines in that Poem are ſufferable, that is, if they have ſo much as Divine probability, as all the Machines in every Poem certainly ought to have, it follows of neceſſity that the Doctrine of the Church muſt be falſe. So that I leave it to any impartial Clergyman to conſider, if it can conſiſt with the credit or intereſt of our Religion ſo violently to eſpouſe a Book, whoſe errours he cannot poſſibly defend, but by contradicting the Doctrine which he is bound to* Teach.

But to come to the Second Part of the Objection. I cannot with all the application of Mind that I am able to uſe, Diſcover, that the State is concern'd in Prince Arthur *any more than the Church. If the State is con-*

concern'd in this Poem, it follows by Manifeſt conſequence that there muſt be a Parallel between the late Revolution and the Expedition of Arthur. Now if there is ſuch a Parallel it muſt neceſſarily reach to the Characters, and eſpecially the principal Characters. For to make two actions like the Cauſes of them muſt be reſembling, and the Cauſes af actions are the manners of the Agents, as has been more than once declar'd in the following Treatiſe. From what has been ſaid it follows that to conſtitute a Parallel between the Revolution and the Expedition of Arthur, *King* William *and Prince* Arthur *muſt have reſembling Characters. Now I would fain ask the Friends of Prince* Arthur *one Queſtion, Whether the reſemblance between Prince* Arthur *and the preſent King was deſign'd*

to be total or partial? If they Anſwer that the reſemblance was deſign'd but partial, then I would ask them in what Qualities theſe Princes conſent and in what they differ, and whether a partial reſemblance ſuffiſes to make the Parallel. For I cannot poſſibly apprehend how any actions can be very like, whoſe cauſes are not very like. But if thoſe Gentlemen reply that the Author intended a total reſemblance, between the preſent King and Prince Arthur, *then I muſt freely tell them, that whatever they may pretend they cannot be* Mr. Blackmore's *Friends, who either tax him of ſo prodigious a want of diſcernment, as even his honeſt enemies would bluſh to accuſe him of, or affirm that he intended to expoſe the King in a very diſſhonourable Character, which I am ſure he has a great deal more*

Honour

Honour and Juſtice, than to deſign. Prince Arthur when he is upon the Coaſts of Armorica, *ſeems very much concern'd for the Cauſe of Religion, and for the welfare of* Great Britain. *But after he has beaten King* Octa's *Navy, anp made a League with that* Saxon *Monarch at Land, he throws of the Mask, and appears concern'd neither for Religion nor for his Subjects, and gives them cauſe to believe, that his zeal and his care were only pretences, which now it was time to diſclaim ſince in all appearance he had compaſs'd his Sole Deſign. Now can any of the Kings moſt inveterate Enemies urge any thing againſt him that is more Maliciouſly falſe? Is not this the very thing which their miſerable Libels have ſo often in vain repeated? That Religion and the State were*

only pretences and that he valued himſelf alone? Have they not ſtupidly objected this to a Heroe, who has been ſeen by aſſembled Nations to value himſelf and human greatneſs ſo little, that if I could be preſumptuous enough to find fault with a Prince who ſhall always be Sacred to me, it ſhould certainly be upon this account becauſe he is the only Perſon of all the Confederates, who has not a due regard for that important Life, upon which the ſafety of the Chriſtian World depends. Yet of all the things that his Enemies have baſely objected to him, not one of them has had courage enough to accuſe him of fear. But Mr. Black-more *has made his Prince* Arthur *afraid upon every occaſion as has been manifeſtly prov'd againſt him in the following Treatiſe. And therefore theſe Gentlemen ought to*

con-

conſider that by affirming Prince Arthur *was deſigned to reſemble the King, they affirm that Mr.* Black-more *has drawn a more unjuſt and a more unreaſonable Character of him than his moſt Malicious and moſt Profligate Enemies have been known to invent: I ſay, to invent. For his Enemies in the midſt of their loudeſt Clamours have inwardly the opinion of him which we have. For why the late damnable Deſign, if they had not conceiv'd an Opinion of him that is infinitely greater than that which Prince* Arthur *could give them? Why ſhould they diveſt themſelves of humanity, by reſolving even while they were under his Protection, to take away his Sacred Life deliberately, if they did not regard him as the unſurmountable Obſtacle to their Deſigns, the Guardian of Law, the Defender*

of

of Faith, and the Invincible Champion of Liberty? Have not his Enemies declar'd by this very Conſpiracy that they think him above a thouſand Prince Arthurs? *And at a time when his mortal Enemies make even the exceſs of their Malice his Panegyrick, ſhall the Friends of Mr.* Blackmore *by the fondneſs of a miſtaken zeal derogate from the greatneſs of his Glory? Mr.* Blackmore *has diſcernment enough to perceive that the King incomparably tranſcends* Prince Arthur: *And has too much Judgment to attempt the drawing a Picture, which whoever preſumes to Deſign ſhould tremble, nnleſs he can place it in ſo true, ſo glorious a light, that the conſenting World may admire it.*

There

THere is lately Publiſh'd the Reports of Sir *Tho. Raymond* Knt. late one of the Judges of the Kings Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer, of Divers Special Caſes in all the ſaid Courts, many of them taken whilſt he was a Judge : And all Printed from the Original, written with his own hand, and ſold by *Samuel Heyrick*, at Grays-Inn-gate in Holborn, and *Dorothy Hargrave*, in Fleetſtreet.

Books Printed for *R. Sare* at Grays-Inn-Gate in *Holborn.*

THe Genuine Epiſtles of the *Apoſtolical Fathers*, Tranſlated by Dr. *Wake.*

A Practical Diſcourſe concerning Swearing, by Dr. *Wake.*

Eraſmus Colloquies.

Quevedo's Viſions both by Sir *Roger L'Eſtrange.*

Epictetus's Morals, with *Simplicius*'s Comment, by Mr. *Stanhop.*

The *Turkiſh Spy*, in Eight Volumes.

The

CATALOGUE.

The Art of *Writing* and *Judging* of *Hiſtory*, by Father *Le Moyne.*

Moral Maxims by the Duke of *Rochefoucaut.*

An *Eſſay* on *Reaſon* by Sr. *G. Mackenzie.*

RE-

REMARKS
UPON
Prince Arthur.

CHAP. I.

Of an Epick Poem in general.

REſolving to Publiſh ſome Remarks which I have made on Prince *Arthur*, I think it convenient to ſay ſomething beforehand of an Epick Poem in general, and to begin with a Definition of it.

An Epick Poem is a Diſcourſe invented with Art, to form the Manners by Inſtructions diſguis'd under the Allegory of Action, which is important, and which is related in Verſe in a delightfull, probable and wonderfull manner.

This Definition is *Boſſu*'s. It will not be amiſs to explain it.

An Epick Poem is a Diſcourſe invented with Art to form the Manners by Inſtructions diſguis'd under the Allegories of an Action. That is, an Epick Poem is a Fable, which conſiſts of two Parts First, of Truth, which is its foundation, and upon which it is built: Secondly, of Fiction, which allegorically diſguiſes that Truth, and gives it the Form of a Fable. The Truth is the Moral, and the Fiction the Action which is built upon it. But the Action, muſt be Important, and that diſtinguiſhes an Epick Poem from Comedy.

It muſt be an Important Action related; and that makes a diſtinction between an Epick Poem and Tragedy.

It is a Diſcourſe in Verſe relating an Action, and this makes it a Poem.

The ſecond part of the Definition ordains, that the Relation be probable, delightfull and wonderfull.

Thus have we explain'd the Definition of *Boſſu*, which is grounded upon the Doctrine of *Ariſtotle*: and tho' we are under no neceſſity of ſaying any more, becauſe Mr. *Blackmore* having own'd the Juriſdiction of *Ariſtotle*, is obliged to be tried by him; yet leſt ſome of his Friends ſhould decline that Juriſdiction, and fly to Reaſon for Refuge, we ſhall take care to ſhew, That *Ariſtotle* preſcrib'd nothing concerning this matter, but what Reaſon ſuggeſted to him, and what ſhe repeats to us. In the next Chapter, we ſhall conſider that part of the Definition which relates to the Fable and Action. And becauſe the Diſtinction between them is very ſmall, we

ſhall

ſhall treat of them both together. We ſhall endeavour to ſhow, that Right Reaſon, as well as *Ariſtotle*, will have a Fable to be the Form of an Epick Poem, and an Action the ſubject matter of it. This we ſhall endeavour to prove, by ſhewing the deſign which every Man has who writes an Heroick Poem, and then by diſcovering what means are proper for the compaſſing that deſign.

CHAP. II.

Of the Action of an Epick Poem; which, with the Moral, makes the Fable.

THE Deſign of every Man who Writes an Epick Poem, is to give Moral Inſtructions to Mankind, and particularly to his own Country-men. Now there are but two Ways of giving Moral Inſtructions: The one is by Precept, which is call'd Philoſophy; the other by Example, which, in other words, is Hiſtory; and ever ſince there have been Societies of Men in the World, there has been both Hiſtory and Moral Philoſophy, either Written or Oral. But *Homer*, who had a Diſcernment altogether extraordinary, and a Genius capable of Reforming the World, ſaw that Common Precepts were ineffectual, and Common Examples impotent. That Precepts were too ſhocking to be Perſuaſive: Becauſe they ſhew us our faults too directly. For Men, for the moſt part, are more greedy of Happineſs, than they are provident of Future. We are impatient of Delay, and would be Happy now. Happineſs and Pleaſure are terms Synonymous: Therefore he who would make us Happy, muſt pleaſe us; whereas Precepts only mortifie us. Beſides, when Precepts grow irkſome to us, we believe, to excuſe our ſelves, that what they perſuade is impoſſible. Therefore Examples are found more prevalent: Becauſe they prove the Poſſibility

of

of what they perſuade. But Hiſtorical Examples are not Philoſophical enough to inſtruct, becauſe they are too Particular. Upon which account it very ſeldom happens, that they are proportion'd to thoſe who read them; and there is hardly one amongſt a thouſand Readers with whom they agree exactly. Nay, thoſe very Perſons with whom they ſquare, ſcarce in all their Lives meet with two Occaſions to make advantage of them. Beſides, we are not ſo much inſtructed by what Men doe, as by the Cauſes and Springs of their Actions; which an Hiſtorian ſeldom tranſmits to us, becauſe he ſeldom knows them: And when he ventures to give thoſe Cauſes, they are, for the moſt part, Conjectures, and very ſeldom Certainties. *Homer* and *Virgil*, without doubt, knew this very well; and therefore, tho' they ſaw that Action was more proper for Inſtruction, than bare Precept; yet they found that it muſt be General Action; ſomething in which all might be equally concern'd; and ſomething of which the Writers might be perfectly Maſters, ſo as to render a Reaſon exactly of every part of it, and to diſcover the Cauſes, and to make known the Effects of every little incident. This they ſaw very well, and ſaw at the ſame time that this General Action muſt be their own Creation; that is, that it muſt be a feign'd one; or, in other Words, a Fable: That the feigning; that is, the imitating an Action, was the likelieſt way both to inſtruct and pleaſe: That Imitation is natural to Man; and that nothing delights us more; and that Imitation

alone makes a Writer of Verſes a Poet. To give all this ſtill further Light by Example; The Deſign that *Virgil* had in Writing the *Æneis*, was to reconcile all the World, and more particularly the *Romans*, to the New Eſtabliſhment, and the Perſon of *Auguſtus Cæſar*. To compaſs this deſign of his, he frames this General Maxim, That thoſe good and great Men, of whom Heaven made choice for the Inſtruments of its great Deſigns, were highly favour'd and protected by Heaven; and that their Oppoſers were impious in vain, and ſhould be ſeverely puniſh'd for their Impiety. After he had done this, he found that the beſt way to teach this Precept, would be to convey it by Example; that is, by Action. But he knew very well, that from a Particular Action, a General Precept could not be deduced: Upon which he forms this Univerſal and Allegorical Action. A great State is deſtroy'd by its Enemies, and by the Permiſſion of Heaven, for the Injuſtice of thoſe who govern'd it. But one Man, who was greatly Good, and who was not an Accomplice in that Injuſtice, is preſerv'd by Heaven; and is choſen King by the Remnant of his wretched Country-men, with whom, and with his Gods, he ſails to a foreign Land; to which he is commanded by thoſe very Gods, and there lays the foundation of a Mighty Empire to his own Glory, and the utter Deſtruction of all who dar'd to expoſe him. Thus *Virgil* form'd a General Action upon an Univerſal Maxim; and thus we ſee what the Fable is, which is the Soul of an Epick Poem. But he

who

who firſt writ an Epick Poem, ſaw, that it was not only neceſſary to inſtruct by Action, and by General Action, which alone is capable of giving General Inſtruction; but he ſaw that That Action, to attain the End which he propounded to reach by it, muſt, beſides its Univerſality, have likewiſe Unity: And that for the following Reaſons. To avoid tediouſneſs; becauſe nothing that over-burdens the Memory, can inſtruct the Mind as it ſhould doe; and therefore *Horace* gives this General Rule for Precepts, *Quicquid præcipies, eſto brevis*; And to avoid confuſion; for nothing that troubles the Memory, can inſtruct the Soul. And Thirdly, becauſe he had but one General Moral Maxim to convey by it; for he knew very well, that one main Doctrine well inculcated, would be ſufficient at one time for the infirmity of Humane-kind; and that there was an Occaſion but for one Action to convey and inculcate one important Doctrine.

But 'tis time to look back, and ſumm up what we have ſaid; which is, That the Deſign of him who writes an Epick Poem, is to give Moral Inſtructions to Mankind. That there are but two Ways of giving Moral inſtruction, Precept and Example, or, in other words, Action; that Hiſtorical Actions were too particular to give general Inſtructions, and conſequently, that the Action, which is the Subject of an Epick Poem, muſt be general; that is, feign'd, or, in other words, a Fable; a Fable compounded of Truth and Fiction; the Truth diſguis'd and convey'd by the Fiction. Then

we proceeded to prove, that the Action, beſides its Univerſality, muſt have Unity: And thus we conſider'd it as far as we can doe, till we come to make that general Action ſingular by the impoſition of Names. But here it will not be amiſs to obſerve what has been all along hinted. That the Action is only fram'd for the Inſtruction; and that it is deſign'd for a proof of the Moral; that every part of that Action ought to be a gradual Progreſs in the proof; and that conſequently all the Parts of it ought to be as dependant one of another, as the Propoſitions are of a Syllogiſm; and that to inſert any thing between the Parts, which is foreign from the Action, that is, from the Argument, is to deſtroy, or at leaſt to weaken that Argument; and is as abſurdly impertinent, as a Parentheſis would be between the Propoſitions of a Categorical Syllogiſm. That an Epick Poet is to drive on his Action, which is but urging his Argument; and that he is ſtill to have an eye to the end of his Action, and to make haſt to that which is the concluſion of his Argument. That *Homer*, one of the greateſt of Poets apparently took this Method, and accordingly receiv'd Commendations for it, from one of the greateſt of Criticks. *Semper ad eventum feſtinat.* The reaſon of the Commendation is plain: For only the laſt Event can be an abſolute proof of what the Poet deſign'd to prove; which is either that Succeſs attends a deſign which is conceiv'd by Vertue, and carried on by Prudence; or that Actions deriv'd from ill Principles, have often unhappy and fatal Conſequences.

Thus

Thus far we have conſider'd the Action in general: But there is no Action which can be perform'd without Agents; every thing that is done, muſt be done by ſome-body. The Poet, after he has invented his Action, is oblig'd to impoſe Names. And here he ought to obſerve two Things. Firſt, To take thoſe Names from Hiſtory, to give the Action an Air of Truth. Secondly, To take the Names of Kings and Rulers of the Earth to make this Action important. For the Divinity is to appear concern'd in it, in order to inforce the Moral; it being certain, that Religion is the only ſolid Foundation even of Moral Vertue. And for that reaſon the Subject muſt be important, to make it in ſome meaſure deſerving of the Care of ſo Auguſt a Super-intendant. Well then, illuſtrious Names are to be impos'd on the Perſons, to heighten the Subject, and to diſtinguiſh the Actors. Which impoſition of Names, does in ſome meaſure make that Action Singular, which was before General. But as that Action which is thus made Singular, is ſtill at the bottom General; ſo thoſe Poetical Perſons, to which Particular Names are aſſign'd, remain at the bottom Univerſal and Allegorical. As ſoon as the Poet has impos'd his Names, he is to frame his Epiſodes; which are nothing but the neceſſary Parts of the Action extended by probable Circumſtances. This is not to be done till after the Names are impos'd. Becauſe if the Poet ſhould find that any thing would accommodate him, which was really done by the Perſons to whom thoſe Names belong, he is to

make

make his advantage of it; that thus he may make his Action credible, by making it enter into the Truth of Hiſtory. But here he is to take care, that the Epiſodes doe not corrupt the Unity of the Action, for Reaſons which we have mention'd above. And that they may be ſure not to doe that, they are to have three Qualities. Firſt, They are to be deriv'd from the firſt Plan of the Action. Secondly, They are to have a neceſſary or probable Dependance one upon another. Thirdly, Not one of them is to be an Action it ſelf, but onely a neceſſary Part of an Action extended by probable Circumſtances. Thus we have endeavour'd to ſhow, that Reaſon, as well as the Doctrine of *Ariſtotle*, demands, that a Fable ſhould be the form of an Epick Poem; and that the Action, which is the ſubject-matter of it, ſhould be Allegorical and Univerſal; that it ſhould be one, and that it ſhould be important. It remains that we prove, that it muſt be likewiſe entire: That is, that it muſt have a Beginning, a Middle, and an End. Firſt, it muſt have a Beginning: For ſince an Action inſtructs chiefly by its Cauſes; and the firſt Motive to any Action is the Foundation of the Merit or Demerit of the Agent; to be ſatisfied, that That Agent is either made happy, becauſe he does well; or elſe miſerable, becauſe he does ill; I muſt be ſatisfied that ſuch or ſuch a Principle was his firſt Motive to, or his firſt Cauſe of, that Action, which makes him happy or miſerable. Thus *Æneas*, upon the Deſtruction of *Troy*, is choſen by the Gods to re-eſtabliſh the *Trojan* Empire in *Italy*. But what

what is the Motive to his putting to Sea? His Piety. The Gods command him, and he obeys; and he proſpers accordingly. Thus *Achilles* quarrels with *Agamemnon*, and ſeparates himſelf from the Common Cauſe, and loſes his deareſt Friend by it. But why did he quarrel? Becauſe he was haughty, violent, unjuſt and inexorable. But, Secondly, the Action muſt have an End; and that End muſt be ſuch, that I may either read the very laſt Event, or have a certain proſpect of it. For if the Poet leaves me in any reaſonable Doubt of that; how can I deduce any certain Moral from the Action? Thirdly, The Action muſt have a Middle: For every thing that has a Beginning, and an End, muſt conſequently have a Middle, and that Middle muſt have a neceſſary dependance both upon the one and the other. I will only ſpeak one word more concerning the Duration of the Action. The time of it ought certainly to be much longer than that of a Tragedy: Becauſe the laſt is deſign'd to move the Paſſions in order to the correcting them, and the Violence of the Paſſions is not durable; and the firſt is intended to alter the Habits, which are not quickly either rooted out or imprinted. Now an Epick Action having longer Duration than a Tragical Action; for that very reaſon it ought to have greater compaſs, and to be extended with Epiſodes.

Thus have I endeavour'd to prove, that Right Reaſon requires, as well as *Ariſtotle*, that a Fable ſhould be the form of an Epick Poem, and an Action the Subject-matter of it: That

that

that Action ſhould be one, and at firſt ſhould be Allegorical and Univerſal, and ſhould in a manner become afterwards Singular by the impoſition of Names; and by the ſame impoſition of Names ſhould likewiſe become important; and then too, that it ſhould be extended with Epiſodes, but Epiſodes which would not corrupt its Unity; in the next place, that it ſhould be entire; that is, that it ſhould have a Beginning, a Middle, and an End; and laſtly, that its Duration ought to be longer than that of a Tragical Action. Thus have we treated of the Action. It remains now that we ſhould treat of the Manner of relating it, and of the Perſons employed in it. But firſt let us conſider Mr. *Blackmore*'s Fable, and the Action of his Poem.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

THE deſign of Mr. *Blackmore* is the very ſame with that of *Virgil*, for which he can never be too much commended. But not only his Deſign, his Moral is the ſame too, if he has any Moral. And here it may be convenient to repeat the Moral of *Virgil*, which is this, That thoſe great and good Men, whom Heaven makes the Inſtruments of its high Deſigns are highly favour'd and protected by Heaven; and that all who dare to oppoſe them are impious in vain, and ſhall be ſeverely puniſh'd for their Impiety.

The Fable which Mr. *Blackmore* builds upon the Moral, if there be any, is this, A State is overthrown, and the King deſtroy'd, and his Son forc'd into Baniſhment: That Son, at the end of about ten Years, in Obedience to the call of Heaven, returns to his Mother-Country, and there eſtabliſhes himſelf and the true Religion to his own Glory and the ruin of thoſe who oppoſe him. The difference between this and the Fable of *Virgil* are ſo very inconſiderable, that they may be call'd the ſame. Mr. *Blackmore* is ſo far from denying this, that he triumphs upon it. He ſays, he form'd himſelf upon *Virgil*'s Model. Nay, he has copied him not only in his Fable, but in his Action epiſodiz'd. He has done more, he has, for a long time, ſervilely follow'd him in the very order of his Epiſodes, for which he

does

does not think himſelf oblig'd to make any excuſe. For the ſame great Maſter copied *Homer* as cloſely, and yet has been condemn'd, no not by one of his Criticks. 'Tis true indeed, *Virgil* has imitated *Homer*, but never in his Fable, nor in the ranging his Epiſodes. He had infinitely more Judgment than to do that; he knew very well, that a Poet was oblig'd to be the Author of his own Fable. *Ariſtotle* had given him a reaſon for it in the ninth Chapter of his Treatiſe of Poetry: For, ſays *Ariſtotle*, no Man is a Poet any further than he imitates; and the Poet, who imitates, imitates an Action, that is, invents a Fable. But to copy another not only in his Fable, but to follow him ſervilely in his Action epiſodiz'd, is rather to imitate an Author than an Action, and rather to copy a ſingular Action, than to frame a general one. But to make the unskilfulneſs of ſuch an Imitation apparent, I would feign put the following Queſtions to Mr. *Blackmore*'s Friends; Firſt, Whether the copying *Virgil*, not only in his Fable, but in his Action epiſodiz'd, muſt, not of neceſſity, to all his Readers, who are acquainted with *Virgil*, that is, to all the beſt of them, make his Incidents not ſurprizing, and conſequently, not agreeable. Secondly, Whether this ſervile Imitation, muſt not with all, who have convers'd with *Virgil*, deſtroy the Probability of the Poem, and give the Action an Air of Fiction, which ought to have an Air of Truth. Thirdly, I deſire to know whether, when the Incidents appear neither ſurprizing nor probable, they can appear admirable, ſince

Ariſtotle

Ariſtotle tells us in the ſame Chapter which I cited above, that the moſt admirable Incidents are thoſe which ſurprize us, (which Experience confirms,) and ſince Reaſon tells us, that no Man of Senſe will admire what he does not believe. Fourthly, I deſire to be inform'd, whether ſome Epiſodes, which do not in the leaſt offend againſt Probability or Reaſon in *Virgil*, may not be reaſonably ſuppos'd to be highly improbable, when they are copied in a modern Poem, by a Poet of our Age, by reaſon of the vaſtly different Circumſtances of Times, Places, Perſons, Cuſtoms, Religions, and common received Opinions. Fifthly, I ſhould be glad to be certified, whether ſince the Epiſodes, as has been ſaid above, are but the neceſſary parts of an Action extended by probable Circumſtances, Parts which have a neceſſary dependance one upon another, and which may be ſaid to produce one another, as Cauſes do their Effects; ſo that the very firſt Incident in a Poem of skilfull Structure virtually influences the very laſt Event: I ſay, ſince this is ſo, I ſhould be glad to be certified whether the Improbability even of one Epiſode muſt not ruine the Probability of the Poem, and deſtroy the Moral. Since that which is probable can never have any dependance upon what is abſurd. But it will then be time to ſpeak of what is probable, or admirable, or agreeable in the Poem, when we come to the Narration. At preſent I deſire leave to prove three Things. Firſt, That the Action of *Prince Arthur* is not one. Secondly, That it is not entire. And

Laſtly,

Laſtly, that there are Things in the Action, as it ſtands in the Poem, with its Names and its Epiſodes; which, without referring them to any thing elſe, or without offending Probability, are ſingly and directly utterly deſtructive of the Moral; which being deſtroy'd, the Fable falls, of which it is the Foundation, with which the Univerſality of the Action falls; ſo that the Action is nothing but an empty Fiction, of no manner of concern to us, without any kind of Inſtruction, and without any reaſonable Meaning.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Unity of the Action.

THE Action of the Poem ought to be one not only in the Plan of the Fable and in the firſt Project, but likewiſe after the Impoſition of Names, and after the framing the Epiſodes. Now that the Action may be one, after it has its Epiſodes, care is to be taken, that the Epiſodes may be proper to it; for it is the Propriety or Impropriety of the Epiſodes that preſerves or corrupts the Unity of the Action. Now that the Epiſodes may be proper to the Action, they ought to be neceſſary parts of it, as we hinted above; but then thoſe neceſſary parts of it, ought to be extended by probable circumſtances; as for example, The neceſſary parts of *Virgil*'s Action, are firſt, The Deſtruction of a State, and the Death of a Monarch. Secondly, His Succeſſors ſetting ſail with his Gods and the remnant of his Country-men, in order to eſtabliſh himſelf and his Religion in a foreign Country. Thirdly, The Obſtacles that he meets in his way. Fourthly, His ſurmounting thoſe Obſtacles. Fifthly, His Arrival in that foreign Country. Sixthly, The Obſtacles to his Eſtabliſhment which he meets with there. And Laſtly, His ſurmounting thoſe Obſtacles. Theſe are the neceſſary parts of the Action: neceſſary, becauſe if you remove but one of them, the Action is deſtroy'd or is render'd imperfect;

and theſe neceſſary parts extended by probable Circumſtances, make the Epiſodes: But then an Epiſode is not only to be part of the Action, and a neceſſary part of it; it is not only to be drawn from the very bottom of the Fable and of the Subject; but it is to have as ſtrict a Connexion with the reſt of the Parts, as the Members of one Body ought to have with each other; which Members have a neceſſary mutual Dependance, and are each of them ſerviceable to the whole, and each of them to every one of the reſt. Now it is plain, that this ſtrict Connexion cannot be made by words; but that it muſt proceed from the neceſſity of the Action, or from the Probability of its Circumſtances. The Epiſodes are not only to be contiguous but continuous, they are not only to follow one another, but to be conſequences of one another, and to produce one another, as Cauſes do their Effects; ſo that the Precedent be the neceſſary or probable cauſe of the Subſequent *. Well then it is plain, from what has been ſaid, that the Epiſodes are to have theſe two Qualifications. Firſt, That they are to be drawn from the very bottom of the Fable and of the Subject. And ſecondly, that they are to be well joyned with one another. And as the firſt of theſe Qualifications provides, That no Epiſode can be true and proper, if the Action is perfect without it. So it is provided by the ſecond, that the Epiſodes ought to be ſuch, as that not one

* *Il ye bien dela difference* (ſays *Boſſu*) *entre lier le recit de l'Action a quelque choſe, & y lier l'Action même.*

one of them be perfect without the reſt of the Action. An Epiſode is not an Action, but a part of one, and is ſtill to be ſhown in its own nature, that is, in the Nature of a Member of a Body, and of a part, which being disjoyn'd from the reſt, remains ſtill a part, and can never become a whole. If an Epiſode were an entire Action, it could never have ſo ſtrict a Dependence upon the reſt of the Epiſodes, as to give it the ſecond requiſite Qualification.

Thus we have ſpoken ſuccinctly of the Nature of Epiſodes, according to the Doctrine of *Ariſtotle*, and his Interpreter *Boſſu*, and have ſhewn in as little compaſs as we could what Qualifications they ought to have; when they have thoſe Qualifications, then they may be ſaid to be proper and regular: when they want one or both of thoſe Qualifications, then they may be ſaid to be vicious and irregular, and to make the Poem epiſodique, and the Action double. We ſhall now endeavour to prove, that there are ſome of theſe irregular Epiſodes in Mr. *Blackmore*'s Poem.

CHAP. V.

THE firſt Epiſode that I deſign to examine, is the Death of King *Uter*, related by *Lucius* one of *Arthur*'s Attendants to *Hoel* King of *Armorica*, in the fourth Book of the Poem. And here I would fain ask Mr. *Blackmore* one queſtion. If the Death of King *Uter* be or be not a part of the Action of the Poem: If it be not a part of the Action, I have already gain'd my point; for it makes the Poem epiſodick and the Action double. I know indeed, very well, that an Incident, which is neither a part of the Fable nor of the Action, may be inſerted into the Action, provided it be neceſſary to give a reaſonable account of ſomething which is a part of it, ſuch is the relation in the *Odyſſes* of the wound which *Ulyſſes* received upon Mount *Parnaſſus*, which is abſolutely neceſſary to prepare the Diſcovery; and ſuch is the Story of *Dido*, which *Venus* relates to *Æneas* in the firſt of the *Æneis*, which is neceſſary to prepare the Reception of *Æneas*, and the Paſſion of *Dido*; but then ſuch foreign Incidents are to be diſpatch'd in a few Lines, as *Homer* and *Virgil* have well obſerv'd; whereas the relation of the Death of King *Uter* is ſtretch'd to the extent of a juſt Epiſode. Since therefore, it has the length of one, it is an Epiſode, and if it be not a part of the Action, it is an irregular Epiſode, and makes the Action double. But that is not all, it makes it likewiſe

wiſe imperfect. Since if the Death of *Uter* be not part of the Action, it muſt want a beginning: For what other beginning can Mr. *Blackmore* aſſign to his Action? Prince *Arthur*'s ſetting ſail from *Neuſtria*, is indeed the beginning of the Narration, but not the beginning of the Action: For that alone, according to *Ariſtotle*, is the beginning of an Action, which neceſſarily ſuppoſes nothing to go before it. Now Prince *Arthur*'s ſetting ſail from *Normandy*, in order to go for *England*, neceſſarily ſuppoſes, that ſomething went before. For it ſuppoſes, that Prince *Arthur* had made Preparatives for this Expedition, and that he had done it by ſome means, and for ſome extraordinary reaſon, of all which the Reader ought to be inform'd, ſince all this comes into the Action, and is abſolutely neceſſary for a clear underſtanding of the whole. Thus *Virgil* begins his Narration with *Æneas*'s ſetting ſail from *Sicily*; but then in the ſecond and third Books of his Poem, he makes his Hero relate to *Dido*, from whence, and how he came into *Sicily*, and whither he was going, for what End, and upon what Motives. But now, if Mr. *Blackmore* ſhall tell me, that the Death of King *Uter*, and the Eſcape of Prince *Arthur* his Son, related by *Lucius* in the fourth Book, to *Hoel* King of *Britanny*, informs the Reader of the Action, and is therefore a neceſſary part, and a juſt beginning of that Action; if Mr. *Blackmore*, I ſay, urges this, I can make no reaſonable reply to it: But in that caſe, I muſt deſire him to ſatisfie me in another thing, and that is, whether that which

follows King *Uter*'s Death and Prince *Arthur*'s Eſcape in the relation of *Lucius*; as Prince *Arthur*'s Journey to *Odar*'s Camp, his Wars with the *Goths*, &c. whether this be not wholly foreign from the Subject? Whether it does not conſtitute an irregular Epiſode, and make a monſtrous Gap in the main Action? For to what purpoſe is this recited? What relation has the Journey to *Odar*'s Camp, or *Arthur*'s declamatory Speech by the way, or his ſerving againſt the *Goths*? What, I ſay, what neceſſary or probable relation can all this have to the Action of the Poem? Is there ſo much as the leaſt ſhew of likelihood, that *Lucius*, who came with *Arthur* from *Normandy*, ſhould relate theſe things to *Hoel*, whoſe Dominions were contiguous to *Normandy*, and who, conſequently, could not but know all this as well as *Lucius* himſelf? All of it, I mean, but the Speech, for that being long and ſententious, and crowded with ſpeculative Notions, in all likelihood, had not come to his Ears; and this *Lucius* muſt have had an admirable Memory, who could repeat it ten years after it was ſpoken. I had made no mention of this at preſent, if it had not been to put the Reader in mind, that there is ſuch a thing as this Speech, becauſe I ſhall be oblig'd to come back to it anon. Thus we have endeavoured to ſhow, that *Arthur*'s Journey to *Odar*'s Camp, his Speech by the way, and his Service in the *Gothick* Wars, as they are delivered in his relation of *Lucius*, make the Poem epiſodick, and corrupt the Unity of the Action. Let us now conſider that which

pre-

precedes the Death of King *Uter*, in the ſame relation of *Lucius*. In the firſt part of which we have a long account of the *Roman* Invaſion, the Decay of the Empire, the *Saxon* Uſurpation, the Battle of *Salusbury*, the Treachery of *Carvil*, and the Death of *Uter*. Now I would fain ask any one, Whether to begin the relation of *Arthur*'s Expedition, with an account of the *Roman* Invaſion, be not to do like the Poet, who begun the War of *Troy*, with an account of the Birth of *Helen*. What neceſſary, nay, what probable relation has the *Roman* Invaſion, or the beginning of the *Saxon* Uſurpation to the immediate Action of the Poem? Is it ſo much as likely, that *Lucius* ſhould make a tedious recital of theſe things to *Hoel*, who was near enough to great *Britain*, to be long inform'd of them before. As for the *Romans*, the *French* were acquainted with them long before the *Engliſh* knew them; and therefore *Hoel* might have reaſon to wonder to hear one born in *England* inſtruct him in the affairs of *Rome*. Thus we ſee, that this relation of the *Roman* Invaſion and of the *Saxon* Uſurpation, is neither neceſſary nor probable; and that they make an Epiſode or Epiſodes, which precede the Action of the Poem, and which conſequently corrupt its Unity. The firſt part of the Action, as we have ſaid in the third Chapter, is the change of a State, as was likewiſe the firſt part of *Virgil*'s Action. The Gods ſave a Prince from the ruin of a powerfull State, which Prince is elected King by the remains of his Countrymen. This is the firſt part of *Virgil*'s general

Action; which when he had ſingulariz'd, by making uſe of *Æneas*'s Name, he was then oblig'd to ſet the Deſtruction of this State before us, that is of *Troy*, and to begin with an Incident that ſuppos'd nothing preceeding it. Now if *Virgil* had made the ſiege of *Troy* the cauſe of its ruin, he would have been oblig'd to have related the beginning of the Siege and the whole ten years War, or elſe he muſt have begun with an incident, that ſuppos'd ſomething before it, and conſequently that beginning had not been juſt: This he had Judgment enough to ſee, and therefore had recourſe to the Treachery of *Sinon*, and the Invention of the *Trojan* Horſe; which is an incident that ſuppoſes nothing before it. For the Town might have been taken by this Stratagem at the beginning of the Siege, as well as at the ten years end. And *Virgil* is ſo far from deriving the Deſtruction of *Troy* from the Siege, that at ten years end, he ſhows you the Town in a flouriſhing condition, and the *Græcians* broken and conquer'd.

——*Fracti bello, fatisque repulſi*
Ductores Danaum, tot jam labentibus annis
Inſtar montis equum divina Palladis arte
Ædificant.

And conſequently he makes the ſetting up of the *Trojan* Horſe, the very firſt cauſe of the Deſtruction of *Troy*. Thus *Virgil* by his Addreſs and his admirable Judgment, had a recourſe to a juſt beginning. Almoſt the very ſame expedient

dient, which *Virgil* made uſe of, lay before Mr. *Blackmore*; but he, not having an equal degree of Judgment, did not ſee it, but us'd it without its advantage: For Mr. *Blackmore*'s Action truly and naturally begins with the Treachery of *Carvil*. The Battle before it ought not to have been deſcrib'd at length: for that Battle being ſo far from contributing to *Uter*'s ruin, that it rather ſecur'd him and weaken'd the *Saxons*, could not be a part of the Action. *Carvil*'s Treachery might as eaſily have deſtroy'd him before there was any Battle. The Succeſs of the Battle and *Uter*'s attempt to reſcue the Iſland from the Uſurpation of *Octa*, ought to have been deſcrib'd in the compaſs of ten lines. Mr. *Blackmore* ought immediately to have come to *Carvil*: Then all thoſe Preliminaries had been omitted, which are neceſſary neither upon the account of the Action, whoſe Unity they plainly corrupt, nor of the perſon to whom they are related, who is ſuppos'd to have known them before: And the circumſtances of *Carvil*'s Treaſon had been retain'd, which are neceſſary both upon the account of the Action, and of the perſon to whom they are related, who might have been reaſonably imagin'd to have been unacquainted with them. And thus we had had a juſt beginning of an Action, a beginning which had left nothing to be ſuppos'd, as neceſſary before it. We had ſeen *Uter* dying, *Arthur* eſcaping and receiv'd by *Odar*; and then this juſt beginning of the Action had given us but a very reaſonable account of the beginning of the Narration, and had ſhown us how *Arthur* came to

equip

equip a Fleet in *Normandy*, and what was the motive that oblig'd him to ſail for *England*. But ſtill there would have remain'd one difficulty, and that is the interval of Time betwixt the Arrival of *Arthur* in *Normandy*, and his ſailing for *England*. For what muſt have been done with that? This has been already demonſtrated, that *Arthur* ought not to have been ſhewn employ'd about any thing foreign from the Action; and it is certain, that the Action ought not to ſtand ſtill. Mr. *Blackmore* has given the reaſon for this in his own Preface. The Action muſt be but one, ſays he; when it ceaſes, the Poem is ended; and if it be reviv'd and taken up again, 'tis a new Poem begins. Action is Motion, and if it ceaſes cannot be reviv'd ſo as to be numerically the ſame. Well then, what remedy could have been found for this: why, if I had been to adviſe Mr. *Blackmore*, I would have wiſh'd him to have plac'd the Death of *Uter* but ſix Months before the Expedition of *Arthur*, which would have juſt given him time for his Arrival in *Normandy*, and for the preparatives for his return. And then *Lucius* had omitted in his relation, thoſe foreign Incidents of *Arthur*'s Journey and of his ſerving againſt the *Goths*, which viſibly corrupt the Unity of the Action and the Probability of the Narration. This indeed might have contradicted the Hiſtory: But at the ſame time, that it would have been leſs true, it would have been more probable; and it is Probability not Truth that a Poet is to follow. For a thing that is true may be very incredible, whereas Probability

lity always perſuades. Beſides the Hiſtory of *Arthur* is ſo remote and ſo little known, that not one Reader in a hundred would have diſcover'd it, and they who had diſcern'd it, would have been ſo far from being offended with Mr. *Blackmore* for the boldneſs of ſo skilfull a Parachroniſm, that they would infallibly have extoll'd his Judgment.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

LET us now conſider another part of the Poem, which makes the whole Epiſodique and the Action double: and that is the relation which *Arthur* makes to *Hoel*, which takes up a fifth part of the Poem, and brings into the Action a foreign Epiſode or a medly of Epiſodes. We have ſaid above, that an Epiſode to be juſt and regular, ought to be a neceſſary part of the Action; that is, that it ought to be taken from the very bottom of the Fable and of the Subject; and then that it ought to have a neceſſary or a probable Connexion with the reſt of the parts, which neceſſary or probable Connexion can never be made by words, but either by the neceſſity of the Action or the Probability of Circumſtances: for ſays *Boſſu*, *Il y a bien de la difference, entre lier le recit d'une Action a quelque choſe, & y lier l'Action meme.* There is a great deal of difference between connecting the recital of an Action to ſomething, and connecting the Action it ſelf. An Epiſode that is juſt and regular, will be imperfect, when disjoyn'd from the body of the Action, and the ſeparation will render the body of the Action imperfect. But now to come to the relation of *Arthur*, what has that to do with the buſineſs of the Poem? Can any thing be more foreign from the *Britiſh* Expedition, than thoſe tedious accounts of Chaos and the Creation? May not

not the relation in the ſecond Book be disjoyn'd from the reſt of the Poem, and yet be perfect alone? Certainly. For if the relation had been printed alone, beginning at the third Verſe, and continuing to the fourth Verſe of the 63d. Page; I ſay, if all this which conſiſts of about eight hundred Verſes, had been printed alone, and publiſhed before the reſt of the Poem, no man would have diſcovered that it had been a relation taken from the Body of a larger Poem. Becauſe in all that compaſs of Verſes, it does not appear, that any one but the Poet ſpeaks, or, that it is addreſs'd to any one but the Reader. So vaſtly different is Mr. *Blackmore*'s Conduct from that which *Virgil* obſerv'd in the relation that *Æneas* made to *Dido*, as we ſhall have occaſion to obſerve more at large in another place: For the reaſon that I have mention'd, if this part of the Poem had been publiſh'd before the reſt, it would never have been thought to have been a relation, or indeed a part of any thing elſe, but it might have paſs'd upon the world very well with the Title of a religious Poem upon the Creation of the World and the Redemption of Man: which had made me almoſt inclin'd to think, that all, or the greateſt part of this relation, was by no means deſign'd for what it is employ'd now; but that it was writ long before Mr. *Blackmore* had any intention to write an Heroick Poem; and that upon forming the deſign of writing Prince *Arthur*, he contriv'd to tack it to the Work. I ſhall give my reaſons for this Conjecture,

jecture, when I come to treat of the Probability of the particular Episodes: But at present I intend to show, that as part of this relation, if it were disjoyn'd from the body of the Action, would be perfect and entire by it self, which has been already prov'd; so if the whole were retrench'd, the Action would not be alter'd by it; which I demonstrate thus. Let the Reader end the first Book with this Verse in the 32d. Page.

What worship to him, what belief I owe?

And begin the fourth Book with these words, *Then in*, instead of *In such*, and the Action will remain as whole and entire, as it is at present, and the Structure of it will be more regular. Nay the very Connexion will be just, and the Poets business will be done in two Lines, better than he did it in two Books: For the Reader will conclude from the first two Verses, that *Arthur* finish'd what the Machine began and confirm'd *Hoel* a Christian. Well then, Since we have clearly shewn, that part of this relation may become a whole, and that if the whole relation were retrench'd, it would not in the least maim the Action, we ought to conclude, that this relation is an irregular Episode, or rather a Medley of irregular Episodes which corrupt the Unity of the Action. For a just Episode must be a part of the Action, but an Episode, says *Aristotle*, which can be transpos'd or remov'd, without maiming or altering the

Action,

Action, that is by no means a part of the Action. Thus we have endeavour'd to ſhow, that the Action of Prince *Arthur* has Epiſodes in it, which are vicious and irregular, and which corrupt its Unity. Two things are yet to be prov'd, that this Action is not entire, and that there are things in the diſpoſition of it, which deſtroy the Moral.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Integrity of the Action.

WE have ſaid already, that an Action to be entire, muſt have a Beginning, a Middle and an End: And that as that was a juſt beginning of an Action, which began it ſo, as that the Reader ſhould require nothing preceeding it to underſtand what he reads, ſo that was a juſt end, which requir'd nothing to follow it, and left the Reader in no expectation, or at leaſt, no doubt of what was to come; We are now to ſhow, that Mr. *Blackmore*'s Poem has not this juſt end. For after the Combat between Prince *Arthur* and *Tollo*, the Poet ſhould have ſhewn us the former in the quiet poſſeſſion of his Dominions, and reſtor'd to the Throne of his Father. Perhaps Mr. *Blackmore* may ſay, that *Virgil* has ended his Action with the ſingle Combat between *Æneas* and *Turnus*. 'Tis true, he did ſo; but Mr. *Blackmore* may be pleas'd to conſider, that *Turnus* had been the main Obſtacle to the *Trojans* Eſtabliſhment. Yet *Virgil* was not contented with removing him, he had before taken care to remove the leſs, as *Amata*, *Mezentius*, *Camilla*. But *Octa* is all along the main Obſtacle to the Reſtoration of *Arthur*, and therefore he continuing in power and place at the end of the Poem, the main Obſtruction is yet in the way, and the end of the Action cannot be juſt. 'Tis true,

Latinus

Latinus remain'd in Power after the ſingle Combat; but firſt he had never oppos'd *Æneas*, quite contrary he had at *Æneas* his very firſt Arrival deſir'd him for the Heir of his Empire, and for his Son-in-Law.

——— *Hunc illum poſcere fata*
Et reor, & ſiquid veri mens augurat opto.

And Secondly, he had taken a ſolemn Oath, to deliver up his Daughter to *Æneas* upon his ſucceſs. *Octa*, it will be urg'd, had taken the like Oath. But what ſignifies an Oath, to a Man of *Octa*'s perfidious Principles? *Latinus* was juſt and honourable, and was inclin'd to the Trojan; *Octa* was baſe and treacherous, and and mortally hated the *Briton*. 'Tis true indeed, he had made a ſolemn Covenant; but then he had made one before too, which yet upon the firſt advantage he broke. What ſecurity then can the Reader have, that he intended to keep this inviolable? And conſequently, how can we have any Moral aſſurance from the Action, that *Arthur*, upon the ſucceſs of the ſingle Combat, was reſtor'd to his Father's Kingdom. Thus it appears, that the main Obſtruction continuing, the Action cannot be juſtly ended, and *Octa* lies as a ſcandal in our way to the Moral: Of which we deſign to ſay more in the following Chapter.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Moral.

SInce Mr. *Blackmore*'s Poem wants a juſt End, it manifeſtly wants a Moral; which muſt always be deduc'd from the very laſt Event. If Prince *Arthur* has any Moral, it muſt be the ſame with *Virgil*'s. Which is this: That thoſe great and good Men, who are choſen by Heav'n to be the Inſtruments of its great Deſigns, are highly favour'd and protected by Heav'n; and that all who oppoſe them are impious, in vain, and ſhall be ſeverely puniſh'd for their Impiety. This Moral has Two Parts: The firſt is, that the great and good Men, whom Heav'n chooſes to be the Inſtruments of its great Deſigns, are under the divine Protection; and conſequently ſhall infallibly ſucceed in their Undertakings. We have ſaid once already, that the Action is to prove the Moral; and if any one ſhall urge againſt this, that to conclude from Particulars to Generals, is not a Logical proceeding: To this we anſwer, That the Action, at the bottom, is Univerſal and Allegorical, even after the Impoſition of Names; and that the Perſons likewiſe, after they are made Singular by the Impoſition of Names, remain at the bottom Univerſal and Allegorical. To illuſtrate this by Example, *Æneas* ſucceeds in his Undertaking, and is eſtabliſh'd. *Æneas*, at the bottom, is an Univerſal Character; and is put for any

any or every good and great Man that is choſen by Heav'n to be inſtrumental in the carrying on its great Deſigns. And therefore the ſhowing that *Æneas* ſucceeds, ſhows that every ſuch good and great Man, ſucceeds in ſuch Enterprizes, and is eſtabliſh'd: To ſhow which, is to demonſtrate the Moral; but then it muſt be ſhown, or the Moral remains unprov'd. Now I would fain ask how Mr. *Blackmore*'s Poem ſhews Prince *Arthur*'s Eſtabliſhment; when we neither ſee it, nor have any Moral aſſurance of it; but, on the Contrary, have very juſt Reaſons to doubt of it. But there is yet another Place in the Story which is deſtructive of this firſt Part of the pretended Moral. King *Uter* is a very good King, (at leaſt Mr. *Blackmore* tells us ſo, tho' the Character which he gives of him does not inform us ſo: but of that we ſhall ſpeak in its place;) and yet this very good King, who begins a very juſt War for the recovering Liberty, and the ſecuring Religion, loſes at once his Life and his Kingdom by the Villainy of a treacherous Pagan. But now let us come to the ſecond Part of the Moral: which is, That all who oppoſe theſe great and theſe good Men, are impious, in vain, and ſhall be ſeverely puniſh'd for their Impiety. Now *Octa* firſt oppoſes King *Uter*, and that by a baſe and a treacherous Way, and not in an open and honourable Manner, as *Mezentius* and *Turnus* reſiſted *Æneas*; yet Treachery prevails, and Right and Innocence fall. But that is not all: The ſame *Octa* oppoſes the Reſtoration of *Arthur*; makes a League upon his ill Succeſs, and then perfidi-

ouſly breaks it; yet at laſt is left in Power and Place; and we find, to our Sorrow, that the very worſt thing that can happen to him, is, that he is like to Marry his Daughter to the Hero, whoſe Father he Murder'd. Thus we have ſhown, that there are two things in Mr. *Blackmore*'s Poem which deſtroy his Moral: which being deſtroy'd, the Fable falls of courſe. For, ſays *Boſſu*, the moſt eſſential Part of a Fable, and that which indiſpenſably ought to be the Foundation of it, is the Truth that is ſignified by it. Now the Fable being faln, the Action is gone: For the Fable, ſays *Ariſtotle*, Chap. 6. is the Imitation of an Action; that is, it is an Univerſal and Allegorical Action. And thus we ſee, that there is no Univerſal and Allegorical Action in Mr. *Blackmore*'s Poem; and conſequently, that *Prince Arthur* is not an Epick Poem; for an Epick Poem, as we have laid down in the Definition of it, is a Diſcourſe invented with Art, to form the Manners by Inſtructions, diſguis'd under the Allegory of an Action; That is, that it is a Fable, or the Imitation of an Action, or an Univerſal and Allegorical Action. But the Subject of Mr. *Blackmore*'s Poem, as we have prov'd, is not an Univerſal and Allegorical Action, but the particular Adventures of *Arthur*; which Adventures, to make uſe of the Words of *Boſſu*, if they are feign'd, make the Poem an empty Fiction and a meer Amuſement. And tho' they are true, the Poem is at the beſt but an hiſtorical and faithfuli Narration. It is by no means one of thoſe Epick Poems, of which *Ariſtotle* and *Horace* have

have left us ſuch admirable Rules, and *Homer* and *Virgil* ſuch juſt Examples. And thus we have done with the Firſt Part of the Definition of *Boſſu:* which is, That an Epick Poem is a Diſcourſe invented with Art, to form the Manners by Inſtructions, diſguis'd under the Allegory of an Action; That is, that it is a Fable, or an Univerſal and Allegorical Action. We have endeavour'd to give the Reaſons why a Fable muſt be the form of it, and a General Action the ſubject matter; we have ſhewn why that Action muſt be one, and why it muſt be made important, by the impoſition of Illuſtrious Names. Then we proceeded to ſhow, that after the Action is render'd in a manner Singular by the Impoſition of Names, it remains ſtill at the bottom Univerſal and Allegorical; that it muſt be one, and that it muſt be entire. Then we came to examine Mr. *Blackmore*'s Poem, and endeavour'd to prove, that his Action is not one, and that it is not Entire, nor Univerſal, nor Allegorical; and conſequently, that his Poem is no Fable, and no Heroick Poem.

REMARKS
UPON
Prince Arthur.

PART II.

CHAP. I.

WE are now come to the ſecond Part of the Definition of an Epick Poem, which is, That it is a Diſcourſe related in Verſe, in a delightfull, probable and wonderfull Manner. It is an Action related and not repreſented, which diſtinguiſhes an Epick Poem from Tragedy. An Epick Poem is then a Narration, and that Narration muſt be delightfull. For as Tragedy and Epick Poetry are more grave and more philoſophical than Hiſtory, becauſe they are more general, ſo they are more perſuaſive than Philoſophy,

becauſe they are more delightfull; for Pleaſure is the firſt mover of the Soul. It has not the leaſt Motion, Inclination or Tendency, but in order to the being pleas'd: The Men who are moſt abandon'd to intereſt, always propound Delight, and the Miſer himſelf, at the very time that he endures Hunger, and Thirſt, and Cold, and Care, and Anxiety, is a wonderfull Martyr to Pleaſure: But before we come to examine, whether Mr. *Blackmore*'s Narration be or be not delightfull, it will be convenient to anſwer an Objection: For, ſays one, to make ſhort of the matter, the Narration of *Prince Arthur* pleaſes me, and pleaſes ten thouſand more, and therefore it is delightfull. I can bring a Gentleman who will uſe the ſame Argument in the behalf of *Quarles*, that he pleaſes him and ten thouſand more, and therefore he is delightfull. I do not ſay this, to make any compariſon between Mr. *Blackmore* and *Quarles*. I know very well there is none. I only ſay this, to put the Reader in mind, that there is a good taſt, and that there is a bad, and that the latter very often prevails. I am perfectly perſuaded that *Bavius* and *Mævius* had a formidable Party in ancient *Rome*, a Party, who thought them by much ſuperiour both to *Horace* and *Virgil*. For I cannot believe, that thoſe two great Men would have made it their buſineſs, to fix an eternal brand upon them, if they had not been Coxcombs in more than ordinary credit. But ſome will tell me, that Men of good ſence are pleas'd with Mr. *Blackmore*'s Poem: 'Tis granted. But that which

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is commonly called good ſence, is not ſufficient to form a good taſt in Poetry, tho' the good ſence ſhould be joyn'd with an inclination for Poetry, and with a tolerable ſhare of experience in it: For if this were ſufficient, it would undeniably follow, that all who have this Experience, this Inclination, and this good Sence, would have the ſame taſt: whereas it is manifeſt, that they who are not without theſe qualities, differ very conſiderably in their opinions and in their taſts of Verſes and Poems. Nay men differ very much from themſelves. A Man of Sence is a Man of Sence at five and twenty; and yet at that Age he has often a quite different taſt from what he has at five and thirty. I think, I need not be troubled to prove that in each of the Nations of Weſtern *Europe*, there are a great many Men of good Sence, who have an inclination for Poetry, and who are not without ſome experience in it. This will be eaſily granted, nor can that which follows be eaſily denied: That there are ſome of our Neighbouring Nations, in which a good taſt is very rarely or not at all to be found: from whence I conclude, that good Sence and Experience joyned with an inclination for Poetry, are all inſufficient to the forming a good Taſt. I will venture to affirm yet further, that there are ſeveral perſons who are not without a Taſt for the little Poetry, and who can judge exactly of Elegies, and Songs, and Amorous, and Bacchanalian Odes; who can tell whether they have a Poetical Spirit in them, and whether Nature be not too much beholden to Art; I ſay, there

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are ſeveral of theſe, who beſides that their Judgments are often perverted by Affection or Intereſt, which frequently debauch the very underſtanding, as well as they corrupt the Will, have not the leaſt Knowledge of the rules or the leaſt Notion of that which the *French* and we call *Genius*; and conſequently cannot be rightly qualified to judge of the greater Poetry. But here it will be convenient to obviate an Objection. For, ſays one, if a true taſt for Epick Poetry were confin'd to ſo ſmall a number, and conſequently, ſo few were capable of receiving the true delight from it, it would follow from hence, that its Inſtruction, which it conveys to the Reader by pleaſure, would not only be reſtrain'd to a very few, but to thoſe who want it leaſt; whereas a general Inſtruction being deſign'd by it, the Pleaſure muſt be general too. To this I anſwer, Firſt, That by pleaſing the beſt Judges, it will infallibly pleaſe the reſt, and pleaſe them more than it could have done, if the others had not been ſatisfied. Secondly, That if the beſt Judges, and thoſe who have a true taſt are diſguſted, the reſt will quickly be cloy'd. For time will be ſure to propagate Truth, when it is once diſcover'd. Pebbles may, by their falſe glittering, be impos'd on the ignorant for Diamonds, but they cannot be long in an Error. The firſt Artiſt that ſees the Stones will ſoon diſcover their want of Solidity, and others then will find out their want of Beauty. 'Tis in Poems as it is in Stones, Time will eaſily make the Diſcovery, whether they are ſolid or no, and the more ſolid they are found, the more

more and the longer will they be ſeen to ſhine, for their full and their laſting Luſtre depends on their perfect Solidity. But now if any one ſhall tell me, that Perſons every way qualified for Judges, commend Mr. *Blackmore*'s Poem; to that I anſwer, that there are ſeveral things in it, which may ſtand before the ſtricteſt Judges. But that the greater part of the Narration, neither is nor can be delightfull to Men of the beſt taſt, is what I ſhall now endeavour to prove.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

THere are three things which render a Narration delightfull: Firſt, The Perſons that are introduc'd in it. Secondly, The Things related in it. And Thirdly, The Manner of relating them. I ſhall begin with the Perſons that are introduc'd. In ſpeaking of which, I ſhall be the more ſuccinct, becauſe *Boſſu* has ſo fully, and ſo admirably treated of them, that ſcarce any thing can be added to what he has ſaid, and the Reader may very well be referr'd to him. The Perſons then introduc'd in an Epick Poem, ought to have Manners: that is, their Diſcourſe and their Actions ought to diſcover their Inclinations and their Affections, and what Reſolutions they are certain to take. The Manners then are to appear of the Perſons that are introduc'd, and they are to have four Qualities. Firſt, They are to be Good. Secondly, They are to be Like. Thirdly, They are to be Convenient. And Fourthly, they are to be Equal. Firſt, They are to be Good: By Goodneſs, I do not mean a Moral Goodneſs; for the Manners may be Poetically Good, tho' they are Morally Vicious. The Manners then are Poetically Good, when they are well mark'd; that is, when the Diſcourſe and the Actions of the Perſons which are introduc'd, make us clearly and diſtinctly ſee their Inclinations and their Affections, ſuch as they are, and make us judge by the Goodneſs or the Pravity of

of thoſe Inclinations, what good or what evil Reſolutions they are certain to take. The Manners of the Perſons then ought to be good, that is, they ought to be well mark'd: and this Goodneſs is the firſt and fundamental Quality of the Manners, without which, they can have none of the other three; for if they are not well mark'd, it is impoſſible they ſhould be Like, or Convenient, or Equal. And they are to be Good, not only upon the Account of Inſtruction; (for an Action inſtructing by its Cauſes, which Cauſes are the Manners, unleſs I can be certain, what the Principles of the Agents are, I can never deduce any certain Moral from the Action) but they are likewiſe to be good, that the Narration may be delightfull. The Man who ſeeks to entertain himſelf in an Epick Poem, where the Manners of the Perſons are not diſtinctly mark'd, is like one who goes for Converſation into a ſtrange Company, where they are all reſerv'd; upon which reſervedneſs he grows uneaſie, and ſtretches and gapes, and takes the firſt opportunity to be gone, whereas, if that company had diſcours'd and had acted ſo freely, as to have diſcover'd their real Sentiments, and ſo to have made themſelves known; they would not only by that means have ſecur'd his Attention, but ſuch of them, whoſe Inclinations and Humours he had lik'd, would have inſinuated themſelves into his Affection, and by little and little engaged him to wiſh them well. The proper delight which Poetry gives us, it gives us by Imitation. Now the Perſons that it introdu-

ces are design'd for Imitations of Men; but they cannot be Imitations of Men, unless the Manners are clearly mark'd: For as I can discern in every Man, with whom I converse for any time, and attentively, how he stands inclin'd and affected, if he is not reserv'd; So if I do not make this discovery in the principal Persons, which are introduced in an Epick Poem, I strait conclude, that those Poetical Persons are not Imitations of Men, but only Fantoms and meer Chimera's.

And so much for the first and fundamental Quality of the Manners, which is their Goodness. The second is their Likeness. But this has relation only to known Characters: That is, to such as have been made famous by History or Common receiv'd Opinion. When a Poet introduces any such notorious Person, he is to paint him with the very same Qualities, which he is known to have had, or to have. And a Poet, who would please, must be sure to keep this Resemblance: For otherwise, he does like a Man who pretends to give me a Character of an old Acquaintance; and gives him such Qualities as I am certain he never had. Which makes me conclude, that this Giver of Characters is either incapable of knowing Mankind, or else he raises my Indignation by endeavouring so grosly to impose upon me. Monsieur *Dacier* has observ'd, that Monsieur *Racine* has offended against this second Quality of the Manners in his *Hippolytus*; for he has made him a Lover. Mr. *Dryden* made the same Observation before him in his Preface to *All for Love*.

Love. If I would reckon up all our Tragedies, whoſe Characters are not reſembling, it would be a very tedious Catalogue. We need not wonder at it, ſince we have ſo few of our Tragedies that have the firſt fundamental Quality of the Manners, and have any Characters at all. The third Quality of the Manners, is their Convenience: They ought to be agreeable to the Age, the Sex, the Climate, the Rank, the Condition of the Perſon that has them. And the Manners ought to have this convenience particularly in the principal Perſons of a Tragedy, and of an Epick Poem, for the following Reaſons. For, firſt, thoſe principal Perſons being Illuſtrious, and by their high Station rendring the Action important, if a Poet gives them any baſe Qualities, unworthy of their Rank, and unbecoming of their Power and Place, he manifeſtly corrupts the Dignity of his Characters, and the Majeſty of his Poem: And conſequently makes an abſurd and unnatural mixture, which will be ſure to diſguſt all who are able to judge. Secondly, He offends againſt that Precept of *Ariſtotle* for drawing the beſt Likeneſs. He is to do like a good Painter, he is to draw his Character like; but he is to conceal its Blemiſhes, if it has any, and is to give it all the Imbelliſhments, which will not corrupt its Reſemblance: For it is a Poet's buſineſs to pleaſe, and it is ſelf-evident that a beſt Likeneſs will pleaſe more than a worſt. In order to the giving this beſt Likeneſs, a Poet is not ſo much to conſult Nature in any particular Perſon, which is but a Copy, and an imperfect

perfect Copy of Universal Nature; he is to examine that Universal Nature, which is always perfect, and to consult the Original Idea's of things, which in a Sovereign manner are beautifull. This is the Precept of *Aristotle*, and his Interpreter *Horace*.

Respicere exemplar Vitæ, morumque jubebo
Doctum Imitatorem & veras hinc ducere voces.

Thus if a Poet is to draw a King or a great Captain, which are famous in History, he is to draw his Characters like, that his Manners may have the second Quality, which *Aristotle* and Nature with him requires. But that they may have the third Qualification likewise, if History has given that King or that Captain, any shamefull Frailty, or low Vice, which are unworthy of the Majesty of the one, and of the high Command of the other; the Poet is oblig'd to conceal that Frailty, and to dissemble that Vice. He is not indeed to give them the Excellence which is oppos'd to the Frailty, or the Virtue which is contrary to the Vice, with which they are attainted by History: Because that would be manifestly to destroy the Resemblance. But he is to give them all the Imbellishments which may be becoming of the Dignity, and not destructive of the Likeness. And therefore in drawing a King, or a great Captain, he is to consider what Inclinations, what Sentiments, and what Designs may be probably inspir'd by those high Offices; and then to choose such as may neither destroy the Resemblance of his Cha-

Characters, nor oppoſe the Deſign of his Action. *Ariſtotle* has taken notice that *Euripides* has offended againſt this convenience of the Manners, in the *Ulyſſes* of his *Icylla*, and in his *Menalippe*, whom, tho' a Woman, and young, he has introduc'd as perfectly inſtructed in the Phyſical Doctrine of *Anaxagoras*. The ſame *Euripides* has offended againſt this third Quality of the Manners in his *Hippolytus*. For *Phædra*, in the Scene in which ſhe diſcovers her Love for her Son, ſpeaks too Philoſophically either for her Sex or for her preſent Condition. For a Speculative or a Sententious Diſcourſe; beſides, that it puts a ſtop to the Action of the Poem, is by no means the Language of a very violent Paſſion. I the rather mention this, becauſe Mr. *Rymer*, who has Tranſlated this Scene of *Euripides*, in his Obſervations upon the Tragedies of the laſt Age, has been ſo far from finding this fault, that he rather ſeems to miſtake it for an Excellence. I had once ſome thoughts of bringing *Hippolytus* upon the *Engliſh* Stage. In order to which, I had imitated the foremention'd Scene of *Euripides*; in imitating which, I took care to avoid his Defects, as *Racine* had judiciouſly ſhewn me the way; who has copied all the Beauties of the *Grecian*, and has prudently declin'd his faults. I have caus'd it to be printed at the end of this Chapter, that the Reader, by comparing it with Mr. *Rymer*'s Tranſlation of *Euripides*, may ſee his fault againſt the convenience of the Manners more clearly, and may meet with a little diverſion amidſt the barrenneſs of theſe dry Specula-

tions. One reaſon, amongſt others, why I did not finiſh that Tragedy, was, becauſe I ſaw there was a neceſſity either for deſtroying the Likeneſs of the Manners in the Perſon of *Hippolytus*, or for introducing a Character, that would by no means be proper for the *Engliſh* Stage. But it is time to proceed to the fourth Condition of the Manners, and that is their Equality. The Manners are to be conſtant and conſiſtent. Every Perſon is ſo clearly to be ſhown at his firſt appearance, that he may afterwards aſſume no reſolution, which may deceive the Expectation which he gave of himſelf at firſt. This Equality of the Manners muſt be maintain'd for the following Reaſons. Firſt, becauſe it is ſo in Nature; which every Poet imitates; and by the imitation of which alone he can pretend to delight. For Nature, for the moſt part, is uniform and regular, and maintains a conſtant courſe. Indeed ſometimes, for the ſake of variety, ſhe appears unequal and irregular; and therefore when a Poet copies ſuch an Original, *Ariſtotle* allows him to copy him like; but in order to the doing that, he is to draw him every-where equally unequal and irregular. But ſecondly, this Equality of the Manners muſt be maintain'd on the account of the Moral. For ſince every Action inſtructs by its Cauſes, which Cauſes are the Manners; how can I deduce a certain Moral, from the Event of that Action, whoſe Cauſes are contradictory. But thirdly, the Manners muſt be maintain'd; becauſe unleſs they have Equality, they have neither the requiſite Goodneſs, nor the Conveniency. This

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is Monſieur *Dacier*'s Reaſon, and it is very ſolid. As I ſhall ſhow by Example. *Euripides* has offended againſt this Equality of the Manners in his *Iphigenia* in *Aulis*. For the timorous and ſuppliant *Iphigenia* that appears at firſt, is by no means the ſame with that generous Princeſs, who ſo nobly contemns Death for her Father's Glory and the Confederate Cauſe. The Manners then in *Iphigenia* are not well mark'd, and conſequently are not good. For how can I believe, by what ſhe appears at firſt, that ſhe will at laſt aſſume that heroick Reſolution of joyfully reſigning her Life for the good of her Country? Nor are the Manners in her convenient. For if the Exceſs of Fear, which ſhe ſhows at firſt is becoming of her; the Exceſs of Courage, which ſhe ſhows at laſt, muſt by conſequence be very undecent in her. But I think we may ſafely affirm, That neither is that Exceſs of Fear becoming of her Rank, nor that Exceſs of Courage of her Sex. And ſo there appears in one Character a double inconveniency of Manners. And thus we have gone through the four Conditions of the Manners, and have given the Reaſons why they ought to be good; that is, why they ought to be well mark'd; why they ought to be convenient; why they ought to be like, and why they ought to be equal. But in ſpeaking of the firſt Condition of the Manners, I omitted a very important thing. I ſhow'd, that by their Goodneſs, I meant a Poetical and not a Moral Goodneſs: that the manners may be Poetically Good, tho' they are Morally Vicious. But this I forgot to add,

That they are never to be Morally Vicious, unleſs it appears to be neceſſary, and that there is to be no vice in any, eſpecially, in the principal Characters; unleſs the Action and the Fable require it. And thus we have laid down the Doctrine of the two great Criticks, *Ariſtotle* and *Horace* in relation to the Manners. Let us now take notice of two or three very important Precepts, which *Boſſu* has grounded upon that Doctrine, and which he has drawn from his piercing Obſervations of the Conduct of *Homer* and *Virgil.* The firſt Precept is grounded upon the firſt Condition that *Ariſtotle* preſcribes for the Manners. And there is the ſame reaſon for it: For the Manners are to be good, that is, they are to be well mark'd; becauſe Poetry is an Imitation of Nature, and the Perſons in a Poem are Imitations of Men. Now it is plain, that any Man who talks without any reſerve, will, in ſome meaſure, ſhow how he is inclin'd and affected. And therefore a Poet is to mark the Manners of his Perſon, ſo as to ſhow how they are inclin'd and affected. But that is not all, ſays *Boſſu*, he is to mark the Manners of his principal Perſons ſo clearly and ſo fully, as to diſtinguiſh them from the reſt of Men. Becauſe to do that, is to imitate Nature exactly; without an exact Imitation of whom, a Poet cannot give perfect delight, Now this is certain, that Nature has as much diſtinguiſh'd every individual Man by the turn of his Mind, as by the form of his Countenance. *Boſſu* has obſerv'd, that there are Qualities of three ſorts which go to the compoſing

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the Character of the Hero of an Epick Poem. The first sort are such as are absolutely necessary for the Fable, and for the Action. And those are always not only to appear, but to appear predominant over the rest, so as that the Hero is to be known and distinguish'd by them. The Qualities of the second sort are such as are to embellish the first. And the third are such as are to sustain them both. The first of these Qualities in the Hero of *Virgil*, is the transcendent Goodness of his Nature. The second Quality, which beautifies and exalts the first, is his solid Piety, and the entire Resignation of his Will to the Gods. The third Quality, and that which sustains the two first, is an Heroick Fortitude, which is absolutely necessary for the carrying on a great Design; and such is the Design of the Hero of an Epick Poem. And thus, in the Character of *Ulysses*, we find Dissimulation set off by Prudence, and sustain'd by Valour. And the first of these Qualities which distinguishes the Hero, is always to appear, as we said above, and is always to predominate over the rest: Nay, it is to reign in those very Episodes, which appear to be contrary to the predominant Quality of the Hero. Thus the Character of *Achilles*'s Rage is set off by a noble Vehemence, and sustain'd by a wonderfull Valour. But Rage is the principal Quality, and therefore that always appears. *Achilles* is angry, whether present or absent; and he is as furious in the Council where he seditiously threatens his General, and in the Funeral Rites of *Patroclus*, where he drags about the Body of

Hector, as he is in the Combat. The fundamental Quality of *Æneas* his Character, is the tranſcendent Goodneſs of his Nature; which was eaſie to be maintain'd in the firſt ſix Books of the *Æneis*, becauſe they ſeem to require a ſweetneſs of Nature. But the ſix laſt are full of the Horrours and Diſtractions of War, where it was no eaſie matter to make this fundamental Quality of the Hero's Character ſhine. The fourth Condition which *Ariſtotle* preſcribes for the Manners, which is their Equality requir'd, that *Æneas*, who in the former part of the Poem had ſhown ſo much Goodneſs of Nature, ſhould ſhow no Cruelty in the latter; but it requir'd no more. If *Æneas*, in the latter part of the Poem, had ſhown Heroick Fortitude without Compaſſion or Cruelty, the Equality of the Manners had been maintain'd; becauſe there had been nothing in one part of them, which could be thought contrary to the other. But now ſee the Precept that *Boſſu* has grounded upon this fourth Precept of *Ariſtotle*. It is not ſufficient, ſays he, that the Manners be equal; there muſt beſides be an Unity of Character, and the Hero muſt every-where appear to be animated with the ſame Spirit which inſpir'd him at firſt. That Quality which makes the fundamental Part of his Character, is to predominate always, and upon all Occaſions. For it is that which diſtinguiſhes him from all other Perſons, and makes him ſuch an individual Hero; and therefore as ſoon as he loſes that, he certainly loſes his Character. And therefore *Æneas* ſhows the ſame ſweetneſs of

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Temper in killing *Lauſus*, that he did in the diſtribution of the Rewards at the Funeral Rites of his Father. Thus has *Boſſu*, from obſerving the Conduct of *Homer* and *Virgil*, judiciouſly grounded two Precepts upon the firſt and fourth Condition, which *Ariſtotle* preſcribes for the Manners. The Poet is not only to mark the Inclinations and Affections of his Hero; but he is to mark them in ſuch a Manner, as clearly to diſtinguiſh him from all other Perſons, and to conſtitute him that individual Hero. In the next place, the Poet is to take care, not only that his Hero appears to have no contrary Sentiments, which the fourth Condition of the Manners requires; but that the Quality, which is the Foundation of his Character, and which conſtitutes him that individual Hero, ſhould always ſhine, and always predominate, either on like or on contrary Occaſions. *Boſſu* has gone yet further, and by obſerving the Conduct of the two Princes of Poets, has clearly ſhown us, that this Quality, which is the Foundation of the Hero's Character, and which muſt always predominate in him, muſt alſo ſhine throughout the reſt of the Poem, and be ſeen to prevail in the reſt of the Perſons, even in the oppoſite Characters, whoſe very Natures are to be ſubjected to the Hero's Nature as he ſubdues their Perſons; that all the parts of the Poem, as parts of one and the ſame Body, may appear to have the ſame Nature, and to be animated all with the ſame commanding Spirit: From a conſideration of which exact Uniformity as from an exact Imitation of Nature, a Sovereign

Delight muſt reſult to diſcerning Readers: I ſhould be too tedious, if I ſhould ſhow how *Virgil* has brought about this by the Paſſions and the Dependencies, which he has given to the Characters which he has oppos'd to his Hero. Beſides, I ſhall have occaſion to ſay ſomething of this, when I come to examine Mr. *Blackmore*'s Characters. But I deſire leave to go back a little, and to take notice of an obſervation, which *Boſſu* has made upon the firſt condition of the Manners. The Manners, ſays he, are to be good; that is, they are to be well mark'd, but they are not to be ſhown ſo fully in ſome Perſons as they are to be ſhown in others; for every Man's Character is to appear no further than he is concern'd in the Action. This obſervation of *Boſſu* is a plain conſequence of the Doctrine of *Ariſtotle*; for ſays he, ἔξει δ' ἦθος μὲν ἐὰν ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη ποιῇ φανερὸν ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ πρᾶξις προαίρεσίν τινα. Then the Manners are good, when a Perſon ſhews by his diſcourſe or by Actions, what choice or what reſolution he will take: That is, when a Perſon by his preſent Sentiments, and by his preſent Actions makes us foreſee the Future, then are the Manners of that Poetical Perſon good. Now it is plain, that a Man, by what he ſays, or what he does, can never ſhow what he will do, unleſs, what he ſays, or what he does, is efficient of what he will do; which can never appear till the thing is done. From whence it clearly follows, that the Manners can never be well mark'd; and that they are Poetically bad, when they do not influence the Action. *Ariſtotle* has formally declar'd

clar'd it a little lower, ἔστι δὲ παραδεῖγμα πονηρίας μὲν ἤθους μὴ ἀναγκαίου. The Manners when they are not neceſſary, are Poetically bad. Now they can never be neceſſary, but as they are Cauſes of Action. And indeed, ſince the Action of a Poem is only for Inſtruction, and it inſtructs by its Cauſes, which Cauſes are the Manners; I cannot find out a Reaſon why any Manners ſhould be ſhown, which are not Cauſes of the Action. Thus we have conſider'd the Manners according to the Doctrine of *Ariſtotle* and *Horace*, and the Obſervations of *Boſſu*. We have ſhown that they are to be well mark'd; that they are to be convenient; that they are to be like; and that they are to be equal; and that beſides this, a Unity of Character is to be preſerv'd in the Hero, and to be maintain'd through the Poem. I ſhall now give the Reader the fore-mention'd Scene, and then proceed to conſider the Characters which are to be found in *Prince Arthur*.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

FOR the better understanding of the following Scene, it will be necessary to premise some things which are out of the Action, and some which are deliver'd in the foregoing Scene.

Phædra was the Daughter of *Minos* and *Pasiphae*, and the Sister of *Ariadne*. *Pasiphae* was the Daughter of the *Sun*, who had discover'd the Intrigue between *Mars* and *Venus*, which Goddess had resolv'd to revenge the Discovery upon all his unhappy Off-spring. The incestuous Passion of *Pasiphae* is very well known, and so is the Love of her Daughter *Ariadne*, who was abandon'd by *Theseus* on the Shore of *Naxos*, one of the *Ægæan* Isles. *Theseus* afterwards married her Sister *Phædra*; who, upon her first Arrival at *Athens*, fell desperately in Love with *Hippolitus* the Son of *Theseus* by an *Amazonian* Lady. But *Phædra* being a Lady of a great deal of Virtue, look'd upon so criminal a Passion with Horror, and resisted its violence with the last Reluctancy. She kept what she felt conceal'd from all the World, even from *Euphrasia* her Friend and her Confident, who came from *Crete* with her. She pretended a Mother-in-Law's Aversion for *Hippolytus*, and caus'd him to be banish'd her Presence, and commanded that no one on pain of Death, should presume to pronounce his Name in her hearing; and at last prevailed upon *Theseus*, by her

her importunity to ſend his Son to *Tretzene*, a Town that belong'd to him, and ſituated upon the *Ægæan* Sea on the Coaſt of *Peloponneſus*. Time, at length, had palliated her Paſſion, which it was not in its power to cure, when at three years end, ſhe was carried by her Huſband to *Tretzene*, which he look'd upon to be a proper place for her Reſidence, while he took a Journey with *Pirithous* into *Epirus*. *Phædra* ſaw *Hippolytus* in her Husband's Abſence, at the ſight of whom her Paſſion broke out with ſo much redoubled Fury, that this unfortunate Lady ſaw very well, that nothing leſs than dying could preſerve her Honour and Innocence: ſhe reſolv'd to die then, and for three days and nights had neither ſlept nor receiv'd any Suſtenance; at the end of which time, the Action of the Play begins, which is open'd by *Hippolytus* and his Friend *Alcander*, who prepare the Audience for the following Scene. *Phædra* reſolves once more to behold the light, in order to which, ſhe ſends *Euphraſia* before, to clear the outward Court of the Palace. *Hippolytus*, who delighted in Hunting and Horſe-races, and who was by nature averſe from Love, did not in the leaſt gueſs at the Paſſion of *Phædra*. And *Euphraſia* reſolv'd to take this opportunity for the making a laſt Effort to oblige her diſtreſs to diſcover the cauſe of ſo violent and ſo ſtrange a diſorder. Three things diſſuaded me from the going on with this Play: The firſt was, That its Subject appears to depend too much on the fabulous Hiſtory. The ſecond was, That I could not be reconcil'd to the fatal neceſſity

neceſſity which lay upon *Phædra*, and which was the original cauſe of her ruin. The third was, The neceſſity that there was for the framing the Character of *Hippolytus* not reſembling, or the forming it improper for the *Engliſh* Stage, which will never endure, that the principal Perſon of the *Drama* ſhould be averſe from Love.

Hippolytus, Alcander, Euphraſia.

Euph. *LOok down relentleſs Heav'n, look down: ah Prince!*
Could ever trouble be compar'd to mine?
Amain the dreadfull hour comes hurrying on,
When the unhappy Queen muſt be no more:
Ev'n in my Arms, ſhe languiſhing expires,
But ſtubbornly conceals the fatal Cauſe.
Some ſecret Charm eclipſes all her brightneſs,
Which ſtruggles with eternal Night in vain.
Now Paſſion plays the Tyrant in her Soul,
And raging, tears her from the arms of Fate
To ſee the Sun once more. Her awfull grief
Commands that all reſpect it and retire.
But ſee, ſhe comes.

Hipp. *Enough, I'll inſtantly withdraw,*
And not inhance it by my hatefull Preſence.

Exeunt Hipp. Alc.

Enter Phædra.

Phæd. *Stop, ſtop* Euphraſia, *for I faint, I die;*
My trembling Knees betray their lifeleſs burden;
Alas I die, ſupport the wretched Phædra.

My

My Eyes are dazled at th' unwonted light,
And ev'ry Object ſeems to dance around them:
The World appears to move in haſt before me,
And in the hurry leaves me.

Euph. *Ye Pow'rs, ye cruel Pow'rs, can you*
ſee this?
And can you perſevere?

Phæd. *Gods! how theſe ornamental Trifles*
plague me.
What vain officious hand, has with ſuch care,
Compos'd my Dreſs, and rank'd my plaited Hair;
O fond Attempt to beautifie Deſpair!
How ev'ry thing torments me? ev'ry thing conſpires
T'undo me more? haſt, haſt, let me be gone,
And hide my Face for ever.

Euph. *How all her wiſhes contradicting claſh?*
'Tis ſcarce an hour, ſince you your ſelf condemn'd
Your barbarous Deſign upon your ſelf:
Since you provok'd your Woman's artfull Hand,
T'adorn you like the charming Queen of Athens,
The beauteous Partner of a Hero's Bed.
'Tis but a moment ſince you wiſh'd once more,
To ſee the chearfull, lovely Face of day,
And can it be thus hatefull grown already?

Phæd. *Bright, glorious Founder of a mournfull*
Race:
O thou of whom my lofty Mother dar'd
To boaſt her ſelf aloud, the high born Daughter!
Refulgent God, who now perhaps mayſt bluſh
At the diſtraction of abandon'd Phædra:
Of thee, O Sun, I come to take my leave,
To take my leave for ever.

Euph. *What? ſtill thus obſtinately bent on*
Fate?

What?

What? ſtill preparing thus to meet that Death,
Which but too faſt advances?

Phæd. *Gods! how I hate theſe Walls, this loathſome Court.*
O for the Chaſe, the Woods enchanting Sport!
Hark! the ſhril Cornet thro' the Groves reſounds!
Hark! the young Hunter chears his fainting Hounds!
How to the charming cry my raviſh'd Heart rebounds!

Euph. *Madam, what means!* ——

Phæd. *Quickly let ſome tranſport me to the Barriers,*
Whence with immortal Raptures, I may ſee,
The Hero in his glorious Flight to Conqueſt,
Whilſt his exulting Chariot ſmoaks
Along the duſty Plain.

Euph. *Madam, this wild Diſcourſe.*——

Phæd. *Ah, Wretch! Ah, curſt of Heav'n! what have I ſaid?*
And whither have my fatal Wiſhes hurry'd me?
O whither is my wandring reaſon ſtray'd?
Alas 'tis gone, 'tis flown, for ever loſt;
For ſo the Gods, the cruel Gods determine.
Hide me, Euphraſia, *or I bluſh to Death:*
Confuſion! ev'ry way my Blood rebels:
Too much I have expos'd my ſhamefull Grief,
Yet ſtill in ſpight of me the ſtreaming Tears
Flow on.

Euph. *If you muſt bluſh, bluſh rather at your Silence,*
Whoſe ſtubbornneſs exaſperates your Grief,
And makes it ſting the fiercer.
Why are you deaf to entreaties and Advice?
Why pertinaciouſly reſolv'd on Ruin?

What

What Fury drives you to provoke the Fates,
While all your wondrous Beauty's in the Bloom,
And greedy Death reſpects your Form divine.
What deadly draught has tainted your pure Blood?
Or Magick Charm has over-turn'd your Mind?
Thrice have the rowling Heav'ns obſcur'd the World,
Since ſleep has been a Stranger to your Eyes.
Thrice has the glittering God of Day diſpers'd
The Shades, and thrice illuſtrated all Nature,
Since you receiv'd the frail Support of Life.
How durſt you thus attempt your own Deſtruction?
Think, you offend the Gods who gave you Being:
Think, that your Husband you betray, to whom
Your ſolemn Faith was plighted.

Phæd. *Ah miſerable me!*

Euph. *Nay, you betray your poor unhappy Children,*
And bring them under a hard Yoke, for know,
That the black hour which ſees their Mother die,
Will animate the ſtrangers haughty Son;
That Son which a Barbarian *bore to* Theſeus,
That mortal Enemy to you, to yours,
Hippolytus! Hippolytus!

Phæd. *Ah Gods!*

Euph. *Ha! this touches to the Quick, this ſtings you.*

Phæd. *What haſt thou done? what fatal Name eſcap'd thee?*

Euph. *Ah, now indeed your rage breaks out with Reaſon;*
At that dire Name I love to ſee you tremble:
Live then, let Love and Duty joyn'd prevail:
Oh live, and let not a Barbarian's *Son,*
Oppreſſing yours with his deteſted Sway,

Inſult

Inſult the richeſt Blood of Greece,
The Progeny of Gods.
But quickly live, the leaſt delay proves mortal;
With utmoſt ſpeed your broken Strength repair,
Whilſt yet life's waſted lamp burns glimmering on,
And yet may be recruited.

Phæd. *Too long it has already burnt,*
And with too guilty Fires.

Euph. *Ha! can it be remorſe that tears you thus?*
What horrid crime creates this dire diſturbance?
Your hands were ne'er embrued in guiltleſs Blood.

Phæd. *My hands, I thank the Gods, were never ſtain'd:*
Oh! had thoſe Gods but kept my Heart as ſpotleſs.

Euph. *What horrible deſign has that concern'd;*
The very thought of which thus ſhakes your Nature.

Phæd: *Hold there, upon thy life no more, for know,*
I die t'avoid that terrible Confeſſion.

Euph. *Then die, perſiſting in your barbarous ſilence;*
But think not, I ſhall cloſe your Eyes in Death,
Or fondly your untimely Fate deplore.
No, while you fainting, linger o'er the Precipice;
I'll run, and down I'll take a deſperate leap
To the Infernal World before you.
Why have I met with this inhumane uſage?
Have I in all my life-time once deceiv'd you?
For this has my firm Faith ſeverely ſtood
A thouſand Trials? Have I left for this,
My Children, Parents, Kindred, Countrey, all,
To follow you to proud inſulting Athens?
Have I left all, and am I thus rewarded?

Phæd.

Phæd. *Why wilt thou offer ſuch ungrateful violence?*
If this infernal Secret once eſcapes me;
Think, that 'twill bring Confuſion to thy quiet;
Tremblings will ſeize thy feeble Limbs,
And Horrors ſhake thy Soul.

Euph. *Your Death would ſhake it with exceſs of Horror,*
And all that damn'd deſpair could e'er inflict,
To plague the wretch by Gods and Men forſaken.

Phæd. *Tho' thou ſhouldſt know the Crime, whoſe Weight o'erwhelms me,*
And ſinks me down to Hell, I yet muſt down;
But blacker fall, a guiltier Ghoſt deſcend.

Euph. *By all my Tears, my Bitterneſs of woe;*
And by my faithfull Heart, which now weeps Blood for you;
By your dear trembling Knees which thus I graſp,
Speak out, and clear the Doubt which now diſtracts me.

Phæd. *Riſe, thou wilt have it ſo, thou ſhalt be ſatisfied.*

Euph. *Speak, I'm all Ear, I have no Senſe but Hearing.*

Phæd. *Lightning this moment blaſt me! What can I ſay?*
Or where can I begin?

Euph. *By all the Gods, I here conjure you ſpeak,*
And with vain Terrors pierce my Soul no more.

Phæd. *O dreadful Hatred of revengeful* Venus!
O Fury fatal to our mournful Line!
To what prodigious things did Love compel,
And goad my raving Mother?

Euph. *Let them be buried in eternal ſilence.*

And rot the Tongue, and rot th' audacious Hand,
That dares tranſmit them to the Times to come.

Phæd. *Poor* Ariadne! *loſt, abandon'd Siſter!*
How moſt deplorably the love-ſick Maid
Dy'd on the Shore, where my falſe Hero left her?

Euph. *Againſt your whole unhappy Line.*
What mortal rage provokes you?

Phæd. *Yes, ſince the cruel Goddeſs has decreed it;*
I fall the laſt of our unhappy Race;
The laſt and moſt deplorable.

Euph. *Are you diſturb'd by Love's unruly Fires?*

Phæd. *His Fires? His Flames which rage with utmoſt Fury,*
While my Heart feels what never Tongue can utter.

Euph. *For whom?*

Phæd. *Ay, there's the dire demand, which when 'tis anſwer'd,*
Will freeze thy Blood with Horror, ſhake thy Frame,
And overturn thy Nature. Know I love——
But 'twill not out, my guilty Soul ſtarts back,
And wants the pow'r t' inform its vocal Organs.
I love ——

Euph. *His Name?*

Phæd. *Gods! how I ſhudder at that fatal Name?*
I love——

Euph. *I grow impatient, Whom?*

Phæd. *Doſt thou not know that Son of the* Barbarian?
That Prince, whom I my ſelf ſo long oppreſt?

Euph. Hippolytus! *Confuſion!* Hippolytus!

Phæd. *I ſaid it not, 'tis thou thy ſelf haſt nam'd him.*

Euph.

Euph. *O Heav'ns! O Earth! and ye infernal Pow'rs:*
By what I have heard, we're ſunk and loſt for ever.
O Horror! Height of Horror! O Deſpair!
O ſtrange unutterable Guilt!
O miſerable Race!
Black fatal Voyage! execrable Soil!
Why have I liv'd t'approach thy balefull Shore?
Phæd. *Thou ſeeſt no new, no tranſitory Grief,*
But long it has been raging.
Scarce was my ſolemn Faith to Theſeus *plighted,*
And I the Partner of a Hero's Bed:
By all the world, and by my ſelf thought happy.
When Athens *ſhow'd me firſt my haughty Enemy;*
I ſaw him, and I trembled at the ſight;
Trembled and bluſh'd, turn'd pale, and burnt, and ſhiver'd,
Whilſt ſtrange diſorder ſeiz'd my aſtoniſh'd Soul,
Confounded by a ſtroke unſeen.
My Eyes, my Ears, my Voice, with all my Pow'rs,
But that of feeling in a moment fail'd;
I felt ſo much, that I could only feel:
Then I th' inexorable Goddeſs knew,
And her devouring Flames, th'avoidleſs Plagues
Of our unhappy Race, which her fierce Anger
To Extirpation urges.
But yet I thought my fervent Supplications,
And low Submiſſions might avert her Wrath,
And vainly hop'd t'aſſwage immortal Fury.
I built th' incens'd divility a Temple,
Where I whole Hecatombs of Victims ſlew,
And in their panting Hearts, I ſought my abſent Reaſon.
Weak Remedies! and mortal the Diſtemper.

For whilſt my coſtly Gums perfum'd the Shrine,
And my fond Tongue implor'd th' avenging Goddeſs;
My Soul ador'd Hippolytus *alone,*
Hippolytus *alone was always preſent to me,*
Ev'n at the ſmoaking Altar where I ſacrific'd;
I offer'd all to him, the God,
Whoſe Name I durſt not utter.
But yet my conſcious Vertue ſtrugled ſtill;
I ſhun'd him, as I would have ſhun'd Deſtruction:
But O extremity of mortal Wo!
Shunning, I meet him in his Fathers Features.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

LET us now consider the Manners that are to be found in *Prince Arthur*. We will begin with those which are in the Hero himself. We have said above, that *Bossu* has observ'd, that the qualities, which compose the Character of the Hero, ought to be mainly three. The First of which is such as is necessary for the Fable and for the Action, which in *Æneas* is the transcendent *Goodness* of his *Nature*, which is the cause of the Subjection and Resignation of his Will to the Gods. The Second, is the Embellishment of the First, which in *Æneas* is his *Piety*. The Third, is that which sustains them both, which in *Æneas*, is *Heroick Fortitude*, and which ought to be inseparable from the Hero of ev'ry Poem, because Valour is necessary for the carrying on a great design. The first of these Qualities is the Characteristical Mark of the Hero, it is that which distinguishes him from all other Men, and therefore it is that which ought always to appear; because when the Hero loses that, he certainly loses his Character. Let us now proceed to examine the Qualities that compose the Character of *Arthur*. In order to which, let us survey him at his first appearance, while he is toss'd by the Fury of that Storm, which Mr. *Blackmore* endeavours to describe so terribly.

When the juſt Arthur *fil'd with Grief and Dread,*
And pale confuſion, deeply ſigh'd and ſaid,
O righteous Heav'n, why haſt thou rang'd this day
Againſt me all thy Terrors in Array?
Arm'd in thy Cauſe thy Temples to reſtore,
And give that Aid thy ſacred Prieſts implore.
If thou ſuch fierce deſtruction doſt diſpence,
To puniſh ſome unpardon'd old Offence;
On me let all thy fiery Darts be ſpent;
Let not my crime involve the Innocent.
Whelm o'er my guilty Head theſe raging Seas,
And let this Sacrifice thy Wrath appeaſe,
But let the Britiſh *Youth return in Peace.*

Here are two Qualities which are apparent in *Arthur*: The one is his Piety, and the other his Concern for his People. But the Reader will be apt to ſay, That the Hero appears to be afraid here. We know it very well, and we are very willing to excuſe it; becauſe Mr. *Blackmore* may very juſtly defend it: He is afraid indeed, but not for himſelf, it is for thoſe for whom his Duty oblig'd him to appear concern'd. The pious Prince is afraid for his People.

Let us now conſider him after the Storm. As ſoon as that was allay'd, by the Vertue of *Uriel*, *Prince Arthur*, whoſe Ship had ſtruck on a Quickſand upon the Coaſts of *Armorica*, leaves it, and makes to ſhore in his Boat, where as ſoon as he arrives, he returns thanks to Heaven for his own Preſervation, and prays for that of his abſent Friends. Then he climbs the Rock, to ſee what Ships he can deſcry, but not

ſo

ſo much as one ſail appears in view. Return'd he makes a Speech of forty Lines to his Men, crowded with Sentences and with ſpeculative Notions, of which the latter end is only to the Purpoſe, and that I beg leave to recite.

We arm'd thus to reſtore in Hell's Deſpight,
To Heav'n its Worſhip, and to Men their Right:
Reſume your Courage then, it can't be true,
That Heav'ns Revenge, ſhould Heav'ns own cauſe purſue.
Theſe Evils are not in Diſpleaſure meant;
Heav'n is too juſt, and you too innocent.
Succeſs and Triumph will our Arms attend,
And theſe rough ways lead to a glorious End.

This is what they call *oratio morata.* For here *Arthur* once more makes a Diſcovery of his Piety and his Concern for his People. And here too he ſhows another Quality, which did not appear before, and that is his Courage. Here then are three Qualities, which are conſpicuous in *Arthur*, his Piety, his Concern for his People, and his Courage. But where all this while is the Characteriſtical Mark of the Hero? Where is the Quality that diſtinguiſhes him from all other Heroes? *Æneas* was pious and Valiant, and was concern'd for his People; and ſo was *Godfrey* of *Bolloign.* How is *Arthur* different from the Hero of *Virgil* or *Taſſo?* where is that Quality, that ought always to be ſeen in him to preſerve the Unity of his Character, and which like an univerſal Soul, ought to run thro' the Poem, and to animate every

part of it? It was obſerv'd in the former part of this Treatiſe, that the principal Perſon of the Poem remains at the bottom, univerſal and allegorical; from whence it follows, that the principal Qualities which compoſe that Character, ought likewiſe to be univerſal and allegorical. Now I think it would be needleſs to go about to prove, that the Concern which *Prince Arthur* ſhews for his Subjects, is not an univerſal Quality. Thus it is plain, that *Prince Arthur* wants ſomething to conſtitute him Mr. *Blackmore*'s individual Hero. The Poet ought to have ſet his Mark upon him before he had turn'd him out upon the Common, that he might have been known to have been his proper Goods, and might have been diſtinguiſh'd from the numerous Herd of Heroes. But as we have prov'd, that there is ſomething wanting to Mr. *Blackmore*'s Hero: let us now take notice of a Quality, which he has, which he ought by no means to have, and by giving him which, the Poet offends againſt the Conveniency of the Manners. And that is that Academical Temper of Mind, which obliges him to declaim upon every turn, and to crowd his Harangues with Sententious and Speculative Notions. For *Arthur* is a King, and a King is to be ſhown grave, majeſtick, jealous of his Authority; with all which, methinks the declamatory Stile is not ſo very conſiſtent: But above all, a King is to be ſhown active: for the Kingly Office conſiſts in Action, which Sententious and Speculative Diſcourſes are always ſure to obſtruct. But Mr. *Blackmore* will ſay, perhaps,

perhaps, That Sententious Diſcourſes inſtruct, and that Inſtruction is the end of Heroick Poetry. But as *Ariſtotle* ſays of Tragedy, That it is not to give all ſorts of Delight, but only the Delight which is proper to it, which it gives by moving Compaſſion and Terror: ſo we might perhaps affirm of Heroick Poetry, that it is not to give all ſorts of Inſtruction, but only that which is proper to it, which it imparts by Action, and not by Precept. But this is indubitable, that the Author of an Epick Poem, ought not to delay or to diſcontinue his Action, by which, as by a proper Inſtrument, he conveys his Inſtruction to us, to give us the ſame Inſtruction by an improper Method. Now this is Mr. *Blackmore*'s particular Caſe. For by the Sententious Harangue which we cited above, he both delays and diſcontinues his Action to give a tedious Account of the very Moral of that Action, if it can pretend to a Moral. But perhaps Mr. *Blackmore* may ſay, that to inſtruct by Fable, is not ſo Chriſtian, as to inſtruct by Precept. To this, I anſwer, Firſt, That if he was of that Opinion, he ought not to have begun to write an Epick Poem. And ſecondly, That the Author and Founder of our Religion, as appears by his Parables, is of another Mind. Now, as it is plain, that Epick Poetry properly inſtructs by Action; ſo it is manifeſt, that the true Philoſophy, and the true Religion can be only ſhown by Action. If a Poet has a mind to make his Hero perfectly vertuous, he has free Liberty to do ſo. Let him make him as much a Philoſopher, and as much

much a Chriſtian as he pleaſes. But let his Philoſophy, and let his Religion both appear by his Action. It is the King's Example that influences the People, and not the Words which he ſpeaks. Let him take care to make his People proſper out of a ſenſe of his Duty, and that in a Monarch's Religion. *Æneas* never is diſcover'd Preaching, but he is always found to be the ſame; Always good-natur'd, always pious, always carefull and anxious for his People. Now let us examine Mr. *Blackmore*'s Speculative Hero, and ſee how conſtant he is to himſelf.

We find *Prince Arthur* appearing at firſt with three very commendable Qualities; which were, Piety, Valour, and a Care and Concern for his People. So that the Poet is now oblig'd to maintain theſe Qualities in his Hero, and to make him behave himſelf throughout the whole Poem, like a Man that has Piety and undaunted Courage, and the tender'ſt Concern for his People. What will any one ſay now to ſee this very Hero, who in the firſt Book of the Poem is ſo concern'd for the Souls of his Subjects; that tho' they were but juſt eſcap'd from a Storm, in which they had been terribly Tempeſt-beaten, and were wet, and cold, and weary, and hungry, and ſpiritleſs, yet does not ſuffer them ſo much as to refreſh themſelves before he inſtructs them: What will any one ſay to ſee this Prince neglect this People after the ſtrangeſt manner? What will any one ſay to ſee this Valiant and this Pious King, become as fearfull as the meaneſt, and

and as impious as the moſt profligate of all his Subjects?

In the Sixth Book, while the Plague was raging in the Britiſh Army, *Arthur*, by Devotion, brings down the Angel *Raphael*, who tells him the Cauſe of his Affliction in the following Verſes.

Th' Angelick Guards return'd to Heav'n complain'd,
That your flagitious Troops you ne'er reſtrain'd.
Your Captains boldly Whoredoms, Riots, Rapes,
Commit, and yet each Criminal eſcapes.
Thus you avow the Ills by others done,
And their unpuniſh'd Guilt becomes your own.

And thus, if we will believe the Poet's own Angel, the Hero is neglectfull of his People, and impious. But this is at the latter end of the Sixth Book. Let us now return to the Firſt. Upon the return of the Meſſage which the Embaſſadours of *Arthur* brought back from *Hoel*, Mr. *Blackmore* ſays, That when

Arthur *heard the Meſſage firſt,*
His wavering Mind with fears, and wiſe diſtruſt,
And riſing Tides of ſudden Joy was toſt,
Uncertain which ſtrong Paſſion preſt him moſt.
But when he ſaw the Preſents Hoel *ſent,*
His Doubts ſuppreſs'd, he grew more confident;
And his calm Mind, eas'd of his anxious Cares,
T' embrace his new and generous Friend, prepares.

Here for ſix lines together the Authour takes care to ſet before us the extraordinary Fear of *Arthur*.

Arthur. Indeed he ſeems to repent at laſt, that he call'd it by its proper Name. And ſo that which was plain *Fear* in the ſecond Verſe, is call'd *Doubt* in the ſixth, and *Care* in the ſeventh. Which puts me in mind of a Cuſtom of the Modern *Italians:* They are very ſenſible how ſcandalous a Paſſion *Fear* is; and therefore when they have a mind to encourage any one whom they reſpect; they never cry, *Don't be afraid, Sir*; but, *Quæ Voſſignoria non ſi dubiti de mente*; *Don't let your Worſhip doubt.* Thus we have ſeen *Prince Arthur* fearfull, neglectfull, and impious. The Manners then of the Hero are ill expreſs'd, becauſe they are not maintain'd. And they are unequal, which is ſelf-evident. And they are inconvenient. For neither is Fear becoming of a Captain, nor Impiety of one who takes up Arms to re-eſtabliſh Religion; nor is Neglect of his Subjects becoming of a good King.

But the Impiety of the Hero is not ſhown only in the Sixth Book. It is apparent from his very Fear in the Firſt: For before he left *England*, the Arch-Angel, *Gabriel*, had aſſur'd him that he ſhould Triumph over *Octa* at ten Years end. Theſe are his Words in the Fourth Book, and the 115th Page.

Now Albion *ſinks beneath the* Saxon *Weight*;
So Heav'n decrees; *'tis ſo ordain'd by Fate:*
But after ten times the revolving Sun,
His crooked Race has through the Zodiack *run,*
The Clouds diſpell'd, propitious Heav'n ſhall ſmile
On Uter's *Houſe, and this reviving Iſle.*

Octa

Octa *ſhall feel juſt Heav'ns avenging Stroke,*
And Albion's *Youth ſhall break the* Saxon *Yoke.*

This we find in the Relation which *Lucius* made to *Hoel.* Now the ten Years that the Angel mention'd, were elaps'd before *Arthur* ſet Sail from *Normandy*, as *Lucius* aſſures us in the ſame Relation, and the 122d Page of the ſame Book.

Ten times the Sun had paſs'd his Oblique way,
By turns contracting and increaſing way,
Darting to either Pole a warmer Ray:
And now the Britiſh Lords, &c.

Thus was *Arthur* aſſur'd by *Gabriel* in *England.* And he was afterwards re-aſſur'd by *Raphael* on the Coaſts of *Britany*: Who ſays to him, Pag. 16. Book the Firſt,

No Force or Arts ſhall your Deſign prevent,
Propitious Heav'n decrees your wiſh'd Event;
You on theſe Coaſts for happy Ends are thrown,
And after this expect the Britiſh Crown.

And immediately afterwards he bids him particularly not be afraid of *Hoel.*

But fear not Hoel's *Pow'r, tho' now your Foe,*
By Hell incens'd, he will not long be ſo.

This, I muſt confeſs, is ſtrange Language for an Angel. However, we are to ſuppoſe that *Prince Arthur* underſtood it. And yet by

and

and by, as we have obſerv'd above, he appears exceedingly afraid of this very *Hoel.* Now that perſon, methinks, muſt ſhow an extraordinary inclination to Fear, whom an Angel from Heav'n, nay whom two Angels cannot enſure; Beſides, that he muſt appear to be impious and unbelieving. But *Hoel* is not the only Perſon of whom *Prince Arthur* appears afraid. For afterwards, in the Seventh Book, when upon the Ravage that the Plague had made amongſt the *Britons*, *Octa* prepar'd to Attack them: Mr. *Blackmore* tells us, That

The Tidings ſoon through all the Army ran,
When in their Minds tormenting Fears began.

Firſt, the Army was afraid, and afterwards the Hero, as appears by the Prayer which he makes immediately upon it.

Shine forth, and with thy Beams diſpell this Night,
Whoſe horrid Shades my lab'ring Soul affright.

And thus we have ſhown the Hero of the Poem neglectfull, impious and fearfull. And conſequently we have in one Character, ſeen Mr. *Blackmore* offending, not only againſt the Unity of Character in the Hero, and in the Poem, and againſt three of the four Conditions of the Manners; but againſt the Neceſſity of the Fable, and of the Action. For if the things which we obſerv'd in the Firſt Part of this Treatiſe had not ruin'd the Moral, it is manifeſt that theſe baſe unneceſſary Vices which Mr. *Black-*

more

more has given to his Hero, would have weaken'd it conſiderably if they had not deſtroy'd it. But it will be objected by the Friends of this Author, that the Hero of the Prince of Poets, appears to be afraid at the Riſing of the Storm in the firſt of the *Æneis*.

Ex templo Æneæ ſolvuntur frigore membra,
Ingemit, &c.

To this I anſwer. Firſt, that we excus'd *Prince Arthur's* Fear upon the like occaſion: Tho' his Fear is directly expreſs'd by the Poet.

When the Juſt Arthur, *fill'd with Grief and Dread.*

Whereas the Fear of *Æneas* is not directly expreſs'd. Secondly, That ſuppoſing *Æneas* was afraid, we can yet make a better Defence for him than can be made for *Arthur*, tho' a good one may be made for him too. For *Æneas* had not only the ſame Cauſe of Fear which *Arthur* had, which was his Love for his People; but he was afraid of miſſing the Rites of Funeral, which they who miſs'd were denied the paſſage of *Styx*: And beſides all this, he was afraid of the Anger of *Juno*, who peculiarly commanded the Air, and from whoſe Fury he knew the preſent Storm proceeded. Theſe are the Excuſes which are made for *Æneas*, by thoſe who allow that he was afraid. He was afraid indeed, ſay they; but he was afraid of the Anger of the Gods, and that comes into the

the Character of Piety. But in caſe of any humane Danger, he always appears intrepid. Nay, *Turnus*, who is a Hero of a much inferiour Rank to *Æneas*, as *Boſſu* has plainly demonſtrated, ſcorns to be afraid of leſs than a God: For he ſays to *Æneas*, in the Twelfth Book, when his Life was in utmoſt danger from him. *V.* 894.

——— *Non me tua turbida torrent*
Dicta ferox, Dii me terrent & Jupiter Hoſtis.

Think not that your Threats can terrifie me inſulting Man. None but the Gods and adverſe Jove *can terrifie* Turnus. To be afraid neither of God nor Man, was only becoming of that Contemner of the Gods *Mezentius*.

Nec mortem horremus, nec divum parcimus ulli,
Deſine, jam venio moriturus.

All the Second-rate Characters in the *Æneis*, *Niſus*, *Eurialus*, *Pallas* and *Lauſus* ſhine with undaunted Courage. But the Hero diſtinguiſhes himſelf from them all; and is, in the midſt of a Battel, like Thunder in a Storm: He appears Superlatively brave upon every Action, and upon every approach of Danger, in a Sovereign Degree, magnanimous.

Theſe are the Excuſes that are made for *Æneas*, by thoſe who allow him to have been afraid in the Storm.

But I would fain ask thoſe Gentlemen one queſtion: And that is, Why they ſhould allow *Æneas* to have been afraid, when *Virgil* has

has never ſaid ſo? For the Words, *Æneæ ſolvuntur frigore membra*, expreſs no Fear. And why ſhould they be thought to imply any, when that which immediately follows implies that *Æneas* was not afraid, and when the very Words which we have cited have a much better and a much more reaſonable ſignification? The Words which *Æneas* utters, imply that he was not afraid For it is plain, that a Man, like *Æneas*, who wiſhes himſelf dead, is not afraid of Death. Indeed, why ſhould he be afraid? He knew very well, that he ſhould ſurvive this Storm. He had divine Aſſurance for it, and he was perfectly Pious. The Ghoſt of *Hector* had told him he ſhould be eſtabliſh'd in a Foreign Country. The Soul of *Creuſa* had averr'd it. His Houſhold-Gods had aſſur'd it, and *Delian* and *Buthrotian Apollo* had given it the laſt Confirmation. Well then, I think it is pretty plain; that the Man who wiſhes that he were dead, and who knew that he ſhould not die, could not be afraid of the preſent Danger. Nor do *Virgil's* Words, *Æneæ ſolvuntur frigore membra*, expreſs any Fear. Why then ſhould they be thought to imply any? Why ſhould the Man, who in all other places writes with perfect Logick and perfect good Sence, be believ'd in this, to contradict himſelf ſo abſurdly? Eſpecially when theſe very Words may be interpreted a much better way, and ſo become more conſiſtent with the Character of *Æneas*, and with the Sence of the Lines which follow. For this Cold and this Trembling, which relax'd the Nerves of *Æneas*, may very well be thought to

be the Shuddring of a Religious Horrour, conceiv'd at the Preſence of the Revengefull Queen of the Gods, who immediately commanded the Air, and by whom the Hero knew, that the preſent Storm was occaſion'd. For the Senſe of the Anger of ſo great a Divinity, muſt needs be an intolerable Burden upon the Soul of ſo Pious a Man as *Æneas*. Now *Ariſtotle* has obſerv'd in the Thirteenth Chapter of his Treatiſe of Poetry, that Horrour is a very different thing from Fear, which Reaſon and Experience every day confirm. Since therefore theſe Words, *Æneæ ſolvuntur frigore membra*, may as well be interpreted of Horrour as Fear; ſince if they are meant of the firſt, they make the Poet conſiſtent with himſelf; whereas they make him contradict himſelf; if they are meant of the laſt; ſince this incident of the Storm may be very well thought to have occaſion'd Horrour in *Æneas*; and laſtly, ſince it appears by the Words of the Hero, that he was not afraid; and it is very plain by his Circumſtances, that there was no occaſion for Fear; we have all the reaſon in the World to conclude, that by *Æneæ ſolvuntur frigore membra*, the Poet meant that his Hero felt Horrour, and not Fear.

Thus have I done my endeavour to clear *Æneas* from the Imputation of Fear; and to ſhow that the Trembling which ſeiz'd him from the Riſing of the Storm, might very well be ſuppos'd to proceed from another Cauſe. And I have the rather done this, becauſe I could never be reconcil'd to the Excuſes which are commonly

monly made for him; which are, that he was afraid for his People, or that he was afraid of the Anger of the Queen of the Gods. For it is hard to imagine in this caſe, that he could be afraid for his People, without being afraid for himſelf; or that he could, in this conjuncture, tremble with Fear at the Anger of *Juno*, without trembling at the Thoughts of approaching Death. As for two or three other Paſſages, in which the Poet mentions his Fear, it is manifeſt that in thoſe places he fears for others, and not for himſelf. But let us now conſider the two other Qualities that compoſe the Character of *Æneas*; that by thus oppoſing the Conduct of *Virgil* to Mr. *Blackmore*'s management, the judgment of the one, and the unskilfulneſs of the other, may the more plainly appear. As it was neceſſary that *Æneas* ſhould be Valiant, becauſe he was to be the Founder of the *Roman* State; ſo it was requiſite that he ſhould be Pious, becauſe he was to eſtabliſh Religion as well as Empire. And the Poet was oblig'd to make the Hero ſhow his Religion by Action, and not by Words, as Mr. *Blackmore* has done; becauſe, as we hinted above, Epick Poetry properly inſtructs by Action, and Religion can only appear by Action; and laſtly, becauſe it is the Prince's Example by which his Subjects are fram'd. And *Virgil* was oblig'd to make the Acts by which *Æneas* diſcover'd his Piety, parts of the Action of his Poem; and not to do as Mr. *Blackmore* has done, to crowd the greateſt part of his Religion together, and make it conſtitute a Medley of irregular Epiſodes;

which would have diſcontinued his Action, and would have corrupted its Unity. Beſides, as one and the ſame Deſign of the Hero comprehended the eſtabliſhing the Trojan Religion and Empire in *Italy*, it was but juſt that they ſhould go hand in hand in the Poem; and as the eſtabliſhing the Trojan Power was to be a means for the ſetting up their Religion, ſo it was but juſt that the Religious Acts of the Hero, ſhould contribute to the Foundation of Empire. Let us now examine the particular Acts by which *Æneas* diſcovers his Piety; which are, Firſt, the actual Obedience which he pays to the Command of the Gods. Secondly, The making thoſe very Gods the Guardians of his Navy, and the Companions of his Voyage. Thirdly, His Religious Duties, which are Prayer and Sacrifices. And Fourthly, the Proofs which he gives of his filial Affection; and thoſe are principally two. Firſt, the Funeral Games celebrated in the Honour of *Anchiſes* his Memory. And Secondly, the Deſcent of *Æneas* to Hell. In the next place, let us conſider how theſe Religious Acts apparently influence the Action of the Poem, and evidently advance the Deſign of the Hero.

The Firſt is the actual Obedience that he pays to the Commands of the Gods: From which it is manifeſt, that the Action had its beginning.

——— ———*Vix prima inceperat æſtas,*
Et Pater Anchiſes dare fatis vela jubebat. Lib. 3.

Another

Another Act by which *Æneas* diſcover'd his Piety, is Sacrifice. Upon his Arrival in *Thrace*, and his laying the Foundation of the City, which he deſign'd to build there, he Sacrifices to his Mother, and to the King of the Gods; and wanting Boughs to adorn the Altar, that want conducts him to *Polydorus* his Tomb, whoſe Spirit inform'd him of his unfortunate Tragedy; and aſſur'd him, that *Thrace* was by no means the Country that the Gods and Fate had deſign'd for him. Upon which they remov'd from that unfortunate Climate, and ſet Sail for *Delos*. There *Æneas* prays to *Apollo* to inſtruct him where he ſhall ſettle. *Apollo* directs them to their Original Mother. Upon which, by a miſtake of *Anchiſes*, they ſet Sail for *Crete*; from which Country *Teucer* deriv'd his Deſcent. But nevertheleſs, by that very miſtake, they were conſiderably advanc'd in their Way to *Italy*. As ſoon as they began to ſettle in *Crete*, they found by the Plague that rag'd amongſt them, that *Crete* was not the Place that was deſtin'd for their Eſtabliſhment, and took a Reſolution to go back to the Oracle at *Delos*; when *Apollo* ſav'd them the Trouble, and deliver'd his Mind to *Æneas* in the Night by the Mouths of the Houſhold-Gods, who had been the Companions of his Voyage. Thus it is plain that *Æneas* his Obedience to the Commands of the Gods, his Sacrifice, his Prayer, and his carrying his Gods along with him influenc'd his Action, and advanc'd his Deſign. Let us next conſider his filial Affection: of which he gave two ſignal Proofs. The firſt was

the Inſtitution of the Funeral Games; and the ſecond his Deſcent to Hell; whether he deſcended in Obedience to the Command that he receiv'd from his Father's Spirit.

——— *Gens dura atque aſpera cultu,*
Debellanda tibi Latio eſt. Ditis tamen ante
Infernas accede domos, & Averna per alta,
Congreſſus peti, Nate, meos. Lib. 5.

And *Æneas* ſays afterwards to the *Sybil* in the Sixth Book.

Unum oro, quando hic inferni janua Regis
Dicitur, & tenebroſa Palas Acheronte refuſa;
Ire ad conſpectum chari genitoris, & ora
Contingat: doceas iter, & ſacra oſtia pandas.
Illum ego per flammas & mille ſequentia tela
Eripui his humeris, medioque ex hoſte recepi:
Ille meum comitatus iter, Maria omnia mecum,
Atque omnes Pelagique minas cœlique ferebat
Invalidus, vires ultra ſortemque Senectæ.
Quin ut te ſupplex peterem, & tua lumina adirem.
Idem orans mandata dabat. Natique patriſque
Alma precor miſerere.

Now the Celebration of the Funeral Games, by drawing all the Men together, was the occaſion of the Women's burning part of the Fleet, and conſequently of the *Trojans* ſailing for *Italy* without their Wives, which left them free to mix with the Blood of the *Italians*, and ſo prepared their Eſtabliſhment. And the Deſcent of *Æneas* to Hell, upon his Arrival in *Italy*,

Italy, animated and exalted the Hero by the view of a glorious Poſterity.

And thus we have ſhown as ſuccinctly as we could, that the Piety of *Æneas* diſcovers it ſelf by Action, and that it advances the Hero's deſign. I ſhould be too tedious if I ſhould ſhow that this Piety of the Hero, is apparent throughout the whole Courſe of the Poem; and that it every where influences the Action, not only by the inſenſible Operation of the Powers, whom the Greatneſs of his Piety engages to favour him, but very often by manifeſt viſible Conſequence. It would be an eaſie matter to prove this, and to demonſtrate further; That as the Religious Acts of *Æneas*, are efficient of ſomething which follows them, ſo they are neceſſary or probable Conſequences of ſomething which went before them; and that therefore they are juſt and regular Parts of the Action.

Let us now come to the third Quality, which goes to the Compoſition of *Æneas* his Character: And that is the tranſcendent Goodneſs of his Nature; which the Poet gave him as the very Ground and Original of his Religion. For an excellent Goodneſs of Nature was very reaſonably believ'd by the Heathens, to be the Principle and Foundation of Piety. And therefore *Mezentius*, a Man of an ill and of a cruel Nature, is repreſented as a Contemner of the Gods, at the ſame time that he is a Deſtroyer of Men. I think it would be ſuperfluous to ſhow that this ſurpaſſing Goodneſs of Nature, is a predominant Quality of *Æneas* his Character; ſince the ſweetneſs and tenderneſs of

his Nature has been objected as a fault to him, and as leſſening of his Merit, and deſtructive of his Courage, by thoſe who have condemn'd him ſomething too raſhly, without conſidering the Deſign of *Virgil*, or the Neceſſity of his Fable, or the Nature of True Valour. We ought now to ſhow that this Excellence of Nature ſhines in the Character, throughout the whole Courſe of the Poem; and that it appears even in the Characters that are oppos'd to the Hero's. But that the Reader may not languiſh by dwelling too long upon one thing, we ſhall firſt examine ſome other perſons who are concern'd in Mr. *Blackmore*'s Poem.

The next who preſents himſelf is *Hoel* King of *Armorica*. Now I deſie any Man in the World to give me this *Hoel*'s Character. *Hoel* is as obſcure, and as much conceal'd, as if he were a Politician: Tho' it is manifeſt that he is none. For notwithſtanding he is every-where mention'd throughout a Third Part of the Narrative, yet he has very little hand in the Plot. Monſieur *Hoel* indeed is a meer Machine, a Monarch of *Brioches*'s making. He ſeems to have neither Life nor Soul of his own, but is actuated by inviſible Springs at firſt from below, and by and by from above. The firſt news we hear of him, is, when that Devil Perſecution, appears to him in the reverend Shape of *Alman*. She gives him an account of *Arthur*'s being thrown upon his Coaſt; and tells him, that the moſt obliging way of receiving him, will be to cut his Throat; that it was the moſt ſignal Favour

vour, that could be conferr'd either upon him or his Company; that they would look upon him as their Friend in it, and their Benefactor; who did them the greateſt Honour they could expect, and to which they had hitherto pretended in vain. This, ſhe aſſures him, in a long Speech of above forty Lines. It ſeems, Mr. *Blackmore* judiciouſly ſaw, that this Fury ought to make a long Speech, or elſe ſhe would go out of her Character, and that her very words ought to appear to perſecute the paſſive Ears of *Hoel*. He hears all this with a great deal of Patience, and without the leaſt Interruption, and what is ſtill more wonderfull, without the leaſt Reply. So that hitherto we have found in *Hoel* neither Thought, nor Voice, nor Motion. Perſecution withdraws, but before ſhe takes leave of him, the Poet tells us, that,

She breath'd her Soul into his Breaſt.

Well then, ſince *Hoel* has now got a Soul in him, we may certainly expect to hear him ſpeak. No, hold a little; in the mean while we are aſſur'd, that he is in a very great Rage, nay, in a more than mortal Fury.

Infernal Flames rage in his poiſon'd Blood,
And his ſwoln Soul boils with the impetuous Flood.

Now as ſoon as ever we find that *Hoel* is thus outragious, we are immediately aſſur'd, that he thinks, and revolves, and is pleas'd.

Hoel

——— Hoel *ſurpriz'd, revolves*
The welcome Meſſage in his Mind.

Becauſe theſe you know are the common and natural Effects of Fury. But not a Syllable has he ſaid all this while; at laſt indeed we are told, that he ſpeaks to thoſe who are about him. But the words we are unworthy to hear, yet as far as we can gueſs, they muſt be the very ſame that Sir *Fopling* uſes to his Equipage. *Hey, Champain, Norman, La Roſe, La Fleur, La Tour, La Verdur* follow me all. Thus attended with theſe, and a crew beſides of Anonymous Ruffians; this Monarch of *Little Britain* ſets out to murder a Hero: Which without Raillery, would be a moſt execrable thing, if it were a voluntary Act. But *Hoel* has a Proverb on his ſide; he does not go but is driven. But by the way he meets with a Miracle which changes his mind, and makes him a Chriſtian; and has beſides, another no leſs amazing effect upon him: for immediately upon the ſight of it, *Hoel* is heard to ſpeak. Thus we find, that *Hoel*, before the Soul of Perſecution was breath'd into him, appears to have had neither Voice, nor Motion, nor Thought. As ſoon as he is poſſeſt, he continues ſilent, but is ſaid to be in a terrible Rage. And indeed Silence and Rage are affirm'd to be uſual Signs of Poſſeſſion. This Rage continues till the Sight of the Miracle, which makes the greateſt alteration that can be imagin'd in him. For of a gloomy but an outrageous wight, he grows

on

on a ſudden to be, of all Mortals, the moſt gentle and the moſt talkative.

But before we come to diſcover that, let us examine the Conduct of *Virgil* upon a like occaſion. The principal Quality in the Character of *Turnus*, is Anger. Now the Poet takes care to make this Quality appear in him upon the firſt introducing him. The firſt time that *Turnus* is introduc'd, is in the ſeventh Book, when *Alecto* appears to him in the Shape of *Calibe*, the Prieſteſs of *Juno*. Now *Virgil*, with a great deal of Judgment, takes care to make *Turnus* appear what he was by his natural Temper, before *Alecto* had laſh'd him into the laſt Fury, and before ſhe had fixed her flaming Brand in his Breaſt: For he appears to be angry with *Calibe*, for the very News which ſhe ſeem'd to have brought out of Kindneſs, and by the Command of *Juno*. For ſays he,

——— *Claſſes invectas Thybredis alveo*
Non, ut rere, meas effugit nuncius aures:
Ne tantos mihi finge metus, nec Regia Juno
Immemor eſt noſtri
Sed te victa ſitu, veriq; effœta ſenectus,
O mater curis nequicquam exercet; & arma
Regum inter, falſa vatem formidine ludit.
Cura tibi Divum effigies & templatueri:
Bella viri, pacemq; gerant queis bella gerenda.

Nay afterwards, when *Alecto* conſeſt the Fury, laſh'd the *Rutilian* into Rage, and fix'd her burning Brand in his Breaſt; *Virgil* diſtinguiſhes with admirable Judgment, the Operation of his natural Anger, from the influence of infernal Fury.

Arma

Arma amens fremit, arma toro tectisq; requirit,
Sævit amor ferri & scelerata insania belli,
Ira super.

Where in the two first Verses, the Poet marks the influence that *Alecto* had upon *Turnus* his Soul, and by the beginning of the third, the Violence of his natural Temper, which observation must be allow'd to be well grounded, or *Virgil* must be acknowledged to have made a very scandalous Anticlimax here, of which the most judicious of Poets could never be guilty.

From what has been said, it plainly appears, that the Conduct of *Virgil*, upon this occasion, is directly contrary to Mr. *Blackmore*'s, who had done very well, if here he imitated the Prudence of that admirable Poet, since it is founded so much upon reason, and upon the very design of the Art: For since Poetry in general is an Imitation of Nature, it follows by undeniable Consequence, that the human Persons, which are introduc'd in an Epick Poem, should be shown, as they are, according to their natural Tempers, and not only as they are, when they are either inspir'd or possess'd.

But now let us see how *Hoel* behaves himself after the sight of the Apparition. Before, as we have observ'd, he was as mute as a Monk, whose order obliges him never to be impertinent, that is, never to speak. The Devil himself could not draw so much as a word from him. Now the Devil a word can any Man speak in his company. *Arthur* sends his Ambassadors to him

him extraordinary; and *Hoel* receives them in an extraordinary Manner. Gentlemen, ſays he, as ſoon as they came within Ear-ſhot, I know what you come about, and you may e'en fairly go back again, for your buſineſs is done to your Hands; and pray let your Maſter know ſo. Tell him, that this Morning, I had ſome Thoughts of ſlitling his Windpipe. But aſſure him now, that I am his heartily *do' ſee*; and that I long to hug him with both my Hands.

Now *Arthur*'s Ambaſſadors, being Men of a deep Reach, and ſo ſoon finding *Hoel* out, and being convinc'd, that he lov'd to talk all himſelf, and that the Fury Perſecution, tho' the Miracle had driven her from his Breaſt, yet ſtill kept the poſſeſſion of his Tongue, like an Enemy, that being chas'd from the Heart of a Country, hovers ſtill upon the Borders; what do theſe men of Sagacity do, but depart without ſpeaking a word? *Arthur* encourag'd by what they told him, reſolves to go to *Hoel* himſelf; who has now another opportunity of making a Speech. For all the buſineſs that *Hoel* has in this Poem, is the making a Speech: a fine Speech, as Mr. *Petulant* ſays, a long Speech, ſuch a Speech, as I think, as Mr. *Bays* ſays, you'll ſay is a *Nonpareilo.*

As a faint Traveller in Arabian *Sands,*
Scorcht with the burning Sun-beams, panting ſtands,
Views the dry Deſart with deſparing Eyes,
And for the Springs and diſtant Rivers ſighs:

As

As Sailors long for Land, Heav'ns Aid implore,
And with their greedy Wiſhes graſp the Shore;
When beaten from the hoſpitable Coaſt,
And in loud Storms upon the Ocean toſt,
Where ruin in ſo many Shapes appears,
They ſcarcely can attend to all their Fears;
I've wiſh'd to ſee you with the like Deſire.
And ſo he goes ſweetly on.

Now let us conſider the time when this Harange was ſpoke; Mr. *Blackmore* marks the time to us, immediately before it begins.

Scarce had the Sun his glittering Chariot driven
Up the ſteep brow and ſharp aſcent of Heav'n;
When the glad Princes did each other meet,
And Hoel *firſt did thus the Stranger greet.*

So that we may obſerve, that theſe two Princes having longed to ſee one another, and being glad to meet one another: *Hoel* to expreſs his ſhare of the Joy, greets *Arthur* with a Speech of about forty Lines, which he begins with a couple of Similies; becauſe you know Similies are proper for Paſſion, and a Man that is tranſported always makes a long Speech.

I have indeed heard of a King, that has been entertain'd at this rate, in an Univerſity Quadrangle: But can any one believe, that ever any one King greeted another ſo? Is there any thing like this in Nature, and in the world? If not, I think I may venture to affirm, that there ought to be no ſuch thing in an Epick Poem. For tho' true Sublimity, like Grace, may exalt Nature, it can never invert it. Not

Not but, I know, that very fine excuſes may be made for this. For perhaps the Friends of the Author may ſay, That as there is a vulgar Error in the World, that a Man may be indicted for having two Wives, but that by marrying five, or ſix, or ſeven, he gets out of the power of the Law, becauſe, ſay they, by taking ſuch a number, he commences Turk, and ſo ſtands exempted from Chriſtian Chaſtiſement: even ſo an Author, that makes one of his Poetical Perſons expreſs his Joy for the meeting another, by greeting him with a Speech that begins with a Simile, is certainly liable to be arraign'd for it, becauſe he offends at once, againſt the light of Nature and Poetical Statute; but that he who makes a Perſon begin ſuch a Speech, with two, or three, or more Similes, is ſecure from Law, by the enormity of his offence, for who ſhould call him to an account for it?

Perhaps, after all, the Poet may have ſhown his Addreſs by this. Perhaps he did it in this time of War, to render our Enemies contemptible, and to ſhow what an impertinent Generation the *French* are.

But to reſume the Didactique Stile, which I have ſo long laid aſide for the Reader's Diverſion, I deſire to return to an obſervation which I have cited from *Ariſtotle*, which is, that the Manners ought to be neceſſary, and that no vicious or baſe Inclination ſhould be given to any of the Poetick Perſons, unleſs they appear to be abſolutely requiſite for the carrying on of the Action. Now this black intention

tion of *Hoel*, cannot be ſaid to be neceſſary: Firſt, Becauſe *Hoel* might have been made a Chriſtian, without this hatred and malice. For he might have appear'd to be the Friend of *Arthur*, and then good Nature and Friendſhip had prepar'd his Converſion. Secondly, Becauſe this murderous Intention is not productive of Action. To have manag'd the Suggeſtion of Perſecution to purpoſe, Mr. *Blackmore* ſhould have ſhown *Hoel ipſo facto*, ſurprizing and attacking *Arthur*; who ſhould have reſiſted with incomparable Valour, both the Force and Rage of unequal Numbers, to the Terror and Amazement of *Hoel*, and the Deſtruction of thoſe around him, till at laſt, being like to be oppreſt by multitudes, yet remaining ſtill unterrify'd, and each moment performing of new Wonders, he ſhould have caſt up his ſparkling Eyes to Heaven, and by a ſublime Apoſtrophe, have oblig'd the deſcending Machine to interpoſe for him. Thus the intention of *Hoel* would have been productive of Action, and have form'd an Obſtacle to the Hero's Deſign, which he had ſurmounted by the force of two of the Qualities, which go to the compoſing his Character, and thoſe are his Valour and Piety.

I am ſenſible, that I have inſiſted too long upon this Character. I now proceed to *Octa's*; for we ſhall have occaſion to enquire into *Uter* in another place, and *Lucius* is ſo very a nothing, that he is not worth the mentioning. The firſt News that we hear of *Octa*, is in the relation of *Lucius*, *Lib.* 4. *Pag.* 106.

Octa

Octa *the famous* Hengiſt's *Son, a bold*
And warlike Prince, did then the Scepter hold.

And now we may reaſonably, thro' the whole Action, expect to ſee *Octa* bold and warlike. But before we enquire into that, let us ſee if Mr. *Blackmore* has given him any other Qualities. *Ibid. p.* 113.

Octa, *whoſe Arts and purchas'd Treaſons won*
More Towns and Battels than his Sword had done.

Here we find him treacherous and undermining, which by the way, is not ſo very conſiſtent with the foremention'd Quality of his Boldneſs: For Boldneſs comes, for the moſt part, either from the hope or aſſurance of Suceeſs, and Treachery from the Fear or from the Deſpondency of ſucceeding by open Force. Let us obſerve him a little further. *Lib.* 5. *p.* 131.

All reſt enjoy, but Octa *anxious lay,*
Watchfull and longing for returning Day.
His dreadfull crimes affright his ſtartled Soul;
And in his Breaſt black Tydes of Horror roll.
Dire Shapes of ſtaring Ghoſts paſs threatning by,
And ſtreaks of Fire acroſs the apartment fly.
He hears the Shrieks of thoſe his bloody Hand
Had murther'd, or that dy'd by his Command:
He hears the Widows Sighs and Orphans moans
Himſelf had made, and tortur'd Priſoners Groans.

I am oblig'd to take no notice of the Verſes yet a-while, let them be never ſo obnoxious, for that would make too great a Confuſion. But here we find this Prince an abominable Oppreſſor, and a moſt bloody Tyrant. Let us ſee him yet a little further, *Lib.* 6. *p.* 171.

Octa *forthwith commands his Lords to meet*
In Council, where they long in order ſate,
T'adviſe what beſt might ſave the threatned State.

This methinks does not agree ſo very well with the Character of his Boldneſs, which was given above. For if this *Octa* is bold, what ſhould he think of, for the ſaving his State but a Battle; ſince there had not been a ſtroke ſtruck at Land yet. But *Lucifer* tells us anon, in the ſame Book; nay, and in downright Terms, that *Octa* was afraid. *Pag.* 171.

Octa *defeated, dreads Prince* Arthur's *Arms,*
And ſues for Peace by Ethelina's *Charms.*

And in the ſeventh Book, the Poet tells us, no leſs than twice, that he is afraid, *p.* 193.

Mean time, ill-boding Prodigies affright
King Octa, *and diſſuade his Men from fight.*

And page 201.
Octa, *that view'd th'important Prodigy,*
Trembled to ſee the Eaſtern Army fly.
He wiſely hid his Fears within his Breaſt.

But

But now 'tis high time to ſumm up the Evidence. The Criminal that is arraign'd, has at his firſt appearance, ſeem'd to be bold and warlike. But ſince that, he has been found to be treacherous and undermining, and an Oppreſſor of his own People, a cruel Tyrant, and a black and barbarous Murtherer. Then he comes to lie under a Suſpicion of Cowardice, tho' his cruelty might have given us that Suſpicion before. Then he is twice declar'd to be afraid by the Poet, which is atteſted and fully confirm'd by the Devil his own dear Friend, and his moſt faithfull Servant. So that we know not what to make of this *Octa*, becauſe the Manners are ill expreſs'd in him; and as they are ill expreſs'd, they are inconvenient. For Fear is unbecoming of him, either as a King or General. Nor are they conſtant or conſiſtent. For Boldneſs and Treachery are rarely joyn'd, if they are not incompatible: and tho' there may be found ſuch a Prodigy, as a bold perfidious Perſon; yet a Poet, who is to imitate Nature, and to give the beſt reſemblance, whenever he pretends to draw a Man, ought not to paint a Monſter. Nor are the Crimes and the Baſeneſs of *Octa* neceſſary: I mean, that all his Crimes are not neceſſary. His Perfidiouſneſs will be found to be of that number: For the making of the League upon *Arthur*'s Landing, manifeſtly retards the Action, and cauſes its Motion to ceaſe, and the breaking that League upon the Plague which follow'd, corrupts the Action's Integrity. For it has been clearly prov'd in the former part of this Trea-

tiſe, that therefore the Action is not entire, becauſe at the end of it, *Octa*, upon whoſe Oath we cannot rely, remains in power and place. Nor does the fear of *Octa* ſerve to advance the Action. For why ſhould he appear beforehand to be afraid of fighting, who afterwards, in Battle, behaves himſelf like a Lion. Nor was it neceſſary to make him a Murderer: For why ſhould Mr. *Blackmore* provide for his Hero a Father-in-Law, that deſerv'd to be empal'd alive? It is evident, that the Murders, which *Octa* is ſaid to commit, are ſo far from being neceſſary to the carrying on of the Action, that they appear to be entirely out of it. And it is as certain, that the leaving ſuch a Villain, as this *Saxon* alive, is contrary, not only to common Poetical Juſtice, but to the Moral of the Poem, and to the Fable, and to the Univerſality of the Action. But they who favour Mr. *Blackmore*, will tell me, that *Mezentius* too was a Murderer. 'Tis eaſily granted, but the caſe is vaſtly different. For the Crimes of *Mezentius* are neceſſary, as Cauſes of Action. It was decreed by Fate, and ordain'd by *Jove*, that *Æneas* ſhould be eſtabliſhed in *Italy*, and lay the Foundation of the *Roman* Empire, which *Turnus* and *Mezentius* very well knew. For all their Prieſts and Oracles had aſſerted it. Now *Turnus* worſhipp'd the ſame *Jupiter*, and *Mezentius* had no other God. From whence then ſhould it proceed, that theſe very Perſons ſhould be the grand Oppoſers, of what they knew had been pre-ordain'd by him? Why ſhould *Mezentius* and *Turnus* do this? the cauſe

is

is plain; becauſe *Turnus* had a Paſſion upon him heighten'd and inflam'd by a turbulent Temper; and becauſe *Mezentius* was a bloody unnatural Tyrant, a Contemner of the Gods, and a Foe to Men. So that here we have an admirable Moral, which is, that none can be capable of oppoſing the reveal'd deſigns of Heaven; but either they, who are carried away head-long by Paſſions made untractable, by the violence of their natural Tempers, which, by neglect are become incorrigible; or elſe they, who have ſtifled the Dictates of Reaſon and Conſcience to ſuch a degree, as quite to have diveſted themſelves of Humanity. For this is certain, that as long as we have any tenderneſs for others, we muſt have ſome for our ſelves. Becauſe the very Foundation of our Compaſſion for others, is a concern for our ſelves. I have already ſhewn this in a former critical Treatiſe. Now he can have little tenderneſs for himſelf, who is impious enough to oppoſe, in ſo bold a way, the known Deſigns of Heaven. And he who has thrown off all concern for himſelf, is not likely to have much Compaſſion for others. The Truth of this Moral is manifeſted every day; for no men appear with ſo much impious boldneſs againſt the cauſe of Heaven, as either they, who have loſt their Reaſons, or they, who have thrown them away.

Thus we have already ſhown one conſiderable difference betwixt *Mezentius* and *Octa*. For the *Saxon* never ſo much as dreamt of oppoſing the Deſigns of Heaven. He worſhipp'd his Idols, whom he thought he ſerv'd by oppoſing

Arthur's Eſtabliſhment. And this, and his Intereſt, to which his Ambition might have been added, would have been ſufficient cauſes for what he did; ſo that there was not the leaſt occaſion for making him a bloody perfidious Villain.

But there is another conſiderable difference between *Mezentius* and *Octa*. For as from the Characters and the Deſigns of *Mezentius* and *Turnus*, a very good Moral may be deduc'd, which, is, that they who oppoſe the known Deſigns of Heav'n, are either ſuch as are hurried on by the Fury of a violent Temper, grown incorrigible by neglect; or ſuch as are inſtigated by an inveterate, inbred Malice; ſo from their Cataſtrophes an admirable Moral may likewiſe be drawn; which is, that the grand and Impoious Oppoſers of the known Deſigns of Heav'n, are ſooner or later ſeverely puniſh'd for their Impiety, and not only ſo, but that the hand of Heav'n is immediately in their Puniſhment, and that it makes uſe of the very Furies of their Paſſion, and the Venom of their Malice, which caus'd their Crimes to bring on likewiſe their Ruin. Thus *Jupiter* in the Tenth of the *Æneis*, prevails upon *Mezentius* his thirſt of Blood, and his luſt of Revenge, to enter that fight, in which his Son and himſelf were ſlain.

At Jovis interea monitis Mezentius ardens
Succedit pugnæ. Æn. 10. V. 689.

And as for *Turnus*, that very exceſs of Rage which made him begin the War, made him loſe two ſignal Occaſions of ending it to his advantage,

vantage, and the loſing theſe, occaſion'd his final Ruin.

The firſt of theſe happen'd at the Siege of *Æneas* his Camp, *Lib.* 9. For *Pandarus* and *Bitias*, in a Bravado, having ſet open the Gates, the *Rutilians* ruſh'd in upon them, and *Turnus* among the reſt; and made ſuch a Slaughter of the *Trojans*, and terrify'd them to that degree, that if he had but thought of opening the Gates which the *Trojans* had ſhut again, and letting in his *Rutilians*, the very Ruins of *Troy* had periſh'd. *Lib.* 9. *V.* 757.

Et ſi continuò victorem ea cura ſubîſſet
Rumpere clauſtra manu, ſocioſq; immittere portis;
Ultimus ille dies bello gentiq; fuiſſet.

But inſtead of that, his Fury engag'd him in the Purſuit of thoſe who were flying. *Lib* 9. *V.* 760.

Sed furor ardentem, cædiſq; inſana cupido,
Egit in adverſos.

The ſecond occaſion happen'd, when *Æneas* ſent his Horſe to beat the Field, while he led the Foot o'er the Mountain to *Laurentum*. *Turnus*, who heard of it from his Spies, oppos'd the *Laurentian* and *Rutilian* Horſe to the *Trojan*, and at the ſame time led the Foot by a nearer way to the Mountains, and laid an Ambuſcade for *Æneas*; which Ambuſcade had infallibly ſucceeded, had *Turnus* had Patience but a moment longer. But upon the News that *Camilla*

was ſlain, and that his Horſes were routed, he riſes in Fury, and departs but a Moment before *Æneas* arrived. And the Poet takes care to tell us, that this very Fury, which occaſion'd his Miſcarriage, and conſequently his ruin, was appointed by *Jupiter*. *Lib.* 11. *V.* 901.

Ille furens (& ſæva Jovis ſic numina poſcunt)
Deſerit obſeſſos colles, nemora aſpera linquit.
Vix è conſpectu exierat, campumq; tenebat:
Cum pater Æneas, ſaltus ingreſſus apertos,
Exuperatq; jugum, ſylvâq; evadit opacâ.

And thus I have endeavour'd to prove, that the murders which *Mezentius* committed, being requiſite to ſhow the extraordinary Malice which caus'd them, are neceſſary, both on account of the Action and on account of the Fable. Firſt, On account of the Action; becauſe *Mezentius* could not be one of the grand Oppoſers of *Æneas*, without either exceſſive Paſſion or extraordinary Malice; and the Poet could not make him act by the former only, becauſe in doing that, he would have confounded his Character with that of *Turnus*. Nor could he give him both violence of Temper and exceſs of Malice, as his principles of Action; becauſe tho' by doing that, he would have diſtinguiſh'd him very fairly from *Turnus*, yet he would have given him a Defect more than was neceſſary for the Action. The Poet then was oblig'd to give him extraordinary Malice only. But ſecondly, theſe Murders of *Mezentius* are neceſſary upon the account of the Moral;

Moral: For by ſhowing the extraordinary Malice of the Man, they convey two important Inſtructions to us. The Firſt is, That a Man can never conſiderately be the grand Oppoſer of Heav'n, without ſuch a degree of Malice, which is a ſubordinate Moral. The Second, Which is part of the main Inſtruction of the Poem, is that, when Malice perverts a Man's Nature to ſuch a degree, as to make him wilfully and deliberately oppoſe Heaven, that Malice occaſions the final Ruin of the Agent.

But now the Murders which *Octa* commits, are of no manner of Neceſſity, either upon account of the Action, becauſe *Octa*'s being of another Religion, as we have ſaid above, is a ſufficient reaſon for his oppoſing *Arthur*, nor on account of the Moral, becauſe *Octa* comes off unpuniſh'd.

But it is time to return to the Hero of *Virgil*, and to ſhow, as we propounded, that the predominant quality of his mind, appears not only in thoſe very Epiſodes that ſeem to require a quite contrary Character, ſuch extraordinary care has the Poet taken to diſtinguiſh him everywhere, and to maintain in him, not only a Conſtancy of Manner, but an Unity of Character; but this reigning Quality is made to ſhine too even in the Characters which are oppos'd to the Heroes. So divinely has this Maker provided, that the ſame univerſal and quickning Soul, ſhould, tho' not in an equal degree be diffus'd thro' his whole Creation. We ſhall have occaſion to prove the former of theſe at large in another place. Let us now demonſtrate the latter, which is that, the predominant Quality of the Hero

Hero appears even in the Characters which are oppos'd to him.

Thus the Malicious, the Cruel and Revengefull *Mezentius*, ſpeaks in the Tenth of the *Æneis*, in the moſt moving and tender Manner; And in the Twelfth *Turnus*, the Violent, the Wrathfull, the Fiery *Turnus*, appears to be gentle, and ſoft, and ſupplicating. And this the Poet, by his admirable Addreſs, has brought about, without the leaſt Violation of Decency, or of the Fourth Condition of the Manners.

The Manners indeed are to be conſtant, not becauſe *Ariſtotle* has ſaid it; for to affirm that would be abſurd, but becauſe Nature will have it ſo. For the Rules of *Ariſtotle*, as we have ſaid above, are but Directions for the Obſervation of Nature, as the beſt of the written Laws, are but the pure Dictates of Reaſon and Repetitions of the Laws of Nature. For either this muſt be granted, or *Ariſtotle* muſt be confeſs'd to have contradicted the Deſign which he had in preſcribing thoſe Rules: Which Deſign was to teach Men to pleaſe, more than they could do without theſe Rules. It being undeniable that the Writer, who follows Nature cloſeſt, is certain to pleaſe moſt. For Poetry is nothing but an Imitation of Nature, which *Ariſtotle*, who knew her well, has very well taught us to imitate. And he who keeps up ſtrictly to his Rules, is as certain to ſucceed, as he who lives up exactly to Reaſon is certain of being happy. But it is as impoſſible for any Man who has not a great Genius, ſtrictly to obſerve the Rules; as it is for any one who has not ſuper-natural Aſ-

ſiſtance

ſiſtance to live up to the Dictates of Reaſon. For People may talk as long as they pleaſe, I defie any one to ſhow me a regular Epick Poem, or Tragedy which was not writ by a very extraordinary Man. But to return to the buſineſs from which we may ſeem to have in ſome meaſure digreſs'd.

The Manners are to be well maintain'd, becauſe Nature is uniform: For Poetry being an Imitation of Nature, it follows, that the humane Poetical perſons are to be Imitations of Men. Now if Nature in Man is always uniform, it is certain that the Manners in the humane Poetical perſons ought never to vary. But if Nature in one and the ſame Man may ſometimes appear irregular, it is evident that the Manners of the humane Poetical perſons may in ſome Caſes differ very much from themſelves.

Thus the Humours in Children alter every Hour, and in the Bloom of Youth they are very rarely conſiſtent. And therefore *Ariſtotle* in thoſe Caſes allows of unequal Manners, provided the inequality of Humour be throughout maintain'd. I had almoſt forgot another ſort of Perſons in which the Manners are variable, and thoſe are ſuch as come indeed to years of Maturity; but by reaſon of the inconſiſtency of their Brains, never come to years of Diſcretion.

But beſides theſe inborn Cauſes of the Inconſtancy of the Manners, which are want of Maturity, and defect of Temper, there are accidental Ones; the which are chiefly two; a very

ry great Calamity, and a very violent Paſſion; which have both been ſeen to inſpire Men with Sentiments and with Reſolutions that have been unexpected from them. Nay, ſo Powerfull have their Effects been, that as the laſt has made People act and talk with Tranſports that have been contrary to the Bent of their Natural Tempers, ſo the firſt has been often known to aſſwage the Fury of the moſt turbulent Paſſions.

But to come cloſer to the Matter in hand: The principal Characters of an Epick Poem, which are thoſe of which we chiefly Treat, are not to vary their Manners at every turn, either from an immatureneſs in Years, or from a defect in Temper; becauſe ſuch a Frailty is inconſiſtent with thoſe extraordinary Qualities, which they muſt have who are fit to oppoſe or to carry on great Deſigns. And tho' even ſuch Perſons as theſe are ſuppos'd to be alter'd, by the Violence of an extraordinary Paſſion, or the Diſtreſs of ſome ſtrange Calamity; yet, conſidering the intrepidity of their Natures, and the firmneſs of their Reſolutions, they muſt be exceeding mournfull or terrible Incidents, which can either ſubdue their Souls by the Force of a Paſſion, which is contrary to the Bent of their Natural Tempers, or aſſwage the impetuous Motions of Rage, which is grounded on their inborn Vehemence. And therefore it muſt be the moſt diſmal of all Misfortunes, which can make *Mezentius* bewail his Miſery, and bewail it with ſo moving an Air, that our very Souls are pierced by the Sufferings of one whom we abhorr'd but juſt before. And it muſt be the moſt

a amazing of all Cataſtrophies, which could aſtoniſh and break the wrathfull Mind of *Turnus*, and bring it to a ſenſe of its wretched State, and force it to ſue for Forgiveneſs to one whom it had with ſo much Fury, and with ſo much Diſdain oppos'd. Let us now conſider that which happen'd both to the one and the other. *Mezentius*, as we have ſaid above, was a Contemner of the Gods, and a Hater of Men. Yet this inhumane Tyrant could not ſo perfectly diveſt himſelf of Humanity, but that he excepted his Son from the Number of thoſe whom he hated; a Son, who indeed deſerv'd the Affection of a much better Father. And this Violence of Love was by ſo much the ſtronger in the Soul of this *Barbarian*, becauſe all its Softneſs was center'd in *Lauſus*; whereas the Tenderneſs of other Men is in different Degrees diffus'd through the whole Species.

Judge then what Impreſſion the cruel Death of this lovely Son; and a Son, who died for his Father, muſt make even upon a *Barbarians* Soul? Can any one be ſurpriz'd upon this occaſion, to behold even the bloody inhumane *Mezentius*, ſtrowing Duſt on his Head, and clinging round round the Body in all the Convulſions of Sorrow; then ſtretching out his Hands to Heaven, and crying out with ſo pathetick an Air.

Tantane me tenuit vivendi, Nate, voluptas,
Ut pro me hoſtili paterer ſuccedere dextræ
Quem genui? tua ne hæc genitor per vulnera ſervor?
Morte tuâ vivens? heu nunc miſero mihi demum,
Exilium infælix! nunc alte vulnus adactum!

And

And thus we have ſeen the predominant Quality of the Hero's Character appearing in *Mezentius*, without the leaſt Violation of the fourth Condition of the Manners. For *Mezentius* does nothing upon this occaſion, but what Nature and Reaſon tell us he would do upon ſuch an aſtoniſhing Incident; and therefore he does nothing but what is extreamly regular. But let us now behold the Cataſtrophie of *Turnus*. And as we have ſeen a very tender Paſſion excited, even in the Savage Mind of *Mezentius*, by the admirable Addreſs of a moſt deplorable Incident, and that without any Offence againſt exact Regularity: Let us now ſee the lofty turbulent Spirit of *Turnus*, humbled by the Plagues that the Terrours of *Jove* inflict upon him. Let us ſee this wrathfull outragious Prince dejected, and ſoft and ſupplicating: Let us ſee this intrepid and hitherto invincible Warriour, ſtretching out his Hand for Mercy, and not for Conqueſt.

Ille humilis ſupplexque, oculos dextramq; precantem
Protendens, Equidem merui, nec deprecor, inquit,
Utere ſorte tua, miſeri te ſiqua Parentis
Tangere cura poteſt; oro (fuit & tibi talis
Anchiſes genitor) Dauni miſerere ſenectæ:
Et me ſeu corpus ſpoliatum lumine mavis
Redde meis, viciſti, & victum tendere palmas
Auſonii videre: tua eſt Lavinia conjux:
Ulterius ne tende odiis.

Here

Here we may take notice of the following Particulars. First, he acknowledges the Wrong which he had done to *Æneas*, by unjustly constraining *Latinus* to declare War against him; and by Attacking his Men in his Absence, after he was Wounded upon the breaking the League. Secondly, he confesses *Æneas* the Conquerour. Thirdly, he resigns his Mistress. And lastly, he begs his Life. This seems to be quite contrary to the Character of the Violent, the Unjust and Inexorable *Turnus*. So that here is an appearing Violation of the fourth Condition of the Manners. But upon enquiry we shall find, that all this is extremely Just; and that Nature and Reason being observ'd, the Rules remain unviolated. To show which, we are not only to consider, that now the fatal Blow has been struck, which has brought *Turnus* to the very brink of Destruction, and laid him at his Enemy's Mercy, but we are to take a short View of what happen'd before. As *Æneas* Sail'd by the Gods Commands for *Italy*, so his Arrival was foretold there by Portents and Prodigies, and by the Oracle of *Faunus*. The last of which, as well as the other two, had not only deterr'd *Latinus* from Marrying his Daughter to *Turnus*, but had just before the Arrival of *Æneas*, assur'd him that a Foreign Hero was coming, who was to lay the Foundation of a glorious Empire there, and for whom his Daughter and Dominions were both predestin'd, *Lib.* 7. *v.* 98.

Externi

Externi veniunt generi qui ſanguine noſtrum,
Nomen in aſtra ferant, quorumque ab ſtirpe nepotes
Omnia ſub pedibus qua ſol utrumque recurrens
Aſpicit Oceanum, vertique regique videbunt.

And *Virgil* takes care to ſhow, that what this Oracle deliver'd was no Secret; but that Fame had taken care to divulge it juſt upon the Arrival of *Æneas*.

Hæc reſponſa patris Fauni, monituſque ſilenti
Nocte datos, non ipſe ſuo premit ore Latinus:
Sed circum late volitans jam Fama per urbes
Auſonias tulerat: cum Laomedontia pubes
Gramineo ripæ religavit ab aggere claſſem.
Ibid. v. 105.

Yet *Turnus*, tho' he was acquainted with this, urg'd by *Alecto* and his inborn Fury heighten'd and inflam'd by Love; not only perſiſts in his Pretenſions, but cauſes his Subjects to Arm, and Alarms his Neighbours, and conſtrains *Latinus* to begin a War againſt his own Inclinations, and the Commands of the Gods: Upon which *Latinus* threatens him with the certain Conſequences of ſo impious an Undertaking.

Frangimur heu fatis, inquit, ferimurque procellâ?
Ipſi has ſacrilego pendetis ſanguine pœnas:
O miſeri: te Turne nefas, te triſte manebit
Supplicium; votiſque Deos venerabere ſeris.
Ibid. 594.

In

In conſequence of which, *Turnus* is twice beaten, his Friends deſtroy'd, and his Party broken; and *Latinus*, in the beginning of the Twelfth Book, takes care to put him in mind, that this was all an Effect of Divine Vengeance. And *Turnus* ſeems to be ſenſible of this, when he approaches the Altar in order to the ſingle Combat. For the ſight of the Altar, upon this occaſion putting him in mind that he had grievouſly offended the Gods, may with a great deal of Reaſon be believ'd to cauſe that Paleneſs and Dejection which appears in his Countenance.

——Inceſſu tacito progreſſus & aram
Suppliciter venerans demiſſo lumine Turnus,
Tabenteſque genæ & juvenali in corpore pallor.

Which ſome Gentlemen, who are avow'd Abhorrers of Thinking, have taken to proceed from his Fear of the ſingle Combat. Immediately afterwards *Turnus* appears to be perfectly convinc'd of the Truth of what *Latinus* predicted in the Seventh Book.

——Te, Turne, neſas, te triſte manebit
Supplicium, votiſque Deos venerabere ſeri.

And that now it was too late to invoke the Gods; and that he had nothing to expect, but the very laſt dreadfull Effect of the Divine Diſpleaſure. And therefore he invokes the infernal Powers.

——————*Vos O mihi manes*
Eſte boni: quoniam ſuperis averſa voluntas.
Lib. 12. v. 546.

Here was enough already to bring a Man to Relent, even a Man of the moſt undaunted Temper, if he had any thing of Belief or Fear of the Gods in him. But immediately upon this the Terrours of *Jove* were upon him, who ſent down one of his Furies on purpoſe to aſtoniſh and to confound him.

——————*Turni ſe peſtis ad ora,*
Fertque refertque ſonans, clipeumque everberat alis.
Illi membra novus ſolvit formidine torpor:
Arrectæque horrore comæ & vox faucibus hæſit.
Lib. 12. v. 865.

But then as ſoon as ever he comes to himſelf, he diſcovers in one Expreſſion to *Æneas* both the Fear and the Greatneſs of his Mind.

——————*Non me tua turbida torrent*
Dicta, ferox, Dei me torrent, & Jupiter hoſtis.

So that here we find a Man who is brought by a long Train of Calamities to a ſenſe of his Crime, by which he had grievouſly offended the Gods; yet of a Crime which proceeded from no irreligious Principle, but from the Violence of a Rage which tranſported and clouded his Mind, and hurried him on to his Ruin. But tho'

tho' *Turnus* discovers Consideratenes, he yet a-while shows no Fear: He was by Nature intrepid and furious, and incapable of Fear. But here see the admirable Address of the Poet. For whom cannot *Jupiter* terrifie? *Jupiter* takes care to plague him with a Passion, whose Motions are quite contrary to those of his natural Fury. For Fear and Rage are inconsistent Affections. See then the Terrours of *Jove* upon him, which dispell the Remains of his Rage, and bring him perfectly to a sence of the greatness of his Crime, which flashes full in his Conscience. He feels the amazing Effects of the Gods displeasure for going against their Commands, for audaciously endeavouring to oppose their Supreme Decrees, and for wageing an unjust and an impious War against the Man who was under their immediate Protection. Now can any thing in the World be more reasonable than for a Man even of his Character, when he lies under such circumstances, and is not without a sense of Religion, and his miserable Condition; Can any thing be more reasonable, than for such a Man to confess his Crime, and the Wrong that he has done, to disclaim his Pretension, which was the cause of his Crime, and to be apprehensive of going out of the World, before he had by Prayer and Sacrifice aton'd the Powers, which he had so grievously offended? Can any thing be more according to Reason and Nature than this? And consequently, can any thing be more regular? We see every Day that People, who by the Violence

of their Paſſions have been tranſported to great Offences; when thoſe Paſſions are diſpell'd by the approach of Death, become ſenſible of their Faults, and confeſs their Injuſtice.

I have now one word to ſay of the different Behaviour of *Mezentius* at his Death. But firſt I deſire the Reader's leave, to ſhow how the Supplication of *Turnus*, which is ſo very reaſonable, and ſo very natural, and conſequently ſo very regular; I deſire leave, I ſay, to ſhow how admirably it ſerves the deſign of the Poet. For tho' I know very well, that this is not exactly to my purpoſe, yet it will ſerve at leaſt to Illuſtrate the Divine Conduct of *Virgil*. This Supplication then is perfectly neceſſary for the Integrity of the Action. For if *Turnus* had died without ſpeaking a word, and the Poem had ended ſo, we might have been in a reaſonable Doubt of the Event; and might have cauſe to believe, that the *Latins* and *Rutilians*, who broke the League once before to avoid the expoſing of *Turnus*, would break it yet once more to revenge him. But by this Supplication we are perfectly ſatisfied, that upon the Death of *Turnus* all things were calm and ſedate, who acknowledg'd in the Preſence both of the *Latins* and his *Rutilians*, that by his Proceedings he had wrong'd *Æneas*, and that he had deſerv'd his Fate.

Equidem merui, nec deprecor inquit.

For

For it is impoſſible that any of the Captains, who were Spectators of the ſingle Combat, could be ſo very unjuſt and ſo very unreaſonable, as to endeavour to revenge a Man who confeſs'd he deſerv'd his Fate. But now let us come to *Mezentius*. He behaves himſelf quite at a different rate. He neither begs his Life, nor confeſſes that he had done any Wrong. He is ſo far from fearing Death, that he reſolves to die; yet he too deſcends to Entreaties. But thoſe Entreaties are only, that he may be buried in the ſame Grave with his much lamented *Lauſus*. All which is extreamly natural. For *Mezentius* was intrepid by Nature, and a confirm'd Atheiſt. And that lovely Son was for ever ſnatch'd from him, who was the only Perſon, and the only Thing of all the World in which he could take delight.

Now a Man muſt of neceſſity deſpiſe Death, who is fierce and valiant by Nature, and who has loſt the only Object that made him in love with Life; and who, beſides all this, contemn'd the Gods, and laugh'd at Futurity. We have ſaid above, that Men who are tranſported by Paſſions to great Offences; when thoſe Paſſions come to be calm'd by the approach of Death, acknowledge their Faults, and repent of the Wrongs they have done. But nothing is more common than for one who has liv'd an Atheiſt, to go out of the World remorſeleſs and inſenſible. *Mezentius* then ſpeaks as one of his Character, and in his

Circumſtances would probably ſpeak, when he cries out,

Nec mortem horremus, nec divum parcimus ulli,
Deſine jam venio moriturus. Lib. 10. v. 879.

And a little afterwards, when *Æneas* had him at his Mercy,

Hoſtis amare, quid increpitas, mortemque mineris?
Nullum in cæde nefas, nec ſic ad prælia veni,
Nec tecum meus hæc pepigit mihi fœdera Lauſus.

Yet in the midſt of this obſtinate Intrepidity, *Virgil* finds a way, to make him deſcend to Entreaty. For he deſires that his Body may be preſerv'd from the Rage of his Subjects, and be buried by that of his dear *Lauſus*.

Unum hoc, per ſiqua eſt victis venia hoſtibus oro,
Corpus humo patiare tegi; ſcio acerba meorum,
Circumſtare odia, hunc, oro, defende furorem,
Et me conſortem nati concede ſepulchro.
Lib. 10. v. 903.

Where we may obſerve by the way, that he takes notice of the Wrongs which he has done his Subjects without the leaſt Remorſe. Now the Concern that he ſhows for his Funeral, and his Requeſt to be buried with his *Lauſus*, ſeems to be extreamly natural, even in one of his undaunted and unrelenting Temper. And there is ſomething ſeen every day in the World that is very

very like it. For nothing is more common than to find an expiring Perſon, who, becauſe he knows himſelf very ſtupid, believes he has no Soul, ſeem very ſollicitous for his Carkaſs. For it is impoſſible for any Man ſo far to ſtifle Eternal Truths, and the Dictates of Common Nature, but that there will be always ſome Remains of them; and the departing Soul of the moſt obſtinate and invincible Atheiſt, by a glimmering Conſciouſneſs of its Immortality, will provide for ſomething at leaſt to come.

And thus we have plainly prov'd, that *Virgil* has made the principal Quality of his Hero's Character ſhine even in the oppoſite Characters, and that without the leaſt Violation of the fourth Condition of the Manners. Now ſince *Virgil* has done nothing, even by varying the Manners in theſe oppoſite Characters, but what the ſtricteſt Reaſon requires; I think it will be needleſs to prove that one of his admirable Judgment has maintain'd the Manners in the reſt of the Characters, with the ſevereſt Conſtancy.

I have ſhown that Mr. *Blackmore* has been ſo very far from maintaining this ſcrupulous Unity, or from obſerving this exact Regularity, or from preſerving a Unity of Character in his Hero, through his Poem, that he has neither mark'd any predominant or diſtinguiſhing Quality in his Hero, nor preſerv'd the Qualities in them which he has mark'd; which being ill maintain'd, are conſequently ill expreſs'd: Upon which ac-

count they can neither be reſembling nor convenient.

Thus much we have ſaid of the Characters; in which, if we appear to have been tedious, I hope the Reader will excuſe it: Since we have already demonſtrated of what importance they are to the Moral; and ſince we ſhall ſhow by the Sequel of this Diſcourſe, in what an extraordinary Manner they influence, not only the Paſſions, but all the Incidents.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

That the Incidents in Prince Arthur, *are not of a delightfull Nature.*

WE now come to the ſecond thing, which makes the Narration delightfull, and that is the things included in it. In the former part of this Treatiſe, we ſpoke of the Epiſodes, as they are neceſſary parts of the Action. We ſhall now ſpeak of the Incidents which compoſe thoſe Epiſodes; or of thoſe probable Circumſtances which extend each part of the Action to the length of a juſt Epiſode. We ſhall now ſhow, that theſe Incidents in Mr. *Blackmore* are not delightfull: I mean, that they are not very delightfull to Readers of the beſt Taſt, and that they who are acquainted with *Virgil*, cannot be pleas'd to a height with them. The Incidents in *Prince Arthur* are not delightfull, for the following Reaſons. Firſt, Becauſe they are not in their Natures agreeable. Secondly, Becauſe there is not a ſufficient number of them. Thirdly, Becauſe they want Variety. Fourthly, Becauſe they have not a true Diſpoſition. Fifthly, Becauſe they are not ſurprizing. And Sixthly, Becauſe they are not Pathetick. We ſhall ſpeak to all theſe as ſuccinctly as poſſibly we can. Firſt, The Incidents are not in their Natures agreeable. The things included in Mr. *Blackmore*'s Narration are chiefly four: Voyages, Wars, Councils, Machines. Now there are three things that make

make a Voyage delightfull to the Reader. 1. The intereſt that he has in the Perſon that takes it, and the concern he lies under for him. 2. The Adventures that happen to that Perſon; And, 3. the Countries thro' which he paſſes. A Man who has a Friend in a foreign Country, receives ten times the Pleaſure from the account which he has of his Travels, that he would from a relation of the ſame Journeys or Voyages taken and made by an indifferent Perſon; unleſs there ſhould be a very great diſproportion in the manner of making it: This experience confirms. From whence it follows, that if a Poet would very much pleaſe us by a relation of the Voyages of his Hero, he muſt take care to give him ſuch Qualities, as may oblige us to wiſh him well. And the Qualities which oblige us to wiſh any one well, are ſuch as we either have our ſelves, or believe we have, or ſuch as we deſire, and conſequently, in ſome meaſure endeavour to have. For the concern which we have for others, is grounded upon the love of our ſelves. And the ſame likeneſs of Humours and Qualities, which obliges us to make a Friend, cauſes us to affect a Poetical Perſon. Now, as I cannot poſſibly be a Friend to any one, with whoſe Humours and Qualities I am unacquainted; ſo I cannot affect any Poetical Perſon, whoſe Character I do not know. But I have prov'd very plainly above, that we are not acquainted with *Prince Arthur*'s Character. For the Manners being ill-maintain'd in him, are conſequently ill-expreſs'd. At one time he appears brave and religious, at another time, impious and

and fearfull: ſo that the Reader knows not what to make of him. For they are not particular Acts, but confirm'd Habits and permanent Qualities, which denominate Men good or bad. Since then the Reader cannot be aſſur'd of any reſemblance between this Hero and himſelf, he cannot appear concern'd for him, and conſequently, ſees him between *Normandy* and *England* with a great deal the leſs delight: Nor are the Adventures which happen to *Arthur*, compar'd to thoſe which *Æneas* meets with, either delightfull or wonderfull. The two moſt conſiderable, are his meeting with *Hoel*, and his converſing with *Uter* in a Dream. Now I am pretty confident, that there is no Man ſo fond of *Prince Arthur*, as to make the leaſt Compariſon between thoſe and what happen'd to *Æneas* in the Court of *Dido*, and in his deſcent to Hell. Nor are the Travels of *Artuhr* to be compar'd in the leaſt, to thoſe of the *Virgilian* Hero. To ſail from *Normandy* to *Wales* is a very Trifle, in compariſon of the immenſe Voyages of *Ulyſſes* and of *Æneas*. *Thrace* and the fabulous *Ægæan* Iſles, the moſt delicious Countries on Earth, and famous for the Births of their Gods and Heroes, and renowned for ſo many wonders that were done before and ſince in them: *Crete*, *Epirus*, *Calabria*, *Sicily*, where there was *Ætna*, *Polyphemus*, *Scilla*, *Charibdis*, all amazing Wonders of Nature, are quite other Countries to give delight, than the Valleys of *England*, or than the Mountains of *Wales*. For that which is wonderfull, is at the ſame time delightfull, ſays *Ariſtotle*, which

which experience confirms, for we are very intent upon any thing at which we wonder, tho' it does not concern us, which we could never be, if it did not delight us. For which reaſon, in ſpeaking of the delightfull, we ſhall likewiſe ſpeak of the admirable, before we come to treat peculiarly of the latter.

The Wars in *Prince Arthur* are to be conſider'd next by us, which are not in themſelves delightfull; becauſe I am not acquainted with any one perſon engag'd in them. For no Man has any Character, as we ſhall prove anon, and conſequently, I am concern'd for no-body. Beſides, they are very little important, in compariſon of *Virgil*'s, upon the event of which, the Empire of the World depended, and from which the Poet's immediate Readers, deriv'd their greatneſs, and deduc'd their Glory. But I cannot ſee how we, who derive our ſelves from the *Normans* and *Saxons*, can be concern'd in *Prince Arthur*'s Succeſs, unleſs it be on the account of Religion, and we are the leſs concern'd upon that account, becauſe *Ethelina* being a Chriſtian, would, in all likelihood, upon the Death of her Father, have propagated her own Religion, tho' *Arthur* had remain'd contented in *Normandy*.

But Thirdly, The Councils in *Prince Arthur* are not in their Nature delightfull, becauſe they are heavy and phlegmatick. Whereas every thing in Poetry ought to be animated. Now nothing can be more ſpiritleſs, than the debate in the ſixth Book, between *Paſſentius* and *Ciſſa*. Indeed, Mr. *Blackmore* tells us, that *Crida*

Crida, in the Council of the ninth, is very angry: But if it be ſo, he is politickly angry. For by what he ſays, he by no means appears to be angry: Whereas all the Concils in *Virgil* are warm and pathetick. That in the ninth is animated, by the enterprize of the two Friends, that of the tenth by the Anger of *Juno*, and that of the eleventh by the violence of *Turnus*. Beſides, that the very Perſons in theſe Councils, *Aſcanius*, *Niſus*, *Eurialus*, the King and Queen of the Gods, and the Queen of Love and *Turnus* are quite other ſort of Perſons to to give delight, than five dull dogmatizing Politicians.

Fourthly, The Machines in *Prince Arthur* are not delightfull. By Machines, I mean the divine and infernal Perſons, for we have treated of the humane above. I have often, indeed, wonder'd why I could never be pleas'd with the Machines in a Chriſtian Poem. At length, I believe I have found out the reaſon. Poetry pleaſes by an imitation of Nature. Now the Chriſtian Machines are quite out of Nature, and conſequently cannot delight. The Heathen Machines are enough out of Nature to be admirable, and enough in Nature to delight. That which brings them nearer to Nature than the Chriſtian Machines, is the diſtinction of Sexes, human Paſſions, and human Inclinations: But however they are ſo far out of Nature, that *Virgil* has ſeldom ventur'd to deſcribe any of his Machines, and when he has done it, it has been in order to move Terror and not to move Delight. For he knew very well

well, that a thing may the rather move Terror for being out of the ordinary courſe of Nature, but that any Imitation which excites Joy, muſt be an Imitation of ſomething in Nature. For Imitation, ſays *Ariſtotle*, is therefore pleaſing, becauſe we are inſtructed by it without Pain. Now to be inſtructed by Imitation, I muſt be a Judge of that Imitation, which I can never be, if I have not a clear and diſtinct Idea of its Object; now *Virgil* knowing very well, that he had no clear and diſtinct Idea of his Gods and Goddeſſes ſaw very well, that for that reaſon he muſt not venture to paint them. And therefore in the firſt Book of the *Æneis*, neither *Juno* nor *Eolus*, nor the Winds, nor *Neptune*, nor *Jupiter*, nor *Cupid*, nor *Venus*, are any of them perſonally deſcrib'd. Indeed the Queen of Love ſeems to come by her Office nearer to Nature than the reſt of the Divinities, and therefore *Virgil* in the firſt Book has ſaid ſomething of her. But he has deſcrib'd her chiefly by Action and the Effect of Action. For when he deſcribes her Habit, he deſcribes her in the diſguiſe of a Mortal, and ſo far he is ſafe within the Compaſs of Nature. But when he ſpeaks of her as confeſſing the Goddeſs; he only ſays, that ſhe diſcover'd her ſelf at the taking leave of her Son by her Celeſtial Hue, by the Ambroſial Fragrancy that was diffus'd from her Hair, and by the Divinity of her Mien.

Dixit & avertens Roſea cervice refulſit
Ambroſiæq; comæ divinum vertice odorem
Spiravere.

Where

Where I desire the Reader's leave to observe, tho' it be not directly to my purpose, that *Virgil*, when he speaks of her Person, mentions only her Hair, and the hinder part of her Neck. A Poet, without Judgment, would certainly have describ'd her Face. But *Virgil* had discernment enough to see, that what he had said of her Hair, and of her Neck, and her Mien, would set her Face before the Reader in a more ravishing Form, than all the most beautifull Colours in Poetry, and the most delicate exquisite Strokes of the greatest of Masters could paint it.

But to return from whence we digress'd. *Virgil* has seldom describ'd any of his Machines; and in those which he has describ'd, he has been very short; and even in those short Descriptions, he has describ'd Actions, and not Persons. For which he is to be commended upon three Accounts. First, Because by describing his Machines by their Actions, he seems not so much to have gone out of Nature, for Motion in Matter is Nature. Secondly, Because all Poetry is Imitation, and nothing represents or imitates like Action; which is *Aristotle*'s Reason, in the Third Book of his Rhetorick, Chapter the Seventh. And Thirdly, Because all Poetry ought to animate, and the describing of Action animates. It being impossible for a Reader to conceive vigorous Motion without Agitation of Mind. Whereas the description of Persons is, for the most part, languishing, even when it is in Nature. Nay, I think I may venture to affirm, that Descriptions of Persons are always languishing,

guiſhing, unleſs they touch a Paſſion. When, I ſay, that *Virgil* deſcribes his Machines ſuccinctly, if he deſcribes them at all; and rather chooſes to ſay what they do, than what they are: I think my ſelf oblig'd to put the Reader in mind, that in the Fourth *Æneid* there is a very Signal Exception; And that is the Deſcription of Fame, who is drawn in fifteen Lines at length; three of which Number deſcribe her Perſon. But then we are to conſider the importance of that Machine; which cauſes the Departure of *Æneas*, and the Death of *Dido*; which are two of the moſt conſiderable Events of the Poem. Now this Deſcription of Fame, which is one of the longeſt of the *Æneis*, is abſolutely neceſſary, as the Reader will find by having recourſe to it, for the making us underſtand how ſhe brought theſe Events about.

Now ſince *Virgil* rarely deſcrib'd his Machines, tho' they are more in Nature than ours; and ſince he was very ſhort when he did deſcribe them, rather Painting their Actions than Drawing their Perſons: I think we may venture to affirm, that they do not appear to be the moſt Judicious of Writers, who are ſeen to be luxuriant in their Deſcriptions of Angels or Devils, in a Chriſtian Poem: Since the firſt of theſe are Beings, of which no Man can have clear and diſtinct Idea's, becauſe they have nothing which is common to us, neither diſtinction of Sexes, nor variety of Paſſions, nor diverſity of Inclinations; and ſince the laſt, tho' Paſſions and Inclinations are aſcrib'd to them; yet by reaſon that they have no good Qualities, do not come ſo

near

CHAP. VII.

That the Incidents in Prince Arthur *are not ſurprizing.*

IT is impoſſible that any Pleaſure can be very great that is not at the ſame time ſurprizing. I ſpeak of the Pleaſures of the Mind: Though what is ſaid of them may be truly affirm'd of the reſt too. If any one doubts of this, let him but have Patience till the next time that he is very much pleas'd, and upon Reflection he will be oblig'd to confeſs it. And therefore, if we could prove that Mr. *Black-more*'s Narration is not at all ſurprizing, it would follow, by manifeſt Conſequence, that it is not at all delightful. We ſhall here endeavour to ſhew, that the Incidents are not ſurprizing, but whether the Thoughts and Expreſſions are ſo, muſt be determined in another Place. Now, that the Incidents are not ſurprizing, may be eaſily demonſtrated. Firſt, that they are not ſurprizing to thoſe who are acquainted with *Virgil*, I take to be ſelf-evident, becauſe they are acquainted with the moſt conſiderable of them before-hand. But ſecondly, they cannot be ſurprizing to any other Reader of good Senſe, becauſe no Man is left in Suſpenſe, either as to the Certainty, or as to the time of the very laſt Event. For we find, in the Relation which *Lucius*

makes to *Hoel* in the fourth Book of the Poem, that the Arch-Angel *Gabriel* ſpeaks theſe Words to Prince *Arthur*, which we have cited in another Place. *lib.* 4. *p.* 115.

After ten times the revolving Sun
His crooked Race has thro' the Zodiack run,
The Clouds diſpell'd, propitious Heav'n ſhall ſmile
On Uter's *Houſe, and this reviving Iſle.*
Octa *ſhall feel juſt Heav'n's avenging Stroke,*
And Albion's *Youth ſhall break the* Saxon *Yoke.*

And not long after we are inform'd by the ſame *Lucius*, that this Term of Time was expir'd.

And *Raphael*, in the very firſt Book of the Poem tells *Arthur*, that as ſoon as he goes from *Armorica*, he ſhall be exalted to the *Britiſh* Throne.

Since therefore two Angels have ſaid it, it muſt be done. For each of them brings it in a Meſſage from God, who cannot deceive us, and whoſe Decrees are irreverſible. Now, ſince we are left in no manner of Suſpenſe, either as to the Certainty of the laſt Event, or as to the Time of its hapning, I cannot ſee how the Incidents which preceed it, can be very ſurprizing. For ſince the Incidents ought naturally to produce one another, and the preceeding ought to be the neceſſary, or at leaſt the probable Cauſe of the ſubſequent, I cannot imagine how any thing can be very ſurprizing to us, which has a neceſſary or probable Tendency to ſome-

thing

thing which we are ſure, muſt very ſuddenly happen. But now, if any one ſhall ſay, that Mr. *Blackmore*'s *Epiſodes* do not naturally produce one another, and that therefore they may be ſurprizing, though we are acquainted with the laſt Event: If any one ſhall urge this in his Behalf, which is a pleaſant Way of excuſing him, I muſt needs confeſs, that this Champion is in the right. And I think my ſelf oblig'd to declare that I was extremly ſurpriz'd to find, that, in the ſecond and third Books there was not a Line to the purpoſe. But the Reſult of the Matter is this. The *Epiſodes* in Prince *Arthur*, which have a neceſſary or probable Tendency to the final Event, cannot be ſurprizing, for the Reaſon which we have mention'd above. And they which are foreign from the Buſineſs, cannot give a Surprize which is Proper to Epick Poetry. Now, that Surprize alone which is admirable, may be ſaid to be proper to Epick Poetry. And *Ariſtotle* has formally declared, in the ninth Chapter of his Treatiſe of Poetry, that that Surprize is the moſt admirable, which flows from Incidents that ſpring from one another contrary to our Expectations.

But it is objected, that this Accuſation lies againſt *Virgil*, as well as againſt Mr. *Blackmore*. For neither has he left the Reader in any Suſpenſe as to the Certainty of the very laſt Event. For *Jupiter* ſays thus to *Venus* in the very firſt of the *Æneids*. *lib.* 1. *v.* 261.

Parce metu, Cytherea ; manent immota tuorum
Fata tibi ; cernes urbem, & promiſſa Lavini
Mœnia, ſublimemq; feres ad ſidera cœli
Magnanimum Æneam : neq; me ſententia vertit.

After which he deſcends to give her an Account of the Hero's Poſterity. In the ſecond Book, the Ghoſts of *Hector* and *Creuſa* give him Aſſurance of his ſucceeding in *Italy*, which Aſſurance is repeated by *Helenus* in the third Book, and by *Anchiſes* in the ſixth.

To this I anſwer, that though they aſſure the thing, they do not aſſure the Time. Nay, *Helenus*, who gives him Inſtructions about the Place of his Settlement, ſeems plainly to hint to him, that he cannot inform him of the Time. *lib.* 3. *v.* 380.

Prohibent nam cætera Parcæ
Scire Helenum, fariq; vetat Saturnia Juno.

And a little below he ſays to the ſame purpoſe. *ibid. v.* 461.

Hæc ſunt, quæ noſtrâ liceat te voce moneri.

Now the time being undetermined, there is a great deal of Room left for Surprize. But to make this Addreſs of *Virgil* yet more conſpicuous, let us conſider the Difference between the Syſtems of Stoical and Poetical Predeſtination.

The Stoical is the ſame with the Calvinical Predeſtination which comprehends the fol-

following Points. First, That every thing which befals us is preordained. Secondly, That every thing which is preordained, is preordained by God alone. Thirdly, That every thing which is preordain'd, is preordained, not only as to the Event, but as to the Point of Time. That every thing which is preordain'd, is eternally irreversible.

Now we shall shew that the poetical System is different from this in every Point of it: Which, when we have shewn, it must needs be granted to the Advantage of *Virgil*; not only, that the Time of *Æneas* his Settlement being unlimited, there is a great deal of Room for Surprize, but that the preordaining *Æneas* his Settlement, cannot give us a full, Certainty of it, and consequently, that *Virgil* had as free Scope to make his Incidents very suprizing as if the Establishment of his Hero had not been at all predestin'd.

The first Point of the Poetical System is, that whatever befals us, is not preordain'd. For the Poets allow Fortune to have the sole Administration of some Affairs. And *Dido* says in her dying Speech, that she had liv'd as long as Fortune had suffer'd her, and had finish'd the Course which she had allotted her. *lib.* 4. *v.* 653:

Vixi, & quem dederat cursum Fortuna, peregi;

And *Virgil* seems to attribute her Death to Fortune. *lib.* 4. *v.* 696.

Nam quia nec fato, meritâ nec morte peribat,
Sed miſera ante diem, ſubitoq; accenſa furore, &c.

Fortune and Fate in the eighth *Æneid*, are made to act in Conſort. For *Evander* ſays to *Æneas*: *lib.* 8. *v.* 333.

Me pulſum patria, pelagiq; extrema ſequentem,
Fortuna omnipotens, & ineluctabile fatum
His poſuere locis:

The ſecond Point of the poetical Syſtem is, that whatever is preordain'd, is done by *Jove* and the Fates in Conſort. *lib.*4. *v.* 438.

Sed nullis ille movetur
Fletibus, aut voces ullas tractabilis audit,
Fata obſtant, placidaſq; viri deus obſtruit aures.

And *Dido* ſays in her Execration

Si tangere portus
Infandum caput ac terris adnare neceſſe eſt
Et ſic fata Jovis poſcunt, hic terminus hæret.

That if Jove *and the Fates had ordain'd, that* Æneas *ſhould land in* Italy, *ſhe could not expect to alter their ſupreme Decrees.*

The third Point of the poetical Syſtem is, that whatever is preordain'd by *Jupiter*, and by the Fates, is unlimited as to the Time.

For

For *Juno* says in the seventh Book, *v.* 313.

Non dabitur regnis (esto) prohibere Latinis,
Atque immota manet fatis Lavinia conjux:
At trahere, atque moras tantis licet addere rebus.

And *Vulcan* tells *Venus* in the eighth Book, *v.* 398.

Nec pater omnipotens Trojam, nec Fata vetabant
Stare, decemq; alios Priamum superesse per annos.

Turnus his Death seems to be at hand, by what *Jupiter* says to *Hercules* in the tenth *v.* 471.

Etiam sua Turnum
Fata vocant, metasq; dati pervenit ad ævi.

And yet his Life afterwards is prolong'd at the Instance of *Juno*. To whom *Jupiter*,

Si mora præsentis leti, tempusq; caduco
Oratur Juveni, meq; hoc ita ponere sentis,
Tolle fuga Turnum, atq; instantibus eripe fatis.

The fourth and last Point is, that if *Jupiter* has not sworn by *Styx*; what he and the Fates have decreed, is not irreversible. Which may be gather'd from what *Jupiter* says to *Venus* in the Verses which he cited above.

Parce metu Cytherea: manent immota tuorum
Fata tibi: cernes urbem & promiſſa Lavini
Mœnia, ſublimemq; fere, ad ſidera cœli
Magnanimum Æneam, neq; me ſententia vertit.

And from what *Juno* ſays to *Jupiter* in the tenth Book, *v.* 632.

Et in melius tua qui potes orſa reflectas.

And from the Sequel of the Words of *Jupiter* which we have cited above.

Tolle fuge Turnum, atq; inſtantibus eripe Fatis
Hactenus indulſiſſe vacat: ſin altior iſtis
Sub precibus venia ulla latet, totumq; moveri
Mutarive putas bellum, ſpes paſcis inanes.

Which certainly implies, that the Decrees of *Jupiter* were ſometimes reverſible. For what he ſays to *Venus* in the firſt Book, and what he ſays here, would both be Impertinencies, if it were otherwiſe. Nay, notwithſtanding what *Jupiter* has ſaid to her, *Juno* ſeems yet to be in Suſpenſe, and not wholly to deſpair of preſerving *Turnus*. For thus ſhe replies to *Jupiter*,

Quid ſi quod voce gravaris
Mente dares? atq; hæc Turno rata vita maneret?
Nunc manet inſontem gravis exitus, aut ego veri
Vana ferar, quod at O potius formidine falſa
Ludar, & in melius tua qui potes orſa reflectas!

Nay,

Nay, in the twelfth Book, she appears to be still in Suspense, when she exhorts *Juturna* to assist her Brother. *lib.* 12. *v.* 152.

Tu, pro germano si quid præsentius audes,
Perge, decet; forsan miseros meliora sequentur.

And a little lower.

Non lachrymis hoc tempus, ait Saturnia Juno
Accelara, & fratrem, si quis modus, eripe morti.

And as long as the Queen of the Gods is in Suspense, the Reader may very well be so too.

And thus we have shewn, that *Virgil*, by his System of Fate, has left all imaginable Room for Surprize in his Incidents, which Mr. *Blackmore* has not done.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

That the Epiſodes *are not Pathetick.*

AS no Pleaſure can be very great, if it is not ſurprizing, ſo no Surprize can be very great if it is not pathetick; from whence it follows by manifeſt Conſequence, that if Mr. *Blackmore*'s Narration is not pathetick, it cannot be very delightful. Indeed, a Poet ought always to ſpeak to the Heart. And the greateſt Wit in the World, when he ceaſes to do that, is a Rhimer and not a Poet. For a Poet, that he may be ſure to inſtruct, is oblig'd to give all the Delight that he can, as we have prov'd above. Now nothing that is not pathetick in Poetry, can very much delight: For he who is very much pleas'd, is at the ſame time very much mov'd; and Poetical Genius, as we ſhall prove in another Place, is it ſelf a Paſſion. A Poet then is oblig'd always to ſpeak to the Heart. And it is for this reaſon, that Point and Conceit, and all that they call Wit, is to be for ever baniſh'd from true Poetry; becauſe he who uſes it, ſpeaks to the Head alone. For nothing but what is ſimple and natural, can go to the Heart; and Nature (humanly ſpeaking) can be touch'd by it ſelf alone.

A Poet is ſo indiſpenſably oblig'd to ſpeak to the Heart, that the epick Poets have for that

that very reaſon, made Admiration their predominant Paſſion; becauſe it is not ſo violent but that it may be laſting, and may be conſequently diffus'd through the whole Poem. But as that Paſſion is not violent, it is not alone ſufficient to give full Delight: For Admiration can only move and raiſe the Reader, whereas to give him the laſt Pleaſure, he muſt have the laſt Tranſport.

We ſhall take another Time to enquire whether the Narration of Prince *Arthur* is admirable. Let us at preſent examine whether it is tender and terrible: For Compaſſion charms us, and Terrour ſhakes us, and both of them very much pleaſe us: And we the rather enquire after thoſe two Affections; becauſe one of them ought, next to Admiration, to be the principal Paſſion in a Poem that is form'd after the Model of the *Æneis*; and both of them being Tragical Paſſions, to treat of them may prove of ſome little Advantage to the Stage.

The terrible and tender are every where in the *Æneis*; but the laſt of them is never to be ſeen in Prince *Arthur*, and the firſt but very rarely, though it is exceeding proper for epick Poetry, as being in its own Nature ſublime, and grave, and majeſtick.

To prove this, we ſhall examine what Characters, what Incidents, what Sentiments, and what Expreſſions are proper for the exciting thoſe two Affections.

The Characters which may be proper for the raiſing thoſe two Paſſions, muſt above all things

things be very fairly distinguished: For, if the Manners are ill expressed in them, we can never become acquainted with them, and consequently, can never be terrified by foreseeing their Dangers, and never be melted by feeling their Sufferings.

When we hear of any grievous Calamity which has happen'd to a Stranger, we are no further concern'd for it, than we are oblig'd by Humanity. But if any thing disastrous happens to a Man whom we know, we are sure to be afflicted at it if we have a Kindness for the Man.

For it is not a bare Knowledge that can create this Concern in us: Since the Knowledge of the Man may make his Affliction delightful to us, if it proves one whom we either despise or hate. The Concern which we speak of, can only be produc'd by a Resemblance of Humours and Qualities in the Person who suffers, or who is like to suffer; and in him who is terrified, or who commiserates.

For, no Man commiserates what another Man suffers, unless he is apprehensive of enduring the like. Now no Reason can be given why one Man should be apprehensive of enduring what another Man suffers, but a Resemblance in Circumstances, and the greater the Resemblance is, the greater will the Apprehension certainly be. This exactly agrees with the Doctrin of *Aristole* in the tenth Chapter of the second Book of his Rhetorick. Ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ

κα-

κακῶ φθαρτικῶ καὶ λυπηρῶ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχαίνειν, ὃ κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειαν ἂν παθεῖν, ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινά. *Let Compassion then be defin'd to be a Trouble of Mind, which is caus'd by an Opinion of something grievous, which has happen'd to another, which he who commiserates, expects that he, or some of his should suffer.* And he tells us afterwards in the same Chapter. Καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐλεοῦσι κατὰ ἡλικίαν, κατὰ ἤθη, κατὰ ἕξεις, κατὰ ἀξιώματα, κατὰ γένη· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις μᾶλλον φαίνεται καὶ αὐτῶ ὑπάρξαι, ὅλως γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα δεῖ λαβεῖν, ὅτι ὅσα ἐφ' αὐτῶν φοβοῦνται, ταῦτα ἐπ' ἄλλων γιγνόμενα ἐλεοῦσιν. *Men have Compassion of those who are their Equals in Age, in Humour, in Manner, in Birth, in Dignity: For what they behold these suffer, they the rather fear may befal themselves. And it is taken for granted, that whatever we are apprehensive of suffering our selves, that we are certain to pity in others.*

But, as we said before, the greater the Resemblance is between him who suffers, and him who commiserates, the stronger will the Apprehension, and consequently, the Compassion be. And therefore a Poet, who forms a Character, by whose Calamities he designs to melt or terrifie his Audience or his Readers, ought to make that poetical Person resemble them as much as he can. Now the way to give him a general Likeness, is neither to make him guilty of great Crimes, nor to make him sovereignly virtuous, but to compound him of Virtues and Faults; for so the Generality of Mankind is compos'd, and consequently the

the Generality of the Readers of an epick Poem, or the major Part of Audience. But a Poet ought not only to give this general Likeneſs, he ought further to make his poetical Perſon unhappy for the very thing or things by which he reſembles thoſe who are deſign'd to commiſerate him. And therefore he ought to give him either ſuch Defects as are to be found in moſt Men, or ſuch to which the major Part are obnoxious. Nay, further, theſe Defects are to be of ſuch a Nature, as that not only they may be found in the Generality of Men, or to which the Generality may at leaſt be liable; but that alſo the Generality may believe that they have them, or that they are at leaſt obnoxious to them. And therefore a Poet is not to make any Perſon, whom he would have commiſerated, unhappy, either for great Crimes, becauſe, as we have ſaid above, the Generality of Men are exempt from thoſe, or for ſcandalous Weakneſſes: Becauſe this latter is not only unjuſt, ſince no Man can help his Weakneſs, but deſtructive of the Poet's Deſign. For though ſcandalous Weakneſſes are to be found in moſt Men, or moſt men at leaſt are liable to them, yet no Man believes that he is ſo: And therefore a Poet is by no means to give any ſcandalous VVeakneſs to any of his Perſons, by which he deſigns to excite Compaſſion or Terrour, though he makes thoſe Perſons unhappy for ſomething elſe. Becauſe that VVeakneſs, as ſoon as ever the Rea-

Readers or Audience diſcern it, will not fail to make the Perſon who has it, contemptible, and ſo reſtrain them from making any Compariſon.

Now thoſe Defects, which either are to be found in moſt Men, and which they believe that they have, or to which moſt Men at leaſt are liable, and believe themſelves liable, are violent Paſſions. And of theſe Paſſions, to make the Pity and Terrour ſurer and ſtronger, ſuch in my Mind ought to be choſen, as are the moſt univerſal, and ſuch as though they are not the leaſt guilty, are the moſt creditable in the Eyes of the World.

Now, of all the Paſſions, the moſt univerſal is Love, as Nature has wiſely contriv'd it for the Propagation of Mankind; and Love, of all the Paſſions, is that, whoſe Exceſs we moſt willingly own: And therefore, Mr. R*ymer*, who would have baniſh'd it from the *Engliſh* Stage, would have depriv'd our Poets of the ſureſt Means of going to the Hearts of an Audience. For upon Reflection, we ſhall certainly find, that the Characters in our Tragedies, which melt us moſt, are thoſe whoſe Misfortunes are brought about by the extraordinary Force of Love.

Thus far we have ſpoken of the Characters. Let us now ſay ſomething ſuccinctly of the Incidents, and more ſuccinctly of the Thoughts and Expreſſions, becauſe the Conſideration of theſe laſt belongs to another Place.

What-

Whatever happens, ſays *Ariſtotle*, in the fifteenth Chapter of his Treatiſe of Poetry, *happens either amongſt Friends, or amongſt Enemies, or amongſt indifferent Perſons. An Enemy who kills, or is about to kill his Enemy, excites no other Compaſſion than that which ſprings from the Evil it ſelf.* That is, than that which Humanity obliges us to take. *The Caſe is the ſame, when any thing like it happens amongſt indifferent Perſons. But when the like Calamities happen amongſt Friends; when a Brother kills, or is about to kill his Brother, a Son his Father, a Mother her Son, or a Son his Mother, that is what a Poet ought to lay hold of.* The moſt terrible, and the moſt melting Calamities are thoſe which are caus'd by a Friend. *Ariſtotle* has given the Reaſon for this in his Rhetorick, as we have cited the Paſſage above. For what we moſt fear ſhould happen to our ſelves, that we moſt commiſerate in others. Now, the Thought of being injur'd or ruin'd by a Friend, is a great deal more terrible than the Apprehenſion of a like Calamity, from a Stranger or Enemy. For there is ſomething of Baſeneſs in fearing this laſt, whereas the braveſt Man for his Friends Sake, may be allow'd to fear the firſt.

There are three Ways, ſays *Ariſtotle*, by which a Friend may oppreſs or deſtroy a Friend. The firſt is when,

Actions are repreſented which are done by Perſons who act with a perfect Knowledge, and that was the Practice of the ancient Poets. Euripi-

ripides *follow'd it when he repreſented* Medea *killing her Children.* The ſecond Way is when,

Perſons are made to act, who do not know the Blackneſs of the Fact they commit; but who, after the committing it, come to know the Relation and the Friendſhip which was between themſelves and the Perſons whom they, through Revenge, deſtroy, as the Sophoclean Oedipus. *It is true in* Sophocles, *that Action of* Oedipus *is out of the Tragedy. Behold one that is in the Action of the Tragedy, and that is the Death of* Eriphyle *kill'd by* Alcmeon *in the Poet* Aſtydamas; *and another is the wounding of* Ulyſſes *by his Son* Telegonus.

A third Way is, when,

A Perſon is about to commit a black Action by Ignorance, and comes to diſcover it before the committing it. Of theſe, ſays *Ariſtotle*, the firſt is the worſt.

The ſecond, ſays he, is good: *Becauſe the Action has nothing that is villanous in it, and the Diſcovery is very pathetick.*

But the laſt is incomparably the beſt of the three, which Euripides *has follow'd in his* Creſphontes, *where* Merope *diſcovers her Son in the very Moment that ſhe was about to kill him; and in* Iphigenia, *where that Princeſs comes to know her Brother in the very Inſtant that ſhe was about to ſacrifice him: And ſo in* Helle, Phyxus *comes to know his Mother, juſt as he was about to deliver her to his Enemies.*

Theſe are the Precepts which *Ariſtotle* has given for the moving Compaſſion and Ter-

rour by Incidents. But theſe are directed to tragick Poets; and do not exactly ſquare with heroick Poetry. For in all the epick Poems that ever we knew, there being two different numerous Parties which proceed againſt one another by open Force, and Friends in them acting moſt commonly on the ſame Side, they cannot be eaſily ignorant one of another; or if they were, the attempting one upon another would in all Probability, make the Fable Epiſodick, and the Action double. To do otherwiſe it muſt certainly be manag'd with an extreme Addreſs. *Taſſo* indeed provides *Tancredi* an *Amazonian* Miſtreſs, who was of the contrary ſide, and whom he kills in her VVarrior's Accoutrements, and immediately after it, upon lifting up her Helmet, knows her. This is according to the ſecond Precept of *Ariſtotle* which we have cited above, and the Diſcovery is very pathetick. *Gier. Cam.* 12. *St.* 67.

La vide, e la connobbe, & reſtó ſenza
E voce, e moto, ahi viſta, ahi conoſcenza!

He ſaw her, and he knew her, and was ſtruck ſpeechleſs and motionleſs: What a Sight was there! And what a Diſcovery!

This *Taſſo* has done, but the Character of *Clorinda* being liable to Cenſure, becauſe it has not all the Probability which might be requir'd, for that very Reaſon the Incident cannot be juſtified. From what has been ſaid,

ſaid, we may very well conclude, that it is very difficult, if not impoſſible to contrive the Incidents in an epick Poem as they are fram'd in a Tragedy.

This *Virgil* ſaw very well; and therefore, ſince it was not in his Power to make his Incidents tragical, he did his Endeavour to bring them as near as he poſſibly could to the Nature of tragical Incidents. And ſince he could not bring it about that a Friend ſhould be the Cauſe of the Death of his Friend; which, with a little Addreſs, may be compaſs'd in Tragedy; he at leaſt contriv'd, that a Friend ſhould occaſion the Death of a Friend, which too is very pathetick. Now, in the Term Friend, *Ariſtotle* includes Relations, as *Dacier* has obſerv'd in his Remarks upon that Place: In *Virgil* then, to mention no more, we have three very pathetick *Epiſodes*. In the tenth Book, we ſee a Son dying for his Father; in the ninth we have a Friend who dies for his Friend. And in the fourth, we find a Miſtreſs who kills her ſelf for her Lover: So that in that admirable Poet we have three Calamities occaſion'd by three of the deareſt Tyes, that ever were known to Man. And we ſhall find the Characters in thoſe Places admirably contriv'd for the exciting Terrour and Pity.

Lauſus, in the tenth Book, is a young Prince of extraordinary Hopes; conſpicuous for his Courage, and for his filial Affection. But his Faults were Preſumption and Obſtinacy

He attacks *Æneas* to ſave his Father, and ſo far he is pardonable. But after his Father had, by his Aſſiſtance, eſcap'd; he ought to have deſiſted, and to have taken the Warning which the *Trojan*, with ſo much Generoſity gave him, *lib.* 10. *v.* 811.

Quo moriture ruis? majoraq; viribus audes?
Fallit te incautum pietas tua, nec minus ille
Exultat demens.

But inſtead of that, he perſeveres to his Ruin.

In the eighth Book *Niſus* ſhews Courage, Friendſhip, and Loyalty, and Concern for his Prince, and a great deal of Zeal for the common Cauſe, *lib.* 9. *v.* 176.

Niſus erat portæ cuſtos, acerrimus armis,
Hyrtacides, —— ——

Lib. 9. *v.* 192.

Æneam acciri omnes populuſq; patreſque
Expoſcunt, mittiq; viros qui certa reportent.
Si tibi quæ poſco, promittunt, (nam mihi facti
Fama ſat eſt.)

Euryalus appears to have the ſame Qualities.

Mene igitur ſocium ſummis adjungere rebus,
Niſe, fugis? ſolum te, in tanta pericula mittam?
Non ita me genitor bellis aſſuetus Opheltes

Ar-

Argolicum terrorem inter, Trojaq; labores
Sublatum erudiit: nec tecum talia geſſi,
Magnanimum Æneam, & fata extrema ſecutus.

For though *Virgil* has every where elſe admirably diſtinguiſh'd his Characters, he has with a great deal of Judgment, in this *Epiſode*, made his two Friends reſembling: And as their Virtues are the ſame, their Fault is the ſame, which is a head-ſtrong Ambition. *lib.* 9. *v.* 184.

Niſus ait: Diine hunc ardorem mentibus addunt
Euryale? an ſua cuique deus fit dira cupido?
Aut pugnam, aut aliquid jamdudum invadere magnum
Mens agitat mihi, nec placidâ contenta quiete eſt.

Euryalus ſays in his Anſwer to him.

Eſt hic, eſt animus lucis contemptor, & iſtum
Qui vitâ bene credet emi, quo tendis, honorem.

From all which we may obſerve, that though they were concerned for their Prince and their fellow-countrymen, yet Ambition was the firſt Motive to their Action, and it accordingly prov'd unfortunate; and this vicious Paſſion that was the Motive to the Action, caus'd it to miſcarry. For that engag'd them in the Slaughter of their Enemies, till the Arrival of *Volſcens*, though they knew that the Fate of their Country depended on the Succeſs of their Voyage, as

that depended upon the Expedition of their Paſſage. *Niſus* ſeems to be ſenſible of this, as *Virgil* who loves to inſtruct by Action, and who hates to moralize, has artfully contriv'd it to hint his Inſtruction to the Reader. *Lib.* 9. *v.* 353.

Breviter cum talia Niſus,
(Senſit enim nimiâ cæde atq; cupidine ferri)
Abſiſtamus, ait.

In the fourth Book we ſee the Separation of *Æneas* and *Dido*, which alone is productive of Compaſſion; as *Ariſtotle has* obſerved in the tenth Chapter of his Rhetorick.

Καὶ τὸ διαιρεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων ἢ συνήθων ἐλεεινόν,
To be torn from ones Friends, and thoſe with whom we have a long time convers'd, excites Compaſſion.

But that is not all, the Vehemence of her Paſſion conſtrains her to lay violent Hands upon her ſelf: And ſuch a Cataſtrophe from ſuch a Cauſe, muſt of neceſſity be very deplorable, as we have ſhewn above.

Let us now conſider the Character of *Dido*, as we ſhall find it in *Boſſu*; and we ſhall eaſily ſee that it is not only compounded of Virtues and Faults, which Compoſition is proper for the exciting Terrour and Pity; but that, by the Oppoſition it has to that of *Æneas*, it is contriv'd to give the laſt Satisfaction to all who are acquainted with the *Carthaginian* and *Roman* States.

Dido,

Dido (*says* Bossu) *is the first Person whom the Poet presents to us, and is* (*after the Hero*) *the most considerable one of the first Part of the* Æneis. *She is the Foundress of the* Carthaginian *State, as* Æneas *is the Founder of the* Roman *Empire; and she represents the Obstacle which that Common-wealth oppos'd to the victorious Progress which at last exalted* Rome *to the World's Empire. As then the Poet has stamp'd the Character of the* Roman *State on his Hero, she ought to have that of* Carthage *imprinted on her. Behold her then passionate, violent, bold, undertaking, ambitious and false to her Word: And all these Qualities are set in Motion by Trick, which is the Character and the Soul of them all. 'Tis by Trick that she makes all her great Undertakings succeed, that she revenges her Husband, chastises her Brother, deceives* Jarbas. *'Tis by the same Quality that she resolves to stop* Æneas, *and not being able to bring it about, she deceives her Sister who was her only Confident.*

As ill and as odious as this Character appears to the Reader, Virgil *was forced upon it by the first Plan of his Fable. But, as far as the Necessity of that Fable permitted him, he has taken care, according to the Maxim of* Aristotle, *to bestow on this Character, all the softning which would consist with his Subject, and to exalt it by all the Beauties of which he found it capable.* Dido, *in the Action of the Poem at least, does not make an ill use of her Wit, unless with Intention to stop* Æneas *at* Carthage. *And she is compelled to it by the Violence of a Passion,*

which takes from the Odium of the Action, and leaves a Place for the Readers Tears, and for his Compaſſion of the Pains which ſhe ſuffers, and of the Death to which ſhe condemns her ſelf. Beſides, he makes her exerciſe her Cunning on legitimate, illuſtrious, and glorious Occaſions. He beſtows on her, Qualities that are truly imperial. She diſcovers, with Bounty, and with Magnificence, an uncommon Eſteem for Virtue. All this is ſhewn in the obliging manner, with which ſhe receives the Trojans, *even before ſhe had ſeen* Æneas.

From all which it appears, that this Character is taken by *Boſſu*, to be very capable of raiſing Compaſſion; as containing a Mixture of good and bad in it. And we have ſhewn above, that the Cauſe of her Calamity, which is the extraordinary Force of Love, is above all things, proper for the exciting of that Affection. And the Preſumption which we have found in *Lauſus*, and the Ambition which we have diſcovered in *Niſus* are neither great Crimes, nor ſhameful Infirmities, but are rather creditable, tho' ungovernable Paſſions.

But to come to Mr. *Blackmore*, there are but three Paſſages in all his Poem, by which he can pretend to excite Compaſſion. The firſt is the Death of *Macor* in the eighth Book. The ſecond is the Supplication of *Elda* for her Husband's Life, in the ſame Book. The third is the Death of *Uter* related by *Lucius* to *Hoel* King of *Armorica*. Firſt, for *Macor*, his Character does not ſeem

to

to be rightly compos'd, nor to have the requisite Mixture of good and bad in it; nor does it appear, that his Death was occasioned by his Fault; nor was it occasion'd by a Friend, but caus'd by an Enemy, which makes the Compassion so much the weaker. And then for *Elda*, the Passion which Mr. *Blackmore* designs to raise by her, is not in the least prepared. First, we never so much as heard of her before her Supplication begins; and we ought to have been acquainted with her Character before, that it might have made the deeper Impression on us. But secondly, she has no Character. For no Quality appears in her but the Love of her Husband, and no one Quality can form a Character. Thirdly, she is never in any Danger of what she pretends to fear. For the Reader knows upon the very Beginning of her Petition, that *Arthur* will spare her Husband, and consequently, cannot be in the least concerned for her. And fourthly, this Petition rather shews a foolish Fondness than a very violent Passion. For though nothing is more proper for the exciting Compassion than a disastrous Love, yet I think I may venture to affirm, that to compass the End design'd by it, it ought always to be joyn'd, not only with good Sense, but likewise with Greatness of Mind.

But to come to *Uter*, his Calamity is caus'd by an Enemy, and not occasion'd by a Friend. Nor is his Character fram'd for the ex-

exciting Compaſſion. Let us conſider what *Lucius* ſays of him in his Relation to *Hoel* in the fourth Book.

Won by the potent Charms of Saxon *Gold*
Carvil *his Prince and Native Country ſold.*
He in indulgent Uter's *Boſom lay*
And did the Secrets of his Breaſt betray.
He on his Conduct and his Faith rely'd,
In Peace and War alike his treacherous Guide.
He held the moſt important Truſts of State,
Nor could his Treaſons Uter's *Love abate.*
Unhappy Prince that ſtill his Foes believ'd
Only by Ruin to be undeceiv'd.
To Friends ingrate his Foes he entertain'd,
Thus loſt the one, but not the other gain'd.
Wiſely undone he knew his Friends too late,
By his own Prudence manag'd to his Fate
Our Prayers and Warnings tir'd his Ears in Vain,
Perfidious Councils only could obtain:
Rough Truth and loyal Bluntneſs gall'd his Ear,
That only ſoft melodious Sounds could bear.
His firm and loyal Friends, tho hardly us'd,
Look'd on enrag'd, to ſee their Prince abus'd.
Tho ſome grown cold ceas'd to lament his Fate,
For Will and choice Compaſſion ſtill abate.

Thus is this *Uter* ſottiſhly eaſie and credulous. But that is a ſmall Matter, compared to his other Fault. For *Uter* is ungrateful likewiſe, and he who ſays that, has ſaid all. This wretch of a Monarch, even by Mr. *Blackmore*'s Confeſſion, loſt his Crown and Life unpitied by thoſe who ſaw it.

And

And thus I have endeavour'd to ſhew, that the Characters and Incidents in Mr. *Blackmore*'s Poem, are not rightly fram'd for the exciting Compaſſion. For the ſame Reaſons they are very improper for the exciting Terrour. I want Time to ſpeak of the reſt of the Affections, as Anger, Indignation, and the like, which are ſeldom truly mov'd through the whole Poem. I will now ſpeak but one Word concerning the two other Sources of the Pathetick, which are the Sentiments and the Expreſſions, becauſe the Conſideration of thoſe belongs to another Place.

The Sentiments ought to be diſorder'd in the violent Paſſions, and the Language ought to be bold and figurative; and the more violent the Paſſions are, the bolder may the Language be. Firſt, becauſe the Nature of violent Paſſion requires this, which troubles the Functions of the Soul, ſo that it cannot ſuit Thoughts to things, nor Words to Thoughts. Secondly, becauſe the Hearers, who partake of the Tranſport, are too much ſhaken to find out Faults. This is the Doctrine of *Ariſtotle* in the ſeventh Chapter of the third Book of his Rhetorick. *And therefore*, ſays *Ariſtotle*, *a bold and a figurative Expreſſion is exceeding proper for Poetry, becauſe all Poety is extreamly pathetick.* Διὸ καὶ τῇ ποιήσει ἥρμοττεν· ἔνθεον γὰρ ἡ ποίησις. The Interpreters have tranſlated theſe Words thus. *Becauſe there is ſomething divine in Poetry.* But I am pretty confident that ἔνθεος is us'd metaphorically

taphorically here, and ſignifies ſomething extreamly pathetick. For otherwiſe nothing can be made of *Ariſtotle*'s Argument, notwithſtanding that he is one of the juſteſt of Thinkers, whereas, if that Word is us'd metaphorically, and ſignifies ſomething pathetick, the Philoſophers arguing is certainly juſt. *A bold and a figurative Expreſſion is proper for Paſſion, and therefore it is proper for Poetry, becauſe Poetry is pathetick.* Which arguing is conſiſtent with the peripatetick Philoſophy, and with the Nature of Poetry. For, I am pretty confident that I can make it appear that *Genius* is nothing but Paſſion.

If I had proceeded to the third thing, which makes a Narration delightful, I had then examined Mr. *Blackmore*'s Thoughts and Expreſſions, and had afterwards proceeded to conſider what is probable and admirable in his Narration. But I have now juſt gone through half my Method, and I am ſo throughly tir'd my ſelf, that it would be unreaſonable to believe that I have not wearied my Reader.

FINIS.

Annotations.

But one Man who was greatly good, and was not, &c.

Page the 6th.

THE immediate moral Cauſe of the Deſtruction of *Troy* was the unjuſt Detenſion of *Helen*. To which all the noble *Trojans* conſented, unleſs *Antenor* and *Æneas*, who conſequently were the only two who were not involv'd in the Deſtruction of their Country. All the reſt were either ſlain or carried away Captives. Now, though *Virgil* had nothing directly to do with *Antenor*, yet he thought fit, for the enforcing the Excellence of the Moral to inſinuate that he had eſcaped; which he has told us, with a great deal of Addreſs, by the Mouth of *Venus* in the firſt *Æneid*. But as for his Hero, he thought it neceſſary to ſhew us that the Cauſe of his not being

being involv'd in the general Ruin, was his refuſing to conſent to the foreſaid Detenſion of *Helen*. Which he has ſhewn us by Action, by which alone an epick Poet ought chiefly to inſtruct. For the Hero is ſhewn in the ſecond Book, relating how he had expoſtulated with himſelf, whether he ſhould kill *Helen*: Which implies that he had been all along averſe from the Detenſion of her, or elſe the Expoſtulation wou'd be ridiculous, as well as it wou'd be unjuſt. But here it will be convenient to vindicate *Virgil*, from an Imputation that is laid to his Charge. And that is, that by this Paſſage he has very much derogated from that Valour which ought to be in a ſovereign degree in his Hero. But a Man like *Virgil*, is never to be accuſed raſhly. For here I doubt not but I ſhall manifeſtly ſhew, firſt, that this Paſſage does not derogate from the Valour of the Hero, and ſecondly, that the very ſame Paſſage was abſolutely neceſſary to ſhew that this Valour was perfect. For the proving of the firſt, I ſhall not urge the extraordinary Diſturbance, into which *Æneas* at that time, had been thrown by the Sight of ſo deplorable a Calamity, and the Loſs of ſo many Friends that were dear to him, with which Commotion he makes *Dido* acquainted, when he relates the Paſſage to her.

Talia jactabam, & furiatâ mente ferebar.

This

This I ſay, I will not urge (though it would certainly be ſome Excuſe for *Æneas*) ſince ſomething may be ſaid that will carry a greater Weight with it, which is this. That the Courage of the Hero was deſigned a ſubordinate Quality to his Piety, and ſo was always to conſent with that. Now *Æneas* look'd upon the killing of *Helen*, as a religious Duty, and a ſort of infernal Sacrifice, due to, and expected by the *Manes* of his Friends.

Sumſiſſe merentes
Laudabor pœnas, animumq; expleſſe juvabit
Ultricis flammæ, & cineres ſatiaſſe meorum.

And here we may take notice of an admirable Obſervation of *Boſſu*, which is, *That* Æneas *was not only become King by the Death of* Priam, *but that he was likewiſe become high Prieſt by the Death of* Panthus: And conſequently, it was very clear to him, that if ſuch a Sacrifice would be acceptable, it could be offer'd by none but himſelf. And thus the Reſolution of *Æneas* to kill *Helen*, is prov'd to derogate no more from his Valour, than the Sacrifice of *Iphigenia*, or of *Polixena*, derogated from the Courage of the *Grecian* Chiefs.

But ſecondly, this Reſolution of the Hero to kill *Helen*, was abſolutely neceſſary to carry on the Action, and ſhew that the Valour of *Æneas* was without Blemiſh.

Æneas

near to humane Nature as the infernal Gods of the Heathens; and ſince by reaſon that they have all of them infernal Rage and diabolical Malice, and bear an immortal Hatred to Man, the good as well as the bad, which the infernal Powers of the Heathens, no, not even the Furies do not; they rather appear to be horrible and odious, than they ſeem to be terrible.

'Tis true indeed, I am not ignorant that the moſt delightfull and moſt admirable Part of the ſublimeſt of all our Poets, is that which relates the Rebellion and Fall of theſe Evil Angels, and their diſmal Condition upon their Fall, and their Conſult for the recovery of their native Manſions, and their Original Glory. But then we are to conſider, that theſe Angels, according to the Syſtem of *Milton*; which an Engliſh Poet, who treats of thoſe Matters after him, is certainly oblig'd to follow, were very different juſt upon their Fall, from what they are believ'd to be at preſent, or to have been in *Prince Arthur*'s time. That this was *Milton*'s Hypotheſis, is apparent from ſeveral Paſſages. For God the Father, in the Sixth Book of *Paradiſe Loſt*, ſpeaking of the good and bad Angels, ſays to his Son:

Equal in their Creation they were form'd,
Save what Sin hath impair'd, which yet hath wrought
Inſenſibly, for I ſuſpend their doom.

And *Milton*, in the Firſt Book, deſcribes *Lucifer*, as one whoſe Glory was not quite extinguiſh'd. The Verſes deſerve to be read everywhere.

——————*He above the reſt*
In ſhape and geſture, proudly eminent,

Stood like a Tow'r, his Form had yet not loſt
All her original brightneſs, nor appear'd
Leſs than Arch-angel ruin'd, and th' exceſs
Of Glory obſcur'd: As when the Sun new riſ'n
Looks through the Horizontal miſty Air
Shorn of his Beams, or from behind the Moon
In dim Eclipſe diſaſtrous Twilight ſheds
On half the Nations, and with fear of change
Perplexes Monarchs: Darkned ſo, yet ſhone
Above them all th' Arch-Angel: but his Face
Deep Scars of Thunder had intrench'd, and Care
Sate on his faded Cheek, but under Brows
Of dauntleſs Courage and conſiderate Pride
Waiting revenge: cruel his Eye, but caſt
Signs of Remorſe and Paſſion to behold
The fellows of his Crime, the followers rather
(Far other once beheld in bliſs) condemn'd
For ever now to have their Lot in pain,
Millions of ſpirits for his fault amerc'd
Of Heav'n, and from eternal Splendours flung
For his revolt, yet faithfull how they ſtood
Their Glory wither'd. As when Heav'ns fire
Hath ſeath'd the Foreſt-Oaks, or Mountain-Pines,
With ſinged top their ſtately growth, tho' bare,
Stands on the blaſted Heath. He now prepar'd
To ſpeak, whereat their doubled Ranks they bend
From wing to wing, and half encloſe him round
With all his Peers. Attention held them mute:
Thrice he aſſay'd, and thrice in ſpight of ſcorn
Tears ſuch as Angels weep burſt forth. At laſt
Words interwove with Sighs found out their way.

Here we may behold in *Lucifer* ſome Remains of Glory, and ſome Reſemblance of Goodneſs; and conſequently the Devils, according to *Mil-*

ton,

ton, were different then, from what they are believ'd to be now. Nor had they yet a while ruin'd Mankind, nor conceiv'd that unrelenting Hate againſt the whole Species, which now they are believ'd to have.

They had not reſolv'd upon their deſign againſt Man till about the middle of the Second Book. And even afterwards, when *Lucifer* took his flight to the new-made World, in order to the executing what they had contriv'd; he ſhows Remorſe upon the top of *Niphates*, in the Speech which is found in the Third Book, and which begins with that wonderfull Apoſtrophe to the Sun.

O Thou who with ſurpaſſing Glory crown'd,
Look'ſt from thy ſole Dominion like the God
Of this new World, at whoſe ſight all the Stars
Hide their diminiſh'd Heads; to thee I call,
But with no friendly Voice, and add thy Name,
O Sun, to tell thee how I hate thy Beams
That bring to my remembrance from what State
I fell; how glorious once above thy ſphere,
Till Pride and worſe Ambition threw me down,
Warring in Heav'n againſt Heav'ns Matchleſs King.
Ah wherefore! he deſerv'd no ſuch return
From me, whom he created what I was
In that bright Eminence, and with his good
Upbraided none; nor was his ſervice hard, &c.

And in the Eighth Book the Devil is made to relent, nay to be pleas'd upon the ſight of *Eve*.

Such pleaſure took the Serpent to behold
This flowry Spot, the ſweet Receſs of Eve
Thus early, thus alone; her heav'nly Form
Angelick, but more ſoft and feminine,

Her

Her gracefull Innocence, her ev'ry Air
Of Geſture or leaſt Action over-aw'd
His Malice, and with Rapine ſweet bereav'd
His fierceneſs of the fierce intent it brought.
That ſpace the evil one abſtracted ſtood
From his own evil, and for the time remain'd
Stupidly good, of Enmity diſarm'd
Of Guile, of Hate, of Envy, of Revenge.

By all which we may ſee, that *Milton*, to introduce his Devils with ſucceſs, ſaw that it was neceſſary to give them ſomething that was allied to Goodneſs. Upon which he very dextrouſly feign'd, that the Change which was caus'd by their Fall, was not wrought in them all at once; and that there was not an entire Alteration work'd in them, till they had a ſecond time provok'd their Creatour by ſucceeding in their attempt upon Man. From whence it ſeems very apparent to me, that a Poet, who introduces Devils into a Poem writ on any more Modern Subject, cannot uſe them with the ſame ſucceſs that *Milton* did, and ought certainly never to deſcribe them, as Mr. *Blackmore* has done. For which reaſon I laid the Scene of the *Court of Death* between the Surface of the Earth and Hell, which is commonly believ'd to be at the Center, and endeavour'd to make what difference I could between thoſe who compos'd it, and meer infernal Spirits.

Thus we have endeavour'd to ſhow, that the things included in Mr. *Blackmore*'s Narration, are not in themſelves delightfull. In the next Chapter I propound to treat of their Number, of their Variety, and of their Diſpoſition.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Number, Variety and Diſpoſition of the Incidents.

THE more numerous the Incidents are in any Narration, the more that Narration delights, provided they neither corrupt the Unity of the Action, nor the Perſpicuity, the Brevity and Simplicity of the Narration. For the Mind does not care for dwelling too long upon an Object, but loves to paſs from one thing to another; becauſe ſuch a Tranſition keeps it from languiſhing, and gives it more Agitation. Now Agitation only can give it Delight. For Agitation not only keeps it from mortifying Reflections, which it naturally has when it is not ſhaken, but gives it a Force which it had not before, and the Conſciouſneſs of its own Force delights it. Beſides, that every large Incident gives a freſh Surprize.

The Number of Incidents in Mr. *Blackmore*'s Poem is very ſmall, conſidering the Length of the Narration: For there are no Incidents at all in the ſecond and third Books of the Poem, unleſs a Man could be ſo extravagant as to call the Creation, and Redemption, and laſt Judgment Incidents. Now the ſecond and third Books make a fifth Part of the Poem; and we have Reaſon to believe, that above a third of the other

eight Books consists of needless and trifling Descriptions, dogmatical Reflections, superfluous Characters and Harangues that are foreign from the Purpose. *Monsieur Segraris* has observed, in the Beginning of his Remarks upon his *Virgil*, that the Poets Proposition and Invocation, the Causes of the Anger, and the Hatred of *Juno*; the Expressions of her Resentment, her Complaint, and her Indignation; her Conversation with *Eolus*; the Qualities and Answer of that God, the wonderful Tempest, the Lamentation of *Æneas*, the Wrath of *Neptune*, his rebuking the Winds, their Flight, and the succeeding Calm, are all in the Compass of an hundred and fifty Verses. If a Man considers this, says he, *rien n'est plus capable de fair voir la richesse et la Grandeur de l'esprit de Virgile, et les qualites les plus souvent contraire, de queques uns qui on crunarcher sur sas pas. Nothing is more capable*, says he, *of shewing the Richness of* Virgil's *Invention, and the Sublimity of his Wit, and the contrary Qualities of some who have thought they have follow'd his Model.*

In the Beginning of Mr. *Blackmore*'s Poem, we have the Proposition, the Invocation, the Causes of *Lucifer*'s persecuting *Arthur*; the Expressions of his Rage and Malice, his Flight to *Thor*, and his Request to him. *Thor*'s Qualities and his Answer, the outragious Storm, the Descent of *Uriel*, and the Calm that succeeds it, in the Compass of between three and four hundred Verses. From whence

whence it appears, that either *Virgil* has not said so much as he ought to have done, or that Mr. *Blackmore* has said almost as much again as in Reason he ought to have said: Which I hope is a very fair Calculation upon the making a just Abatement for the Succinctness of the Latin Tongue. Now a Poet that has such a Number of Words, does not only cause us to languish, by making us dwell too long upon an Object, but he clogs and retards his Action, and very often raises the Indignation of his Reader. For though Instruction be the chief End of a Poet, yet Diversion is the principal Aim of the Reader; and the Generality of Readers have Recourse to Poems, as they have to Company, more for their Pleasure than for their Benefit. Now the Pleasure that we propound to our selves by conversing, is not only the hearing what others can say; but the speaking our selves in our Turns, and the springing of new Ideas, and the starting of new Notions, upon the Hints which we have from others: Upon which Account nothing is found to be more troublesome to Company, than a Fellow who talks all: For he not only deprives us of the forementionʼd Pleasure of starting and delivering our own Notions, but mortifies our Vanity another Way too, and that is by telling us, that he values himself upon his own Sufficiency, and mistrusts our Capacities.

The same thing happens to us when we are engaged in the reading a Poet who ex-

hauſts his Subject; he deprives us of the Pleaſure of thinking our ſelves, which is the greateſt in the World, and treats us like People who are not able to think.

But now, as to paſs from one thing to another agitates; ſo the more thoſe Objects are different one from another, the more their Variety ſhakes and ſurprizes us: Which Reflection dictated the following Verſes to *Boileau.*

Voulez vous du public meriter les amours?
Sans ceſſe en ecrivant variez vos diſcours.
Un ſtile trop egal et toujours uniforme,
En vain brille a nos yeux, il faut qu' il nous endorme
On lit peu ces auteurs nes pour nous ennuyer
Qui toujours ſur un ton ſemble pſalmodier
Heureux qui dans ſes vers ſcait d'une voix legere
Paſſer du graueau doux, du plaiſant au ſenere,
Son Liure aimé du ciel, et cheri des lecteurs
Eſt ſouvent chez Barbin entouré d'achepteurs.

Which in Engliſh is thus; *Would you deſerve the Approbation of the Publick? In writing diverſifie your Stile inceſſantly: Too equal and too uniform a manner, ſhines to no purpoſe, and inclines us to ſleep. Rarely are thoſe Authors read who are born to plague us, and who appear always whineing in the ſame ungrateful Tone. Happy the Man who can ſo command his Voice, as to paſs, without any Conſtraint, from that which is grave, to that which is moving, and from that*

which

which is pleaſant, to that which is ſevere and ſolemn.

Thus has *Boileau* preſcribed Variety; both for the Stile and Subject. I muſt confeſs, the Queſtion here is not concerning Stile. But it will not be amiſs to give the Reader a Hint, that if it appears that Mr. *Blackmore* has not Variety of Matter; and that the Stile perpetually ought to be ſuited to the Subject; it muſt of neceſſity follow, that either Mr. *Blackmore* has not ſuited his Manner of writing to his Subject, or that his Stile is not enough diverſified. But to ſhew that Mr. *Blackmore* has not Variety of things, which is our Buſineſs here, we need only put the Reader in mind, that ſince we have ſhewn, that this Author has no Plenty, it evidently follows, that he has no Variety. For, though there may be Plenty without Variety, yet I cannot ſee how the latter can be without the former; but we will ſtill go a little further, and ſhew that Mr. *Blackmore* has not Variety even in Proportion to his little Subſtance.

As *Virgil* has, with an admirable Simplicity, diverſified his Stile inceſſantly and inimitably, whereas Mr. *Blackmore*, with a forbidding Affectation, has a wearisome Uniformity, ſo it is extremly remarkable, that *Virgil*, with exact Regularity, and a perfect Unity, has Variety, as well as Plenty of Matter; whereas Mr. *Blackmore*, in the irregular Conſtitution of a double Action does not only want a ſufficient Variety of Inci-

dents, but a Variety proportioned even to his little Number.

Virgil, after he has terrified his Reader with the Deſcription of that wonderful Tempeſt which we find in the Beginning of his Poem, takes care to refreſh him, by the pleaſing Landskip of the Place where *Æneas* landed. Mr. *Blackmore*, who in the Beginning of his Poem, has ſervilely follow'd *Virgil*, has made a like Deſcription. But this is in an extraordinary manner remarkable, that *Virgil*'s Deſcription is not only neceſſary, but exceedingly beautiful; nay, the very Beauty of it makes the Neceſſity, whereas Mr. *Blackmore*'s is without Neceſſity, as it is abſolutely without Beauty.

After this Deſcription, we have an Account of the future Greatneſs of *Rome* from the Mouth of the King of the Gods; we have in the ſame firſt *Æneid*, *Venus* diſguis'd in an enchanting manner, and appearing in the hunting Dreſs of a *Tyrian* Virgin; which Machine is abſolutely neceſſary to prepare the Paſſion of *Dido*; and then we have the Metamorphoſis of the God of Love to *Aſcanius*, and ſee him in the Lap of a beautiful Queen, and not only ſee, but feel her Careſſes, which is certainly one of the moſt charming Images that ever was ſhewn in Poetry.

Ille ubi complexu Æneæ colloq; pependit
Et magnum falſi implevit genitoris amorem;
Reginam petit; hæc oculis, hæc pectore toto
Hæret,

Hæret, & interdum gremio fovet, inscia Dido
Insidet, quantus miseræ Deus—

Thus *Virgil* is apparently entitled to the Benediction of the *French* Criticks. For he passes from that which is pleasant, and from that which is terrible, to that which is soft and moving.

But Mr. *Blackmore*, after he has wearied us with the Description of a Tempest, which is mortally tedious, gives us the solemn Entertainment of a sententious Harangue, and anon proceeds to describe Persecution, after such a Manner, that as *Longinus* says of the Goddess Discord of *Hesiod*, he has render'd the Image nauseous which he designed terrible. Indeed, he continues to be so grave and so solemn for the whole first four Books, excepting in Places where he is trifling and childish, that I appeal to any impartial Reader, whether *Boileau*'s Expression may not be applied to him, and whether he does not all that while appear *Toujours sur un ton psalmodier*, *to be continually setting a Psalm.*

But to make this Want of Variety in Mr. *Blackmore* still more manifest, the Reader is desired to consider, that *Virgil*, though he has scarce one thing in his whole Poem which is absolutely foreign from his Action, yet his Narration is every where moving, and he always speaks to the Heart; whereas the Pathetick in Mr. *Blackmore*'s Narration is scarce any where to be found; though

in that Narration there are ſeveral things which are wholly foreign from the Subject: So that in the one we have only Action, and yet that Action very often ſtands ſtill; in the other we have always both Action and Paſſion, and yet the Action by the Paſſion is never obſtructed, any further than is requiſite for the forming one of thoſe juſt Difficulties, without which the Intrigue would be altogether inſipid.

Let us now examin, with as much Succinctneſs as we can, the Travels, the Machins, the Councils, the Battels in Mr. *Blackmore* and *Virgil*, and conſider the Variety of one and the other in Relation to theſe.

For the firſt, *Virgil*, in his firſt Book, ſhews his Hero in *Europe* and *Africa*. The Scene of the ſecond Book lies in *Aſia*, and *Æneas* in the third is ſeen in all the three Parts of the then known World. He ſets Sail from the leſſer *Aſia*, he lands both in the Iſles and Continent of *Europe*, and is thrown upon the *African* Coaſts. Whereas, Mr. *Blackmore*'s Hero ſails only from little to great *Britain*.

In *Virgil* the Machins are as well diſtinguiſh'd as the Men; *Jupiter*, *Juno*, *Mercury*, *Venus*, *Minerva*, *Diana*, *Apollo*, are not only more generally diſtinguiſh'd by Sexes, but each by a ſingular Complication of their ſeveral Paſſions and Inclinations. Nay, the infernal Perſons, *Charon*, *Pluto*, *Rhadamanthus*, *Alecto*, *Atropos*, are as fairly diſtinguiſh'd as the celeſtial Perſons. Whereas, in Mr.

Mr. *Blackmore*, the Angels are diſtinguiſh'd only by their Ranks and their Offices, which cannot characteriſtically mark the Perſons. Their Inclinations are the ſame: For Love and Zeal are found to predominate in all; ſo that their Characters are all a-like, and *Gabriel*, *Raphael*, and *Uriel*, are as it were but one Perſon. The Devils have likewiſe the ſame Qualities, Rage and Envy, Hatred and Malice tyrannizing in all.

Virgil has a great deal of Variety in his Councils, not only becauſe there is Paſſion in all of them, which we have ſaid above; but becauſe the Characters in them are admirably well diſtinguiſh'd. In the Council of the Gods in the tenth Book, *Venus* appears zealous for her Offspring, and ſupplicating. *Juno* ſhews Wrath, and Severity, and Enmity, and Hate to the *Trojans*. *Jupiter* ſhews a Majeſty and Impartiality becoming the King of the Gods. In the Council in the eleventh Book, *Venulus* diſcovers the Opinion and Reſolution of *Diomedes*, which appear to be his own, not only by his Affirmation, but by his way of Delivering them. The Speech which he makes is grave and ſenſible, and by a moving Relation of the Misfortunes of the *Grecians*, excites a gentle Compaſſion; which ſhews a Tenderneſs of Nature in him who raiſes it, and an Inclination to Peace.

The next who declares his Opinion is *Drances* who diſcovers a great deal of Malice and Rancour, and diſguiſes his Envy, and the Hate

Hate which he bears to *Turnus*, under a pretended Concern for the State. The firſt delivers himſelf with Tenderneſs and Concern for the State. The Harangue of the ſecond is a bitter Invective; an undaunted Courage, and a generous Rage appears in the Anſwer of *Turnus*.

In Mr. *Blackmore*'s Poem are two Councils, the firſt in the ſixth, and the ſecond in the ninth Book. The Speakers in the firſt are *Paſcentius* and *Ciſſa*, and thoſe in the ſecond are *Oſroed*, *Paſcentius*, and *Crida*. I ſuppoſe Mr. *Blackmore* does not pretend to diſtinguiſh *Paſcentius* and *Ciſſa*. I am ſure, by what they ſay, they do not diſtinguiſh themſelves. For I defie any Man to determine what ſort of Perſons they are. *Paſcentius* and *Oſroed* are as little diſtinguiſhable: Indeed *Crida* appears to be different from the other two; but he does by no means appear to have the Diſtinction which Mr. *Blackmore* deſigned for him. Before he begins his Speech we are told that he burns with Choler.

Paſcentius *ceas'd*, Crida *with Choler burn'd*,
And with an Air diſturb'd, theſe Words return'd.

Let us a little examine the Perſon, and ſee if we can juſtly conclude from his Expreſſions, that the Man is in Paſſion, or ſpeaks with an Air diſturb'd.

We all well know, Paſcentius's *Tongue was made*
Smooth, ſoft, and fluent, fitted to perſwade.

For

For Courtly Arts, and fine Intrigues of State
No Saxon *Genius can* Pascentius *mate:*
All to his Eloquence at home must yield
As he to all for Courage in the Field.
Men of the Cabinet take no Delight
In bloody War, they are too wise to fight. (find,
The Britons *Strength, and* Arthur's *Arms I*
Strike fiercely on a prudent timerous Mind.
A brave Heroick Spirit can't despair (War.
Who minds the Turns, and doubtful Chance of

Is this the Language of a Man in Fury? Can these Expressions agree with an Air disturb'd? I appeal to any sensible Reader, whether, if any one should talk at this rate upon the Stage, with an angry Voice and Air, he should not conclude it to be excellent Comedy? There does indeed appear to be Malice in the foremention'd Speech. But Cold does not differ more from Heat, than Malice does from Fury.

Let us next inquire whether *Turnus*, in the Council of the eleventh *Æneid*, does not deliver himself at a very different rate. *Drances* had provok'd him by the following Expressions.

Nulla salus bello, pacem te poscimus omnes
Turne; *simul Pacis solum inviolabile pignus.—*
Pone animos, & pulsus abi——
Et jam tu si qua tibi viri
Si Patrii quid Martis habes, illum aspice contra
Qui vocet.

The

The Reader may eaſily diſcover, that what *Turnus* anſwers, Nature would dictate upon the like Occaſion to one of his violent Temper.

Imus in adverſas? Quid ceſſas? An tibi Mavors
Ventoſâ in linguâ pedibusq; fugacibus iſtis
Semper erit? (*pulſum*
Pulſus ego? Aut quiſquam merito, fadiſſime,
Arguet, Iliaco tumidam qui creſcere Thybrim
Sanguine, & Evandri totam cum ſtirpe videbit
Procubuiſti domum, atq; exutos Arcadas armis?
Nulla ſalus bello? Capiti cane talia demens
Dardanio, rebusq; tuis.

I would fain ask the Reader if any thing but Nature could dictate this; and if the Motions of a Mind that is truly enrag'd are not diſcernible in every Line of it?

But 'tis time to ſhew, that there is not that Variety in the Wars of Mr. *Blackmore*, that a Reader may reaſonably expect. There is neither Variety of Action, nor Variety of Agents in them. In *Virgil* one while we behold the ſacking of a Town, by and by a Skirmiſh, and anon a Siege; then a daring Enterprize, then a nocturnal Combat of Horſe, after which a Battel, and to crown all, an Aſſault, and a terrible and admirable ſingle Combat. Whereas, all the Variety that we have in Mr. *Blackmore*, is a Sea-fight, a Land-Fight, and a ſingle Combat. And as for the laſt, I hope no Reader can be ſo partial to Mr. *Blackmore* as to affirm, that there is one

one Quarter of the Variety in the Combat between *Arthur* and *Tollo*, that there is in that between *Turnus* and the *Trojan* Hero.

But then the Agents in Mr. *Blackmore*'s Wars appear to be all of a Piece. Every Man is a *Turnus*; every one acts with Fury; so that all their Characters are alike, or rather, none of them can be said to have any Character: For a Character is that which distinguishes one Man from another. In the fourth Book, Page 109. the Author says of King *Uter*,

Observing his disorder'd Troops retir'd
His boiling Soul distracting Passion fir'd.

By the way, what can Mr. *Blackmore* mean by *a boyling Soul?* A Metaphor is a Comparison in little, and things that are compared ought to be *ejusdem generis:* Now boiling implies Extension, and a Soul supposes thinking, and thinking and Extension have nothing at all in common.

Let us now take a View of *Octa*, and we shall find that his Valour is not at all different from *Uter*'s, *lib.* 4. *p.* 111.

As when a Lyon that with Fury ran
To seize by Night some weary Caravan,
That lay encamp'd on an Arabian *Wild,*
Repuls'd by Fires, and of his Prey beguil'd.
With hideous Roar he raves at his Defeat.
Oft stands, looks back, and makes a sowre Retreat

King

King Octa's *Soul like Indignation fir'd*
Who raving with his vanquish'd Men retir'd.

'Tis a hard caſe that I muſt be obliged to tranſcribe ſuch Lines as theſe; which I can not for my Life reconcile either to Senſe or Grammar. For what is the Verb that anſwers to Lyon? 'Tis plain there is none, and conſequently the Senſe is imperfect: For a Man who mentions any thing, affirms ſomething of the thing which is mention'd, or elſe he ſays nothing. Now nothing can affirm but a Verb. However, theſe Verſes ſhew us that *Octa* is as outragious as *Uter*, and I am willing to believe, for Mr. *Blackmore*'s ſake, that he, when he indited them, was not altogether ſerene.

In the Beginning of the Battel of the eighth Book, we find the ſame *Octa* in the very ſame Condition, *lib.* 8. *p.* 221.

Octa *enrag'd to ſee the numerous Spoils*
Round Cadwall *ſpread, ſprung thro the thronging Files,*
Ruſhing with Fury on, and threatning high.

Let us now ſee if the Hero has a Valour that is different from that of the other two. In the ſame Beginning of the foremention'd Battel Mr. *Blackmore* tells us, that,

The Prince enrag'd, caught up his Spear in haſt,
Which he at Ciſſa *with ſuch Fury caſt.*

By

By which we may see, that the Valour of *Arthur* is not at all distinguish'd from the Valour of *Uter*, or from the Courage of *Otta*.

In the very third Line of the tenth Book, we find, that,

Boyling with Martial Rage King Tollo *stands.*

And in the 272d. Page of the same Book,

First furious Tollo *springs out from the Lines.*

And at the very Bottom of the same Page.

Thus Tollo *boasts, thus did his Fury rise,*
And Streaks of Fire flash'd from his raging Eyes.

In the 281st. Page of the same Book 'tis said of *Arthur*,

He made his Way like an impetuous Flood
Or furious burning raging thro the Wood.

And in the 293d. Page of the same Book.

So Arthur *boiling with Heroick Rage,*
Springs with a full Career, &c.

Thus have I shewn, that the Character of Mr. *Blackmore's* Warriers are all confounded; and that *Uter* has nothing in Fight, but in Name to distinguish him from *Arthur*, or *Arthur* from *Otta*,

Octa, or *Octa* from *Tollo*; whereas *Virgil* has made the Valour of *Turnus* quite different from that of his Hero, and has distinguish-ed that of *Mezentius* from both.

The first time that *Turnus* appears in the Field, is in the Beginning of the ninth Book, bringing up his Men to the Siege of *Æneas* his Camp. Now in that Place the Poet takes a particular care to shew a Valour in him that is joyn'd with Fury. For he wants Pa-tience to attend the heavy Motions of his Men, and with twenty Horse-men, rides upon a Stretch up to the very Trenches of the Camp. When he comes there, he is for beginning the Assault before his Body comes up to him. He excites his Men by asking them who dares second him. And the very Question shews, that Fury had made him im-potent.

Ecquis erit, mecum, Juvenes, qui primus in hostem?
En ait, & jaculum adtorquens emittit in auras
Principium pugnæ.

And immediately upon it.

Huc turbidus atq; huc
Lustrat equo muros, aditumq; per avia quærit.
Ac veluti pleno Lupus insidiatus ovili,
Cum fremit ad caulas, ventos perpessus & imbres
Nocte super media, tuti sub matribus agni
Balatum exercent: Ille asper & improbus irâ
Sævit in absentes: Collecta fatigat edendi
Ex longo rabies, & siccæ sanguine fauces

Haud

Haud aliter Rutulo muros & caſtra tuenti
Igneſcunt iræ, duris dolor oſſibus ardet.

Where we find, that, in the Compaſs of ten Verſes, the Poet uſes no leſs than ſeven different Expreſſions to mark the extraordinary Fury of *Turnus*. *Virgil* had prepar'd the Reader for this in the ſixth Book by the Mouth of the *Sybill*.

Alius Latio jam partus Achilles
Natus & ipſe Deâ.

And likewiſe, in the ſeventh Book, as we have obſerv'd in another Place. And he conſtantly and admirably maintains ſo outragious a Courage in him, till Reaſon obliges him to keep it up no longer.

But now let us ſhew, that this furious Valour of *Turnus*, is directly oppoſite to that of the *Trojan* Hero.

The firſt time that *Æneas* appears in the Field, is in the tenth Book, *v.* 310. where, for a long time, he ſhews a ſedate and a temperate Valour, becoming of that Excellence of Nature which is the fundamental Quality of his Character. And here it will be neceſſary to ſhew what we promis'd above, that *Virgil* has admirably preſerv'd the Unity of Character in his Hero, and that the fundamental Quality of this Character ſhines even in thoſe *Epiſodes* that are of a contrary Nature.

It may be ojected indeed to the Poet, that the Hero in this very tenth Book does ſeveral things, which are, in Appearance, deſtructive of this fundamental Quality. He deſigns to ſacrifice eight noble *Italians*, *v.* 520. He refuſes to give *Magus* his Life when he begs it of him; and afterwards treats *Liger* with the ſame Severity; and laſtly, he is ſeen to deſtroy, with a Fury, ſurpaſſing even that of *Turnus. lib.* 10. *v.*602.

Talia per campos edebat funera Ductor
Dardanius, torrentis aquæ vel turbinis atri
More furens :

For the clearer anſwering of theſe Objections, it will be neceſſary to ſhew what this Excellence of Nature is, by which the Reader will ſee, firſt, that it is very conſiſtent with Anger. Secondly, that the Anger of a good natur'd Man, when it is once rais'd, is greater than that of another. Thirdly, that a Man of an excellent Nature can command his Anger when it is at the Height. And laſtly, that as he takes it up, he lays it down with Reaſon. And the Reader being convinced of theſe four things, will eaſily confeſs, that *Æneas*, by his Proceedings in this tenth Book, has rather maintain'd than forfeited the Character of a Man of an admirable Goodneſs of Nature.

I know that there are ſeveral People in the World, who miſtake a ſoft eaſie Creature, a Wretch that is never to be provok'd, for

for one who has Goodneſs of Nature. But ſince a Man, who has Goodneſs of Nature, is much more perfect, and more what he ſhould be, than one who is not good natur'd, as he certainly is, or he could never engage the Affections of a Man of Senſe, which yet he never fails to do, and ſince Anger being a natural Quality, neceſſary for Action, and aſſiſtent to Virtue, the Want of it muſt be a Defect, I cannot poſſibly comprehend how any one who is not capable of Anger, can have Goodneſs of Nature.

By Goodneſs of Nature I never could comprehend any thing but a Force and Rectitude of Reaſon (which is partly the Reſult of the Happineſs of the Conſtitution) which, like an excellent Prince, commands the Paſſions that it rules without oppreſſing them; and wiſely governs them by the ſame Laws by which it is guided it ſelf. A Man therefore who has Goodneſs of Nature never ſhews himſelf peeviſh or moroſe, becauſe Peeviſhneſs is a Weakneſs, and Moroſeneſs a Vice; nor does he ever appear to be angry without a very juſt Occaſion, becauſe a groundleſs Anger ſhews the Infirmity of Reaſon rather than proves the Force of it. But when Anger comes to be neceſſary, as it frequently does, either for the exciting a Man to his Duty, or for the avoiding a vicious Compaſſion, then it being a Weakneſs not to be angry; a Man who has any Goodneſs of Nature will let looſe the Reins to Rage: And that Rage being rais'd by a great Occa-

ſion, and rais'd to a ſuitable Height, is often, for that reaſon, found to be more vehement in a good natured Man than it appears in another. Yet in the very midſt of its greateſt Fury, by Virtue of his extraordinary Force of Mind, a good natur'd Man can, by an Effort, reſtrain it. But nothing but Reaſon can oblige him to make that Effort, as nothing but Reaſon could raiſe his Paſſion at firſt.

Excellence of Nature is the Force and Rightneſs of Reaſon, and a Love of the like in others. For Self-love, which prevails in all, obliges us to be fond of our own Reſemblance. Therefore a Man of an excellent Nature has a Concern and a Tenderneſs for Mankind. For no Man, who can juſtly be call'd a Man, can be ſaid to have his Reaſon entirely perverted. But the foreſaid Concern is greater or leſs in Proportion to the greater or leſs Corruption of its Object. A Man of an excellent Nature of himſelf is calm and ſedate, not becauſe his Mind is determin'd by a contingent regular Motion of Spirits, but becauſe that Motion is regulated by the commanding Force of his Reaſon, which tells that this Sedateneſs of Temper is due to thoſe with whom he converſes, whoſe Peace he is obliged to maintain, and whoſe Happineſs he is engag'd to promote, not only as they partake of the ſame common Nature with him, but as they are Members of that Community, on whoſe well-doing depends his own.

Rea-

Reaſon tells him yet further, that this Serenity is due to himſelf, and to the Preſervation of his own Happineſs, which to maintain is as much his Duty as it is his Intereſt. But the ſame Reaſon aſſures him, that ſometimes a ſhort Diſturbance is neceſſary for the ſecuring a long Serenity, and that Rage may grow neceſſary for repelling the Violence of thoſe who would injuriouſly deſtroy his Happineſs.

Æneas, at his firſt coming into the Field, appears in a perfect Tranquility; and the Poet, for the ſpace of two hundred Lines, uſes not ſo much as a Word that can ſhew the leaſt Commotion in his Hero. So loath was *Æneas* to be enrag'd at his Enemies, becauſe they were ſhortly to become his Subjects. But when *Turnus* had ſlain his Friend, and inſulted upon that Action, then his Reflection upon the Obligation which he had to *Evander*, and upon the Worth of *Pallas*, and the Conſideration of his own Security, and of the Malice and Rage of his Enemies, who had not only broken their League with him contrary to the Command of their Gods and their King, but appear'd obſtinately bent to his Ruin, and had ſtruck at his Life through that of his deareſt Friend: Theſe Conſiderations obliged him at laſt to let looſe the Reins to Fury. And he ſaw nothing extaordinary enough in *Magus*, or in *Lucagus*, or in *Liger*, to oblige him to check that Fury. But when *Lauſus* lay extended at his Feet, a Son who died for his Father, the

Conſideration of his Merit and Vertue, a Vertue ſo like his own, prevail'd upon *Æneas* to deſcend to Compaſſion, by bringing to his Mind the ſad Remembrance of his own filial Affection.

And thus I hope it has been clearly ſhewn, that the Valour of *Æneas* is in its Nature a debonair and a temperate Valour, and that there is nothing done by him in the tenth *Æneid*, that may be ſaid to be contradictory of this, but that every thing there is very conſiſtent with that tranſcendent Goodneſs of Nature which is the fundamental Quality of his Character, and that this Quality at the Death of *Lauſus* ſhines out in all its Luſtre.

I had almoſt forgot the Sacrifice of the Captives, but that being a cuſtomary religious Duty, is very conſonant to the Piety of the Hero; and is by no means contrary to his Goodneſs of Nature; which, as we have ſhewn above, is nothing but a Habit of right Reaſon, which can never be contrary to a Religious Duty.

In the twelfth Book, though Horrour and Diſtraction reign almoſt throughout it, *Æneas* does nothing that is inconſiſtent with his natural Sedateneſs of Valour, and with his excellent Goodneſs of Nature. When *Virgil* ſpeaks of the Preparatives for the ſingle Combat, he tells you of *Turnus*, that he is meerly poſſeſt by Fury. *His agitur furiis.* But when he ſpeaks of *Æneas*, he tells you that he rowzes the Sedateneſs of his natural

tural Valour by Anger, *se ſuſcitat irâ*; but it is an Anger that is perfectly obedient to Reaſon. He is angry with *Turnus* alone: For after the *Latins* had broke the ſecond League with him, he does what he can to reſtrain his *Trojans*, and endeavours to ſpare his Enemies whom he regarded now as his Subjects. *Lib.* 12. *v.* 311.

At pius Æneas dextram tendebat inermem,
Nudato capite, atque ſuos clamore vocabat.
Quo ruitis? quæve iſta repens diſcordia ſurgit?
O cohibete iras! ictum jam fœdus, & omnes
Compoſitæ leges: mihi jus concurrere ſoli.
Me ſinite, atque auferte metus, ego fœdora faxo
Firma manu: Turnum jam debent hæc mihi ſacra.

And upon his Return to the Field after the Cure of the dangerous Wound he had receiv'd, he is not yet provok'd, either to attack the fighting *Italians*, or to purſue the flying. *ibid. v.* 464.

Ipſe neque adverſos dignatur ſternere morti:
Nec pede congreſſos, nec equo, nec tela ferentes
Inſequitur: ſolum denſa in caligine Turnum
Veſtigat luſtrans, ſolum in certamina poſcit.

But when he ſaw that *Turnus* avoided him, and that the reſt aſſaulted him, ſome by Treachery, and ſome by Violence, and that he had like to have been wounded a ſecond time by *Meſſapus*, after he had call'd the Gods to witneſs that he was compell'd to

this, he thought it fitting to give up the Reins to Fury, and made havock of the *Latins*, and the *Rutilians* with undiſtinguiſhing Slaughter. *Ibid. v.* 494.

Tum verò aſſurgunt iræ, inſidiiſque ſubactus
Diverſos ubi ſenſit equos, currumque referri,
Multa Jovem, & læſi teſtatus fœderis aras
Jam tandem invadit medios, & Marte ſecundo
Terribilis, ſævam nullo diſcrimine cædem
Suſcitat, irarumque omnes effundit habenas.

So that it is plain, that in all this there is nothing contrary, either to his natural Sedateneſs of Valour, or to his admirable Goodneſs of Nature.

But it is objected to him, that he kills *Turnus* after he had ſubmitted himſelf to him, and beg'd his Life. 'Tis true, indeed, ſay the Criticks, the Death of *Turnus* was abſolutely neceſſary for the Integrity of the Action. But the Poet ſhould have brought it about by a Way, that would not have corrupted the Unity of *Æneas* his Character, nor have deſtroyed his Goodneſs of Nature.

This, ſay the Criticks; but yet upon Enquiry, I hope to find that the Poet has done what they with Reaſon exact of him. For if it appears that *Æneas* had Reaſon to kill the *Rutilian*, notwithſtanding his Submiſſion, then he ſhew'd no ill Nature in doing it. For Goodneſs of Nature is nothing but Rightneſs of Reaſon. *Turnus* indeed, with all

all his ill Qualities, had a great deal of Merit. And therefore it was but reasonable that *Æneas* should be seen to relent upon his Submission. He does relent, but kills him notwithstanding.

Stetit acer in armis
Æneas, volvens oculos, dextramq; repressit,
Et jam jamq; magis cunctantem flectere sermo
Caperat ;

Æneas kills him for his own Security, because he could not confide in him. For he had broken two Leagues already. This has been urg'd in the Defence of *Virgil*, but this can never defend him. For *Turnus* never gave his Consent, either to the making the first League, which was never perfected, or to the breaking the second. And further, if *Æneas* had given *Turnus* his Life, the *Rutilian* would have had an Obligation upon him which he had not before. But supposing *Æneas* could not confide in him: That Consideration had not been altogether becoming of the Magnanimity of a Hero. *Virgil* saw this very well, and therefore he makes his Hero kill him to revenge the Death of *Pallas*. But here lay two Difficulties in the Way. For first, the Hero at such a Conjuncture might be reasonably thought to be too much concern'd to think of the Death of *Pallas*. Secondly, the Question might be very well ask'd, Where the indispensable Obligation lay

to

to revenge the Death of *Pallas* by the Death of *Turnus*? *Virgil* has remov'd both these Difficulties with incomparable Address. He has provided for the putting his Hero in mind in the Middle of his tenth Book, by making *Turnus* wear the Spoils of *Pallas*. *Lib.* 10. *v.* 495.

——Et lævo pressit pede, talia fatus,
Exanimem; rapiens immania pondera baltei,
Quo nunc Turnus ovat spolio, gaudetq; potitus

And the Poet gives you a Hint of his Design, even in that very Place, and gives us Cause to reflect that he does not make *Turnus* wear the Belt of *Pallas* for nothing. For the Time, says he, is coming, when *Turnus* shall curse both the Day and the Spoyls, and the Action. *Ibid. v.* 503.

Turno tempus erit, magno cum optaverat emptum.
Intactum Pallanta, & cum spolia ista, diemq;
Oderit.

And accordingly we see, at the latter End of the twelfth Book, that the wearing of this very Belt is the Cause of the Death of *Turnus*. *lib.* 12. *v.* 940.

Et jam jamq; magis cunctantem flectere sermo
Cœperat, infelix humero cum apparuit alto,
Balteus, & notis fulserunt cingula bullis
Pallantis pueri, victum quem vulnere Turnus

Stra-

Straverat, atque humeris inimicum inſigne gere-
Ille occulis poſtquam ſævi monumenta doloris (bat.
Exuviaſque hauſit, furiis accenſus, & ira
Terribilis : Tune hinc ſpoliis indute meorum
Eripiare mihi? Pallas te hoc vulnere, Pallas
Immolat, & pœnam ſcelerato ex ſanguine ſumit.

But let us come to the ſecond Difficulty, where lay the indiſpenſable Obligation of revenging the Death of *Pallas*, by the Death of *Turnus?* And here, in Excuſe of *Virgil*, I could urge his own Expreſſion, *Immolat*. By which he ſeems to hint, that his Hero look'd upon the killing *Turnus* as a religious Duty, and thought himſelf obliged to ſacrifice him to the *Manes* of *Pallas*. But there is ſtill a more juſt and unexceptionable Anſwer. And here ſee the admirable Addreſs of *Virgil*, who, as we have obſerv'd in ſo many Places always, makes his Religion contribute to the working up of his Deſign. For the funeral Pomp of *Pallas*, in the Beginning of the eleventh Book, by reaſon of the Meſſage which *Evander* ſends back by the Mourners, not only prepares, but juſtifies the Death of *Turnus*. *lib.* 11. *v.* 175.

Vadite, & hæc memores regi mandate referte :
Quod vitam moror, inviſam, Pallante perempto,
Dextera cauſa tua eſt, Turnum gnatoq; patriq;
Quam debere vides : meritis vacat hic tibi ſolus
Fortunæque locus :

The

The Sight of the Belt which put *Æneas* in mind of the Death of *Pallas*, could not but remind him of the Meſſage too of *Evander*. And conſequently, he had Reaſon to think, that if after the Receit of ſuch a Meſſage, he ſuffer'd *Turnus* to live after he had him in his Power, he ſhould not only ſave a Man, of whom he could not be ſecure, but diſoblige *Evander*, to whom he had great Obligations, and make the *Arcadians* his Enemies, and give ſufficient Cauſe to the *Etrurians* to look upon him as an ungrateful Perſon. So that Duty and Intereſt both conſpired in *Æneas*, to animate and determine him to the Death of *Turnus*.

And thus I have endeavour'd to ſhew that the Valour of *Æneas* is of it ſelf ſedate, and always conſiſtent with right Reaſon, that is, with good Nature: And conſequently, that it very much differs from that of *Turnus*, which is always outragious and ungovernable. We are now to ſhew that the Valour of *Mezentius* is clearly diſtinguiſh'd from the Valour of the *Rutilian*, and from that of the *Trojan* Hero.

Æneas had a Valour, that of it ſelf was ſedate and temperate, and was always attended with good Nature. The Courage of *Turnus* was joyn'd with Fury, yet accompanied with Generoſity and with Greatneſs of Mind. *Mezentius* has a ſavage and a cruel Courage. He has no Fury, but then he has Fierceneſs which is a Habit and not a Paſſion, and nothing but the Effect of Fury cool'd

cool'd into a very keen Hatred, and an inveterate Malice. *Turnus* ſeems to fight to appeaſe his Anger, *Mezentius* to ſatisfie his Revenge, and his Malice, and his barbarous Thirſt of Blood. *Mezentius* is mentioned once in the Seventh, and twice in the ninth Book, without ſo much as a Word that may ſerve to expreſs Anger in him. It is true, when *Evander* mentions him in the eighth; he does uſe the Word *furens*. *lib.* 8. *v.* 489.

At feſſi tandem cives infanda furentem
Armati circumſiſtunt.

But there it is plainly us'd in a metaphorical Senſe. *Turnus* goes into the Field with Grief.

—Duris dolor oſſibus ardet.

Which, as *Ariſtotle* ſays in his Rhetorick, alwâys accompanies Anger, Ἔχω δὲ ἡ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινομένης, whereas *Mezentius* deſtroys with a barbarous Joy. *lib.* 10. *v.* 721.

Impaſtus ſtabula alta leo ceu ſæpe peragrans
(Suadet enim veſana fames) ſi fortè fugacem (vnm,
Conſpexit capream, aut ſurgentem in cornua cer-
Gaudet hians immane, comaſq; arrexit, & hæret
Viſceribus ſuper incumbens: lavit improba teter
Ora cruor.
Sic ruit in denſos alacer Mezentius hoſtes.

He

He is so far from being subject to Fury, that he is hardly to be provok'd to a common Anger.

He calmly kills *Orodes*, who, when he threatens him with a like Fate, from a more powerful Hand, makes him but half angry. *Ibid. v.* 742.

Ad quem subridens mista Mezentius ira.

Thus it is plain, that he has not the Fury of *Turnus*; and the Poet takes care, in the Beginning of this Episode, to tell you, that he has Barbarity, which is peculiar to himself. For he gives us an Image of him, than which, nothing could more discover a Savage Fierceness. *lib.* 10. *v.* 707.

Ac velut ille canum morsu de montibus altis
Actus aper (multos Vesulus quem pinifer annos
Defendit, multosq; palus Laurentia) sylva
Pastus arundinea, post quam inter retia ventum est,
Substitit, infremuitq; ferox, & inhorruit armos:
Nec cuiquam irasci, propiusve accedere virtus,
Sed jaculis, tutisq; procul clamoribus instant:
Ille autem impavidus partes cunctatur in omnes,
Dentibus infrendens, & tergo, decutit hastas.
Haud aliter, &c.

From all which it is plain, that the Valour of this *Tuscan*, is as different from that of the *Trojan*, as from that of the *Rutilian* Hero, which is the thing we propounded to prove.

And

And thus we have endeavoured to ſhew, that *Virgil* has infinitely a greater Variety than Mr. *Blackmore*, both in his Travels, and Machines, and Councils, and Battels. It remains, that we prove that his Incidents are better diſpos'd. But becauſe we have been already tedious, we ſhall ſpeak but a Word of this.

There is certainly ſomething very tender in the meeting of *Æneas* and *Andromache*, in the third Book, but if that had come immediately after the Paſſion of *Dido*, where the Pity is beyond Compariſon ſtronger, it would have appear'd to be down-right inſipid, whereas in the Place where it is, it admirably prepares us for that Paſſion. For the very ſame Reaſon, if the funeral Games had imediately ſucceeded the Deſtruction of *Troy*, they would have been very flat. For thoſe Games being Contentions for Victory, and conſequently, meer Imitations of War, would have made but a very faint Impreſſion upon us, if they had immediately ſucceeded the more forcible Images of the thing which they imitate. Whereas, ſucceeding the Paſſion of *Dido*, they prove both diverting and admirable. From what I have ſaid, I hope the Reader will be convinced that Mr. *Blackmore*'s Horſe-race, in the ninth Book, comes ſomething indiſcreetly after the Battel of the eighth. But if any one ſhall urge, that it immediately ſucceeds the pathetick Lamentation of *Cador* for the Death of *Macor*; to that I anſwer, that neither *Macor* nor

Cador

Cador having any Characters, the Lamentation of the latter can excite but a weak Compaſſion, as ſhall be ſhewn anon. Whereas the funeral Games of *Virgil* coming immediately after our Minds have been for a long time ſhaken by the wonderful Paſſion of *Dido*, are abſolutely neceſſary to recreate and to divert us. But now let us ſhew that the Incidents contain'd in Mr. *Blackmore*'s Narration to diſcerning Readers are not at all ſurprizing.

CHAP.

Æneas, when he aſſum'd this Reſolution, was on the Battlements of the Palace of *Priam* employed in its Defence, from whence he had ſeen, not only the King, but the reſt of the Royal Family, either ſlain or made Captives. Nevertheleſs, he could not tell, but that the *Trojans* might have rallied in ſome other Place, and might have been more ſucceſsful.

Now, it is the Duty of every one to prefer his Country to his own Family, and to defend it to the very laſt. At the ſame time there was a Neceſſity for the Hero's returning to his own Houſe; without which, the preſerving *Aſcanius* from the *Grecian* Power any longer, would have offended Probability, and he not being preſerv'd, the Deſign of the Hero had been deſtroy'd, which was the re-eſtabliſhing the Family of *Priam* in a foreign Country. What then had the Poet to do in this Caſe? Why, he was oblig'd to find out ſome Method, to ſatisfie *Æneas*, and to convince his Readers, that the former had done his Duty. And this he has extreamly well brought about by the Reſolution of *Æneas* to kill *Helen*. For that gives an Occaſion for the Introduction of *Venus*, who had *Helen* under her Protection, and who ſatisfies her Son, that it was not ſo much *Paris*, or the invidious Beauty of *Helen*, as it was the Inclemency of the Gods that deſtroy'd *Ilium*.

Non tibi Tyndaridis facies inviſa Lacænæ,
Culpatuve Paris, Divom inclementia Divom
Has evertit opes, ſternitq; à culmine Trojam.

And it was not only a Faction of Divinities, which was the Caſe during the Siege, but the moſt conſiderable of them all, and even the King of the Gods himſelf; who, till then, had always been neutral.

Ipſe Pater Danais animos viresque ſecundas
Sufficit, ipſe Deos in Dardana ſuſcitat arma.

And ſhe does not only tell him this, ſhe makes him behold it. He ſees the majeſtick Figures of the Gods imployed in the raiſing the City, and knows that it would be impious to fight againſt thoſe. Thus the Poet makes the reſt of the *Trojans* yield to the *Grecians*, but his Hero ſubmits to the Gods alone.

'Tis true indeed, after all *Venus* might have been made to deſcend, without the Reſolution of the Hero to kill *Helen*; but how very little artful that would have been, the judicious Reader will eaſily diſcern.

ANNOT.

Annotation.

Fracti Bello fatiſq; repulſi;
Ductores Danaum, &c.

Page 24.

THAT this is the very Beginning of the Action, is apparent from the Requeſt that *Dido* makes to *Æneas* in the latter End of the firſt Book.

Imo age, & à prima dic hoſpes origine noti
Inſidias inquit Danaum caſuſq; tuorum.

And here we may ſee another End, to which the Hero's Deſign upon *Helen*, conduces. For it ſerves to make the Beginning of the Action probable. For notwithſtanding the artful Speech of *Sinon*, and the extream Addreſs of the Poet, we ſhould have been very much ſhock'd at the Credulity of the *Trojans* who were no Strangers to the Craft of *Ulyſſes*, if they had receiv'd the wooden Horſe into their City only upon *Sinon*'s Word. This the Poet ſaw very well, and therefore made uſe of the Prodigy which follows, of the two Serpents that ſwum from *Tenedos*, and kill'd *Laocoon* and his two Sons, and afterwards went and lay under the Image of *Pallas*, to whom *Sinon* had pretended that the Horſe was conſecrated,

which *Laocoon* had violated by the Caſt of his Spear. Now the Reſolution of *Æneas* to kill *Helen*, by bringing down *Venus*, makes this Prodigy probable; for *Venus* ſhews her Son the Figures of the Gods employed in raſing the City, and *Pallas* among the reſt of them.

Jam ſummas arces, Tritonia (reſpice) Pallas
Inſedit, nimbo effulgens & Gorgone ſæva.

Since therefore it is plain, that this Goddeſs was concern'd in the Deſtruction of the City, we may very well believe that ſhe was likewiſe concern'd in the carrying on the Deſign of it, and directed the Serpents: and it is the more reaſonable to believe this, becauſe the *Grecians*, after their Stratagem had taken effect, could have deſtroyed the City without her, whereas her Aſſiſtance appears to have been abſolutely neceſſary for the carrying on the Deſign.

AN-

Annotation.

Which has made me almoſt inclin'd to think.

Page 24.

NOT having Time to go through my intended Method, I deſign to give my Reaſons in this Place, why I believe Mr. *Blackmore* writ the ſecond and third Books of his Poem, before he had any Thoughts of writing the whole Poem; the Verſes in theſe two Books are of a different Character from thoſe of the reſt of the Poem. For there are more good Verſes in theſe two than in any four of the reſt; and there is more of the Pathetick in them, than there is in all the reſt of the Poem. For in ſome Places of them, there appears to be ſomething terrible, whereas that Paſſion is but very faintly mov'd, throughout the reſt of the Poem.

Secondly, theſe two Books have nothing to do with the reſt of the Poem. They are entire without that, as that is without them, as intire as it is with them.

Thirdly, there are ſeveral things in this pretended Relation of Prince *Arthur* to *Hoel*, of which Prince *Arthur* could have no Knowledge, as the *Carteſian* Syſtem, Illuminations, Fireworks, *&c.* and conſequently, they

could not be deſign'd for the Mouth of this *Britiſh* Hero.

It will be objected to this, that Prince *Arthur* had this Account of *Chaos*, and the Creation, by Viſion and Revelation, as he aſſures *Hoel*, at the End of the firſt Book, and that therefore he might be inform'd by thoſe, of what he could not know of himſelf.

To this I anſwer, that this ſtill confirms what I endeavour to prove, and makes the pretended Relation more extravagant. For never has there been ſuch a Viſion, or ſuch a Revelation known. It is a Viſion of ſomething a long time paſt, and a Revelation of ſomething reaſonable. Now every Viſion is either of ſomething but juſt paſt, which cannot be otherwiſe known, by reaſon of the Diſtance of Place, or of ſomething to come. For every Viſion, is to acquaint the Perſon who has that Viſion with ſomething which could not be conveyed to him by a natural Way. For a Viſion is a Miracle, and God never does that by a Miracle, which he can do by the ordinary courſe of Nature; becauſe that would be to argue him changeable, and to derogate from his infinite Wiſdom. Now the Knowledge of any thing which has been a long time paſt, can be convey'd, if God ſees it neceſſary by a natural Way, and that is by Hiſtory or Tradition. The Account of the Creation was deliver'd down to *Moſes* by Tradition, and tranſmitted by Hiſtory from him to us. If it had not been con-

conveyed to us thus, what Occaſion was there for a Revelation to acquaint *Arthur* or *Hoel* that God created the World when every Man ſees it by the Light of Nature? To make God have Recourſe to a Miracle for the revealing that which every Man knows already, or which every Man at leaſt may know without a Miracle, is to be impious, and to make him act abſurdly. But if Mr. *Blackmore* anſwers, that this Revelation was not to inform *Arthur* or *Hoel* of the thing, but to inſtruct them in the Manner how; I anſwer, that this Manner how, was not at all neceſſary to Mr. *Blackmore*'s Deſign, which is the making *Hoel* a Chriſtian. For a Man may be a very good Chriſtian, and yet a very bad natural Philoſopher. I would fain know which of the Apoſtles underſtood the *Carteſian* Syſtem. And I cannot, for my Life, comprehend, why God, who did not think it neceſſary to reveal it, either to St. *Peter*, or to St. *Paul*, ſhould reveal it to *Arthur* and *Hoel*. Since therefore this Viſion and this Revelation, are ſo improbable on every ſide, and ſo abſurd on moſt, we ought to conclude, that Mr. *Blackmore* had Recourſe to them, as very bad, yet the only Means to tack the pretended Relation of *Arthur* to the reſt of the Work. But,

Fourthly, No Man ever writ an Epick Poem, without writing Verſes preluding to it. No one can doubt of that. Since then Mr. *Blackmore* did write Verſes before he thought of Prince *Arthur*, and ſince we ne-

ver ſaw any Verſes of his before the Heroick Poem appear'd, and we have ſhewn that the pretended Relation of *Arthur* is of a different Character from the reſt of the Poem; and a thing entire by it ſelf, and that there are ſeveral things in it which are very abſurd, as they are tack'd to the reſt of the Work; and which would be reaſonable enough if the pretended Relation had been publiſhed by it ſelf, we have very good probable Grounds to conclude, that the Verſes included in that Relation, are ſome of thoſe which were writ before Mr. *Blackmore* thought of writing Prince *Arthur*.

Annotation.

But he was afraid of miſſing the Rites of Funeral.

Page 24.

THAT which is ſo often ſaid to excuſe *Æneas* his Fear in the firſt of the *Æneis*, which is, that he was afraid of miſſing the Rites of Funeral, without which there was no ferrying over the *Stygian* Lake, ſeems to me to be invalid. For *Æneas*, in the Relation that he makes to *Dido* of the Deſtruction of *Troy*, makes *Anchiſes*, when they urg'd him to depart, adviſe his Son and Daughter-in-law to make their Eſcape, but that

that for his own part, he was resolv'd to dye upon the Place; *As for the want of a Funeral*, says he, *that is but a Trifle.*

——*Facilis jactura sepulcri.*

Which he speaks as if he design'd to obviate an Objection that he believ'd his Son might make; which looks as if *Anchises* thought it without Consequence, and *Æneas*, by repeating it, as his Father's Opinion, appears to be of the same Mind too. What shall we say then, that *Æneas* did not know that Souls, whose Bodies were unburied, were denied the Passage of the infernal River, till the *Sybill*, upon his Descent to Hell, shew'd him the Ghosts that were hovering upon the hithermost Banks of *Styx*, and amongst the rest, some of his own Friends, as *Leucaspis*, *Orontes*, and *Palinurus*. Indeed, she speaks as if she made a Discovery to him.

Hi, quos vehit unda, sepulti.
Nec ripas datur horrendas, & rauca fluenta
Transportare prius quam sedibus ossa quierunt;
Centum errant annos, volitanq; hæc littora circum.

But then we meet with a terrible Difficulty at the latter End of the fifth Book. For when *Æneas* saw that *Palinurus* was lost, after fetching a deep Sigh, and appearing very much disturb'd at the deplorable Accident, he ends the Book with the two following

lowing Verſes which are ſo admirable for the Pathetick.

Heu nimium Cœlo & Pelago confiſe ſereno
Nudus in ignotâ Palinure jacebis arenâ.

Where we may obſerve that *Æneas* does not lament the Death of *Palinurus*, but only his want of Funeral.

Nudus in ignotâ, &c.

From whence it is plain, that *Æneas* knew the Conſequence of it: For elſe theſe Verſes which are now ſo extreamly pathetick, would ſhew a very great Weakneſs in the Hero, and conſequently, a very great Abſurdity in the Poet, and would neither be conſonant to good Senſe, nor the Nature of true Compaſſion: It being undeniable, that the want of a Funeral, conſider'd in it ſelf, and without any Conſequence, is but a Trifle, compar'd to the Calamity of a ſudden untimely Death. *Æneas* therefore, as was ſaid above, knew the Conſequence of this want of Funeral before his Deſcent to Hell; and the *Sybill* only told him this, to remind him, upon the Sight of the Ghoſts that were flocking to the Banks of *Styx*: What then can be ſaid to the Paſſage in the ſecond Book,

——— *Facilis jactura ſepulcri.*

The

The only reaſonable Anſwer that I can make to it is this, That *Æneas* and *Anchiſes* both knew and believed that all, who had any Excellence above the reſt of Mankind, and were of divine Extraction, were exempted from the common Fate. When *Æneas* deſires the *Sybill*, in the ſixth Book, to be his Guide to the infernal Regions, he tells her, that he might undoubtedly take this Journey, ſince there had been Perſons who had done it before him, and that he had the ſame Qualification that they had.

Si potuit manes, acceſſere conjugis Orpheus,
Threiciâ fretus citharâ fidibuſq; canoris.
Si fratrem Pollux alternâ Morte redemit,
Itque reditq; viam toties, quid Theſea, magnum
Quid memorem Alciden? & mi genus ab Jove
ſummo.

Where we ſee that all, whom he mentioned, were Perſons who had ſome Excellence above the reſt of his Contemporaries, and were of divine Extraction. The *Sybill* makes anſwer to him, that very few had been able to do what he deſir'd.

Pauci quos æquus amavit
Jupiter, aut ardens evexit ad Æthera virtus
Diis geniti potuere.

And

And thoſe few had been Perſons of extraordinary Virtues, and of divine Original.

And afterwards, when *Æneas* and the *Sybil* approach'd the Banks of the River, *Charon* ſays to them,

Nec vero Alciden me ſum lætatus euntem
Accepiſſe lacu, nec Theſea Perithoumq;
Diis quamquam geniti atq; invicti viribus eſſent:

I was not well pleas'd with carrying over Hercules, *nor the two Friends, though they were Heroes all, and all of divine Extraction.*

From whence it appears, that ſince *Æneas* knew, that Perſons of extraordinary Virtue, and of divine Extraction, had paſs'd and repaſs'd the River of Hell without ſo much as dying, which was denyed to others; he might very well believe, that they might paſs it once for all, without the Rites of Funeral, though it was denyed to others.

ANNOTATION.

Conſiſts of needleſs and trifling Deſcriptions.

Of Deſcriptions.

Page 146.

IN ſpeaking of Deſcriptions, I ſhall endeavour to explain *Boſſu*, whoſe Inſtructions concerning this matter, are neither ſo full nor clear as to be underſtood by every one.

Deſcriptions in Heroick Poetry are either of Action, and that if it is long, is call'd Narration, if it be ſhort painting; or of the Circumſtances of Action, as Time, Place, *&c.* or of Perſons. It is neceſſary to declare, that by Deſcription here we do not mean Narration, of which we have treated apart: The Deſcriptions which we ſpeak of here, are but Parts of that which we call Narration. Nothing requires more Judgment than to write them as they ſhould be. He who writes an Heroick Poem, is not to make Deſcriptions, only becauſe he has a mind to it, or to indulge the Wantonneſs of an extravagant Fancy. Deſcriptions in an epick Poem are only for the Action, and the Action is only for the Moral. The Poet is to make all the Haſte that he poſſibly can with good ſpeed, to the End of his Action, which is the Praiſe

Praiſe that *Horace* has given to *Homer*; becauſe till we come to the End, we can never have the main Inſtruction. He ought indeed to make his Narration as pleaſing as he can, becauſe Pleaſure ſerves to the making us attentive to the Action, and tends to the imprinting it upon our Minds more ſtrongly; For we always remember a long time, that which has very much pleaſed us. But he is to conſider at the ſame time, that the Pleaſure which he gives us, is only for the Inſtruction, and therefore he ought to give us ſuch a Sort of a Pleaſure, as may not hinder or divert the Inſtruction, either by digreſſing from the Action, or by confining our Attentions too long to a Part of it. From whence it follows, that Deſcriptions in an Epick Poem, are never to be made, unleſs they appear to be neceſſary, and they can never be neceſſary only upon two Accounts. Firſt, when they are requiſite to give us a reaſonable account of ſome Part of the Action, in order to the making it probable. Secondly, when they ſerve to imprint ſome important Circumſtance upon our Minds more ſtrongly. But when they are thus neceſſary, they ought to be ſhort, not only for the Reaſons which we have mentioned above, but becauſe otherwiſe they would have a quite contrary Effect to that for which they are deſigned. For if they grow tedious and cloy us, inſtead of imprinting what they deſcribe more ſtrongly on us, they infallibly ſerve to make us for-

forget it. For a great Man has obſerv'd, that we are never ſo likely to forget things, as when we are weary of hearing them. Thus it appears from what we have ſaid, that Deſcriptions are never to be made, but when they are neceſſary, and then too they are to be ſhort. But beſides all this, they are to be accommodated to the Character of an Epick Poem in general, and of the Place where they are ſet in particular.

Firſt, They are to be accommodated to the Character of an Epick Poem in general. Now the Character of an Epick Poem in general, is Gravity, Elevation, and Majeſty. For the firſt of theſe creates an Aw in us, and is therefore abſolutely neceſſary to a Law-giver, and ſuch is the Writer of every lawful Poem; and as the firſt of theſe three cauſes a Reverence in us, ſo the two laſt produce Admiration, which ought to reign every where in an Epick Poem, for Reaſons which we have mention'd above. The Deſcriptions then in an Epick Poem, ought to be grave, majeſtick, and elevated. Indeed, they ought not all to be exalted alike; but yet not one of them is to be cold and creeping, they are all of them to have Fire in a greater or leſs Degree, and they are all to have a great and a noble Air. From whence it follows, that they ought all of them to be above Point, and that which we call Conceit, which are always cold, and little and low and wanton, and infinitely below the

the Gravity and Majeſty of the greater Poetry. Now, as Deſcriptions ought to be free from theſe, ſo they ought never to deſcribe any trifling Circumſtances of the Objects which they preſent to us. Every thing that they mention, ought to be great and important; not only that they may be adapted to the grave and majeſtick Character of the Poem; but that they may be ſubſervient to one of the two Ends, for which Deſcriptions are neceſſary. And as the Circumſtances which they mention, ought to be great, ſo they are ſtill to proceed from a great to a more important Circumſtance, or elſe the Reader finds an Anticlimax, than which nothing can be more injudicious in Poetry. For that which is great and ſtrong in it ſelf, may appear to be little and weak, when it comes after ſomething which is greater and ſtronger. From whence it is evident, that it is ill manag'd when it is thus out of its Place, and ſhews an apparent Defect in Judgment.

But Deſcriptions are not only to be accommodated to the Character of the Epick Poem in General, they are to be adapted to the Character of the Place where they are in particular; and if that Place is pathetick, they are to exalt the very ſame Paſſion that reigns there. As for Example, if the Place where the Deſcription is, appears to be deſign'd for the exciting Terrour, the Deſcription is to tend to the raiſing that Paſſion, for which it is very proper, as that Paſſion is extreamly

treamly proper for Epick Poetry. For Terrour always includes Admiration; ſince we always, in ſome Meaſure, admire that, with which we are very much terrified. Now, if a Poet would heighthen Terrour by Deſcription, he is to examine all the terrible Circumſtances of the Object which he deſcribes, of which he is to chooſe the moſt terrible, and thoſe which are moſt capable of imprinting that Object very ſtrongly in our Minds, and of theſe he is to preſent firſt to us that which is leaſt dreadful, and ſo to proceed gradually if the Subject will allow it, to ſomething which is altogether aſtoniſhing and amazing.

Annotation.

Latinus *remain'd in Power and Place after the ſingle Combat. But firſt he had never.*

Page 33.

Virgil takes ſeveral Occaſions to mark the Inclination that *Latinus* had to *Æneas*, and his Averſion to the Proceedings of *Turnus*. The Reader may conſult the ſeventh *Æneid*, from the 250. Verſe, to the two hundred and eighty fifth. And afterwards in the ſame Book he remains a long time deaf to the Clamours of thoſe who urge

him to declare War. And when he is able to hold out no longer, he proteſts againſt the Proceedings of *Amata* and *Turnus*, and lets go the Reins of the Government. All which the Reader may ſee from the 575. to the 600th Verſe. And afterwards, in the eleventh Book, he feels Remorſe of Conſcience for not having made a ſtronger Effort to marry his Daughter to *Æneas*, in ſpight of his Wife and *Turnus*, *v.* 470.

Multaſq; ſe incuſat qui non acceperit ultro.
Dardanium Æneam generumq; aſciverit urbi.

And in the 12. he feels this Remorſe again, and makes the ſame Accuſation againſt himſelf. *v.* 650.

Annotation.

The pious Prince is afraid for his People.

Page the 70.

THAT is not the beſt Excuſe that can be made for Prince *Arthur*, but is a Miſtake that ſlipt from me in the Hurry of writing this Treatiſe.

An-

Annotation.

Secondly, that ſuppoſing Æneas *was afraid.*

Page the 79.

HEre was ſomething left out in the Copy through the Hurry of writing. All this, to the Bottom of the next Page, is ſpoken by thoſe who endeavour to defend the Fear of *Æneas* (of which the Reader is not adviſ'd ſoon enough.) It is my Opinion, that a better Excuſe may be made for the Fear of Prince *Arthur*, than for that of *Æneas*, ſuppoſing them both afraid. A Man who conſiders the Differences of their Religions muſt eaſily conſent to that, but then it is my Opinion, that the *Trojan* was not afraid.

Annotation.

A Man muſt affirm ſomething, or elſe he ſays nothing.

Page 158.

EVery Negative includes an Affirmative.

AN-

Annotation.

Which can never be contrary to a religious Duty.

Page 166.

Right Reason may be contrary to the Doctrine of some Religions, but when a Man once is convinc'd of that, it is certainly most reasonable to do the Duties that are taught by it.

Annotation.

That neither Macor *nor* Cador *having any Characters.*

Page 175.

This was a Mistake occasion'd by my Dispatch. *Macor* seems to be better distinguish'd than most of Mr. *Blackmore*'s poetical Persons; but it is not a Character proper for the exciting Compassion.

FINIS.